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Abstract
The research presented in this thesis aimed to investigate digital watermarking
to provide a systematic way for designing, analysing, and applying it, with a
particular focus on medical image security. Digital watermarking is an evolving
technology and has showed great promise to complement the security protection of
image data depicting natural scenes or medical phenomena. Medical images have
been selected here as an area of watermarking application, since they represent
a key component of modern health care services. With the remote access and
distribution, they are also subject to growing security threats with legal and
ethical complexities, which the digital watermarking has the potential to address.
However, despite its great promise, digital watermarking has not been widely
adopted in all potential applications like medical imaging. Existing watermarking
schemes often suffer from technical and security flaws. Validation of the suitability
of those schemes for an application becomes more challenging. One main reason
for these problems is that no standard approach is undertaken for the watermark-
ing application. Particularly, several research gaps have been identified: (i) there
is no known construction of a complete or formal watermarking model that helps
identify and evaluate the state-of-the-art watermarking scheme(s) for an applica-
tion(s); (ii) watermarking properties are not well defined and some of them (e.g .,
robustness, security) are naturally misinterpreted in practice; (iii) security levels
of existing watermarking schemes are mostly unknown; and for medical image
applications, (iv) requirements for the watermarking of medical images are not
well defined; and (v) there is no watermark embedding scheme available which is
equally suitable for different modalities of medical images.
In addressing these gaps, in this research, a number of original contributions
have been made. This research has started with a comprehensive literature re-
view on digital watermarking schemes and their applications, and determined
the requirements for watermarking of medical images. A novel generic formal
watermarking model for digital image applications has then been developed. Us-
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ing that model, a set of fundamental watermarking properties has been formally
defined. A set of expected attack models in digital image application scenarios
has also been developed.
Using the presented watermarking model, an important case of watermarking
schemes (called self-authentication schemes) have also been analysed to determine
their security levels. A self-authentication scheme aims to authenticate the con-
tent of a watermarked image, and to detect and recover any possible alterations
using the self-embedded watermark. Three new counterfeiting attack models have
been developed and validated for the self-authentication schemes. Thereby, the
schemes have been shown to violate the systematic definition of security. The
presented attacks capture all possible counterfeiting instances in three levels of
modifications of a valid watermarked image. For defending against these attacks,
a set of requirements has been determined and a new self-authentication model
has been developed.
Moreover, in support of developing a self-authentication scheme for medical
image applications according to the presented self-authentication model, a novel
watermark embedding scheme is developed, which avoids the limitations of ex-
isting embedding schemes. Further, a new watermarking capacity control model
is developed to determine the computational efficiency of watermarking schemes
and validated using their asymptotic analysis. Experimental results demonstrate
that the novel embedding scheme has higher capacity-distortion performance and
more efficient capacity control ability (which conforms to the new capacity control
model) than prominent existing schemes. Being irreversible and general RONI
(region of non-interest) based, this novel scheme would help provide continuous
security protection and minimize legal-ethical impacts, and thereby has the po-
tential to be commercially viable in the future for medical image applications.
This research advances knowledge in the area of digital image watermarking
and its applications. The presented novel generic formal watermarking model
and formal definitions of the fundamental watermarking properties and possible
attacks, are the foundation of a unified and intuitive watermarking theory. The
generic watermarking model would also allow a unified treatment of all practically
meaningful variants of digital image watermarking schemes. The developed new
counterfeiting attack models and their utilization for complete security analysis
of self-authentication schemes can be used as principles to determine the secu-
rity levels of other watermarking schemes. The presented new self-authentication
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model would help develop more secure self-authentication scheme. Additionally,
the presented watermark embedding scheme for medical images and its validation
has created a new efficient embedding approach, which can be used for different
applications such as content authentication, tampering detection and localiza-
tion, and annotation. Further, it is anticipated that the generalized notion of
watermarking capacity control and the use of asymptotic analysis for studying
computational aspects of watermarking schemes would create a new era in wa-
termarking research.
In summary, the findings, theoretical developments and analyses, and experi-
mental evidence of this research represent a comprehensive source of information,
which can be assimilated and disseminated towards standardizing future research
in the formal modelling, complete security analysis and computational aspects,
of watermarking schemes.
v

Contents
Abstract iii
List of Figures xiii
List of Tables xvii
List of Models xix
List of Abbreviations xxi
Statement of Original Authorship xxiii
Acknowledgements xxvii
Chapter 1 Introduction 1
1.1 Motivation and Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.2 Research Objectives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
1.3 Research Questions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
1.4 Research Scope . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
1.5 Research Outcomes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
1.6 Research Significance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
1.7 Thesis Organization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Chapter 2 Watermarking for Medical Image Security 17
2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
2.2 Digital Image Watermarking . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
2.2.1 Advantages of Watermarking . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
2.2.2 Design and Evaluation Criteria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
2.2.3 Limitations of Conventional Security Measures . . . . . . . 26
2.2.4 Watermarking vs. Other Security Measures/Tools . . . . . 31
vii
Contents
2.3 Medical Image Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
2.3.1 Overview of Security Standards . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
2.3.2 General Security Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
2.3.3 Expected Threats and Their Security Measures . . . . . . 39
2.4 Watermarking Schemes for Medical Images . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
2.5 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
2.6 Chapter Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
Chapter 3 Watermarking Model, Properties and Attacks 47
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
3.2 Current State of Watermarking Models . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
3.3 A Novel Formal Generic Watermarking Model . . . . . . . . . . . 56
3.3.1 Construction of a Basic Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
3.3.2 Towards a Complete Formal Watermarking Model . . . . . 61
3.3.3 A Comparative Study of the Formal Model . . . . . . . . . 64
3.4 Formal Definitions of Watermarking Properties . . . . . . . . . . 65
3.4.1 Perceptual Similarity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
3.4.2 Visibility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
3.4.3 Blindness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
3.4.4 Invertibility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
3.4.5 Robustness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
3.4.6 Embedding Capacity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
3.4.7 Error Probability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
3.4.8 Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
3.5 Formal Models of Watermarking Security Attacks . . . . . . . . . 77
3.5.1 Active Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
3.5.2 System Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
3.5.3 Passive Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
3.6 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
3.7 Chapter Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
Chapter 4 Security Analysis of Watermarking Schemes 87
4.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
4.2 Watermarking Security and Robustness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
4.2.1 Research Trends and Overall Status . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
4.2.2 Problems in Individual Schemes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
viii
Contents
4.2.3 Fundamental Problem Realization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
4.2.4 Guidelines for Security and Robustness Assessment . . . . 95
4.3 Analysis of Self-Authentication Schemes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
4.3.1 Weaknesses of the Self-Authentication Schemes . . . . . . 98
4.3.2 Counterfeiting Attacks on the Self-Authentication Schemes 100
4.3.3 General Model of the Self-Authentication Schemes . . . . . 102
4.4 New Counterfeiting Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
4.4.1 Mapping Sequence Recovery Method, Getmap . . . . . . . 106
4.4.2 Counterfeiting Attack 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
4.4.3 Counterfeiting Attack 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
4.4.4 Counterfeiting Attack 3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
4.5 Applicability of the Counterfeiting Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
4.5.1 The ZF Scheme . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
4.5.2 The ESC Scheme . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116
4.5.3 Implementation of the Proposed Attacks . . . . . . . . . . 117
4.6 Experimental Results and Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118
4.7 Countermeasures Against the Counterfeiting Attacks . . . . . . . 124
4.7.1 Requirements for Self-Authentication Schemes . . . . . . . 125
4.7.2 How Can Self-Authentication Requirements be Met? . . . 127
4.7.3 A New Self-Authentication Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131
4.8 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133
4.9 Chapter Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136
Chapter 5 Watermarking Application to Medical Images 139
5.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139
5.1.1 Towards Applying the Self-Authentication Model to Medi-
cal Images . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 140
5.1.2 Challenges for Developing an Embedding Scheme . . . . . 142
5.2 State of Medical Image Watermarking . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 143
5.3 Capacity Control and RONI Selection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 148
5.3.1 A New Computationally Efficient Capacity Control Model 148
5.3.2 A New General RONI Selection Approach . . . . . . . . . 150
5.4 A Novel Embedding Scheme for Medical Images . . . . . . . . . . 153
5.4.1 Features of the Embedding Scheme . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153
5.4.2 Implementation of the Embedding Scheme . . . . . . . . . 155
5.4.3 Applicability of the Embedding Scheme . . . . . . . . . . . 158
ix
Contents
5.5 Capacity Control Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 161
5.5.1 Analysis and Improvement of the HLL Scheme . . . . . . 162
5.5.2 Analysis of the Novel Embedding Scheme . . . . . . . . . . 163
5.6 Experimental Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 164
5.6.1 Performance Evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 165
5.6.2 Performance Comparison . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 168
5.6.3 Capacity Control Test . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 170
5.7 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 171
5.8 Chapter Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 175
Chapter 6 Conclusions and Future Research 177
6.1 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 177
6.2 Future Challenges . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 181
Appendices 183
Appendix A Proof of Statements 185
A.1 Statement 4.1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 185
A.2 Statement 4.2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 186
A.3 Statement 4.3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 187
Appendix B Model of ZF Scheme 189
B.1 Watermark Generation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 192
B.2 Watermark Embedding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 193
B.3 Watermark Detection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 194
Appendix C Model of ESC Scheme 197
C.1 Watermark Generation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 202
C.2 Watermark Embedding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 203
C.3 Watermark Detection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 204
Appendix D Peer Reviewed Publications 207
D.1 H. Nyeem, W. Boles, and C. Boyd, Counterfeiting Attacks on
Block-Wise Dependent Fragile Watermarking Schemes, in Pro-
ceedings of the 6th International Conference on Security of Infor-
mation and Networks (SIN'13), ACM, 2013, pp. 8693. . . . . . . 207
x
Contents
D.2 H. Nyeem, W. Boles, and C. Boyd, Utilizing Least Significant
Bit-Planes of RONI Pixels for Medical Image Watermarking, in
Proceedings of the 15th International Conference on Digital Im-
age Computing: Techniques and Applications (DICTA'13), IEEE,
2013, pp. 18. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 207
D.3 H. Nyeem, W. Boles, and C. Boyd, On the Robustness
and Security of Digital Image Watermarking, in Proceedings of
International Conference on Informatics, Electronics & Vision
(ICIEV'12), IEEE, 2012, pp. 1136-1141. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 207
D.4 H. Nyeem, W. Boles, and C. Boyd, Developing a Digital Im-
age Watermarking Model in Proceedings of the 13th International
Conference on Digital Image Computing: Techniques and Applica-
tions (DICTA'11), IEEE, 2011, pp. 468-473 . . . . . . . . . . . . 207
D.5 H. Nyeem, W. Boles, and C. Boyd, Capacity Control in Fragile
Watermarking Schemes, To be submitted to the 40th IEEE In-
ternational Conference on Acoustics, Speech and Signal Processing
(ICASSP) 2015 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 207
D.6 H. Nyeem, W. Boles, and C. Boyd, A Review of Medical Image
Watermarking Requirements for Teleradiology, Journal of Digital
Imaging, vol. 26, no. 2, pp. 326-343, Springer, 2013. . . . . . . . . 208
D.7 H. Nyeem, W. Boles, and C. Boyd, Digital Image Watermarking:
A Formal Model, Fundamental Properties, and Possible Attacks,
EURASIP Journal on Advances in Signal Processing, Springer.
(awaiting editorial decision) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 208
D.8 H. Nyeem, W. Boles, and C. Boyd, Counterfeiting Attacks,
Countermeasures and Future Challenges: Developing a Secure Self-
Authentication Watermarking Model, Multimedia Tools and Ap-
plications, Springer. (under review) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 208
D.9 H. Nyeem, W. Boles, and C. Boyd, Content-Independent Em-
bedding Scheme for Multi-Modal Medical Image Watermarking,
BioMedical Engineering Online, Springer. (under review) . . . . . 208
D.10H. Nyeem, W. Boles, and C. Boyd, An efficient watermarking
scheme for medical image applications, IEEE Transactions on In-
formation Technology in Biomedicine, IEEE. (to be submitted) . . 208
Bibliography 209
xi

List of Figures
1.1 Example of manipulated image (Courtesy: www.worth1000.com) . 2
1.2 Example of manipulated medical image [1] . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2.1 Examples of medical images in different modalities. (Courtesy:
Medical Image Samples [2].) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
2.2 Link between digital watermarking and medical image applications
from a practical design perspective. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
2.3 Teleradiology model. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
3.1 Fundamental components of (digital) image watermarking: (a) wa-
termark generation, (b) watermark embedding, and (c) watermark
detection. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
3.2 Deploying keys in the detection function of the basic model. . . . 61
3.3 Key-based digital watermarking model: (a) watermark encoding,
and (b) watermark decoding. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
4.1 Yearly published literature in digital image watermarking research
addressing robustness and security problems. . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
4.2 Realization of watermarking security and robustness in terms of
their requirements. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
4.3 Attacks for digital image watermarking. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
4.4 Entire block swap. (A part of cameraman image [3] is used.) . . . 109
4.5 Selected block swap. (A part of jet-plane image [3] is used.) . . . 111
4.6 Average computation time of Getmap (·) for ESC and ZF schemes
for images of increasing size (up to 512× 512). . . . . . . . . . . . 119
4.7 Average computation time of the proposed attacks for the images
of increasing size (up to 512× 512). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120
xiii
List of Figures
4.8 Original set of watermarked images: (ac) ESC scheme and (d
f) ZF scheme. (Original test images for (ac) and (df) are down-
loaded from: [3] and [4] respectively.) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120
4.9 Attacks on the ESC scheme watermarked images. From left, cam-
eraman (first column), house (second column), jet-plane (third col-
umn). (ac) Counterfeiting Attack 1 (entire blocks), (df) Coun-
terfeiting Attack 1 (selected blocks), (g-i) Counterfeiting Attack 2,
and (jl) Counterfeiting Attack 3. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122
4.10 Attacks on the ZF scheme watermarked images. From left, ab-
domen (first column), colon (second column), retina (third col-
umn). (ac) Counterfeiting Attack 1 (entire blocks), (df) Coun-
terfeiting Attack 1 (selected blocks), (g-i) Counterfeiting Attack 2,
and (jl) Counterfeiting Attack 3. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123
5.1 Flow-chart of the proposed capacity control model. Extension via
no condition (dim-dotted arrow) in existing scenario is proposed. . 149
5.2 Examples of ROI locations for different medical scenarios. . . . . 152
5.3 Embedding flow-chart of the proposed scheme. . . . . . . . . . . . 156
5.4 Extraction flow-chart of the proposed scheme. . . . . . . . . . . . 157
5.5 Data-frame: (a) payload, P , and (b) Load for Cl = 32. . . . . . . 159
5.6 An example of the proposed embedding scheme for an 8-bit image
of size 10×10 with NBW = 2 and NLSB = 3. (A few arbitrary bit
locations in different bit planes, e.g ., f (0, 0, 1), f (1, 5, 2), etc. are
shown to identify the overall bit locations.) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 159
5.7 Capacity control flow-chart of the HLL scheme. (Dotted-blocks
indicate their approximate worst-case running time. The proposed
improvement helps avoid the scanning block shown by the dotted-
arrow to invoke E (·).) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 163
5.8 Capacity control flow-chart of the proposed scheme. . . . . . . . . 164
5.9 Performance evaluation of the proposed scheme for increasing val-
ues of NBW (up to 3) and NLSB (up to 8): (a) capacity (kbits),
(b) embedding time (seconds), (c) PSNR (dBs), and (d) MSSIM.
(Averages are calculated for 370 images of different modalities and
sizes.) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 166
xiv
List of Figures
5.10 Performance comparison of the proposed scheme with the THY
scheme [5], where NBW ∈ {1, 2, 3} and NLSB = 4: (ad) for
the same size images, (eh) for the variance of same size images,
(a,e) capacity (kbits), (b,f) embedding time (seconds), (c,g) PSNR
(dBs), and (d,h) MSSIM. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 167
5.11 Test images of size 512 × 512 × 8: (a) Aerial, (b) Mandrill,
(c) Stream and bridge, and (d) Man. (Available here [3]) . . . . . 171
5.12 Evaluation and comparison of capacity control efficacy for Aerial
and Mandrill. From left, capacity control time (1st column), num-
ber of scanning the input image (2nd column), PSNR (3rd column),
and MSSIM (4th column). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 172
5.13 Evaluation and comparison of capacity control efficacy for Stream
and bridge and Man. From left, capacity control time (1st col-
umn), number of scanning the input image (2nd column), PSNR
(3rd column), and MSSIM (4th column). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 173
xv

List of Tables
2.1 Digital watermarking in spatial and transform domain. . . . . . . 21
2.2 Digital watermarking vs. other security measures/tools. . . . . . 34
2.3 Security requirements for medical information. . . . . . . . . . . 40
3.1 Summary of models used in relevant studies. . . . . . . . . . . . 51
3.2 Components of a basic watermarking model. . . . . . . . . . . . 59
3.3 Components of a key-based watermarking model. . . . . . . . . . 63
3.4 Summary of the novel formal generic watermarking model. . . . 66
4.1 Counterfeiting attack levels . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118
4.2 Perceptual Differences Between Output and Input Images of the
Proposed Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
4.3 Summary of Using Conventional Authentication Tools for the At-
tainment of the Self-Authentication Scheme Requirements. . . . . 128
5.1 Overall Performance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 169
5.2 Image Modality-wise Performance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 170
xvii

List of Models
4.1 Generalized Self-Authentication Scheme . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
4.2 Proposed Mapping-Sequence Recovery Method, Getmap (·) . . . . 107
4.3 Proposed Counterfeiting Attack 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
4.4 Proposed Counterfeiting Attack 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
4.5 Proposed Counterfeiting Attack 3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
4.6 A New Self-Authentication Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134
B.1 ZF Scheme [6]: Watermark Generation, zfG (·) . . . . . . . . . . 192
B.2 ZF Scheme [6]: Watermark Embedding, zfE (·) . . . . . . . . . . 193
B.3 ZF Scheme [6]: Watermark Detection, zfD (·) . . . . . . . . . . . 194
B.4 ZF Scheme [6]: zfD (·) recovery part . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 195
C.1 BlockShift . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 201
C.2 ESC Scheme [7]: Watermark Generation, escG (·) . . . . . . . . . 202
C.3 ESC Scheme [7]: Watermark Embedding, escE (·) . . . . . . . . . 203
C.4 ESC Scheme [7]: Watermark Detection, escD (·) . . . . . . . . . . 204
xix

List of Abbreviations
ACR American College of Radiology
AES Advanced Encryption Standard
BER Bit Error Rate
CAT Computer Aided Tomography
CQ Correlation Quality
CR Computed Radiography
CT Computed Tomography
CFR45 Code of Federal Regulations number 45
DCT Digital Cosine Transform
DWT Digital Wavelet Transform
DSA Digital Signature Arithmetic
DICOM Digital Imaging and Communication in Medicine
DS Digital Signature
DX Digital Radiography
ECG Electrocardiograms
ES Endoscopy
EPR Electronic Patient Records
ETR Electronic Transaction Records
EPHI Electronic Personal Health Information
FPR false-positive rate
FNR false-negative rate
FIR First Information Report
HIS Hospital Information System
HIPAA Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act
IWT Integer Wavelet Transform
JPEG Joint Photographic Experts Group
KD Knowledge Digest
xxi
List of Abbreviations
LSB Least Significant Bit
MSSIM Mean Structural Similarity
MG Mammography
MIEP Medical Image Exchange Platform
MSB Most Significant Bit
MSE Mean Square Error
MRI Magnetic Resonance Imaging
MD Message Digest (algorithm)
MAC Machine Authentication Code
NCC Normalized Cross Correlation
NEMA National Electrical Manufacturers Association
NEB Number of Embedding Bit
ROI Region of Interest
RONI Region of Non-Interest (or NROINon-ROI)
RIS Radiology Information System
PET Positron Emission Tomography
PACS Picture Archiving and Communication System
PSNR Peak Signal to Noise Ratio
RF Radio Fluoroscopy
SNR Signal to Noise Ratio
SHA Secure Hash Algorithm
SSIM Structural Similarity
US Ultrasound
XA X-Ray Angiography
WPSNR Weighted Peak Signal to Noise Ratio
xxii
Statement of Original Authorship
The work contained in this thesis has not been previously submitted to meet
requirements for an award at this or any other higher education institution. To
the best of my knowledge and belief, the thesis contains no material previously
published or written by another person except where due reference is made.
Signature:
Date:
xxiii
QUT Verified Signature

Dedication
To a grandfather,
who one of his grandchildren has never seen but always been
inspired by...
To a child,
who his father hasn't met yet...
To a family,
who has been missing a member for a while...
xxv

Acknowledgements
My experience as a HDR student at QUT has been more than pleasurable, which
would not be the same without the support of my supervisors, colleagues, friends,
and family. At the end of this PhD project, it is a pleasure to thank everybody
who has helped me along the way.
First and foremost, I would like to thank my supervisors, Prof Wageeh Boles
and Prof Colin Boyd, for their continuous help and support. As my principal
supervisor, Prof Boles has been a perfect mentor for me. I am grateful to him
for giving me directions, confidence and valuable advice, and for everything that
I have learned from him. He has had a tremendous impact on the way I perceive
research and life in general. Prof Boyd has also been very helpful in many ways
to me and for my research. His feedback from different critical angle has been
always encouraging and useful. He also has taught me many practical aspects
of research. I am particularly grateful to him for supporting my initial research
aspiration at QUT, and for introducing me with Prof Boles. Once again I thank
my supervisors, who I feel that I truly have been privileged to work with.
I also wish to thank Prof Vinod Chandran, Prof Ted Steinberg, A/Prof Clinton
Fookes, and Dr Juan Gonzalez Nieto for their valuable and constructive feedback
on the early research progress during my confirmation of candidature seminar,
which has been indeed stimulating for the rest part of my research. Thanks again
to Prof Chandran, Prof Steinberg, Dr Kenneth Radke, and my supervisors for
their assistance and being on the final seminar review panel. I also thank all
the reviewers, for their appreciation and constructive feedback on my thesis and
publications.
I acknowledge the help of Prof Anthony Maeder (University of Western Syd-
ney) for making useful suggestions regarding medical image datasets and their
web-links. The assistance of Dr Beat Schmutz (IHBI, QUT) for providing MR
and CT test images, and Dr Frank Gaillard (Radiopedia.org) for other medical
images, are also noted with gratitude.
xxvii
Acknowledgements
I acknowledge the logistic support received from the QUT HDR student sup-
port team, and EECS administration team. I am specially grateful to Ellainne
Steele, Joanne Kelly, Joanne Reaves, wand Elaine Reyes for their prompt help
and useful suggestions on the administrative difficulties that I was confronted
with. I would also like to acknowledge the services and information received from
the QUT medical centre, for my well-being during the study. I would never forget
the help and advice I received from my GP, Susan Gould and Peggy Wong.
I also thank to my colleagues and friends, who made my working at O401
and S1013, QUT more than easy and enjoyable. I am grateful for their sug-
gestions and help to find a solution, technical or otherwise. I would specially
mention Meisam Babai, Dr Mamun Rahman, Azmeri Rahman, Melissa Chan,
Amani Samha, Lance De Vine, Inma Tomeo-Reyes, Dinesha Uluwitige, Dilesha
Walawwe, and Palmo Thinley, for many conversations and laughs which helped
take the pressure off during stressful times. I am grateful to Dr Brenden Chen, Dr
Lakmali Nadisha Atapattu, Dr Randike Gajanayake and Dr Andrea M Goncher
for their help, time, and many useful tips about programming and thesis writing.
I thank all of my native friends, who have been more than a friend to me, for
their every support and for making me feel less alone. I am specially grateful to Dr
Badiul Islam, Dr Mobashwer Alam, Shamsur Rahman, Dr Al-Amin, Dr Shahadat
Hossain, and Dr MD Saiful Islam for their great help in my early days in Australia.
Special thanks to Mostafizur Rahman Mukul for being a good companion for more
than a year. Thanks to Tusher Kumer Sarker, Chandan Kumar, Naimul Islam,
Mujibul Anam, Abul Bashar, Iftekharul Alam, Fahim Faisal, Mahmudur Rahman
and all other friends at Rochester Tce., Kelvin Grove, for their time and moral
support. Evening tea and weekend party were really refreshing and entertaining.
I thank each member of my family, for being understanding and supportive. I
am most thankful to my parents, for their invaluable encouragement. I am grate-
ful to Zulfiquar Haidar, Jannatun Naim, and Jannatul Ferdous for supporting
my parents in my long absence. I am also grateful to Habiba Begum, Sadiqur
Rahman Chowdhury and Tania Rahman Chowdhury, for their generosity and
support to my wife and children. With all of his unforgettable memories, I wish
my father-in-law could see me graduate. Furthermore, I could not find words
that express my deepest gratitude to my wife Luisa Fozila Chowdhury, for her
endless patience and sacrifice. Much-much-much love to my sweet and adorable
sons, Aydin and newborn Ehsan (now seven months old but I have not seen him
xxviii
Acknowledgements
yet!), who I have always missed and longed to see and hug, during this long-pe-
riod-away from them. Although many of you may not understand, nor ever want
to understand, much of what is written beyond this page, you should at least
know that it could not have been done without you.
Hussain Nyeem
Queensland University of Technology (QUT)
July 2014
xxix

Chapter 1
Introduction
Chapter Organization
This chapter presents the motivation for the research (that will be pre-
sented in this thesis), and points out the gap in the research literature, in
Section 1.1. The research objectives, questions, and scope are discussed in
Section 1.2, Section 1.3, and Section 1.4, respectively. Section 1.5 outlines
the research outcomes and Section 1.6 presents their underlying signifi-
cance. The rest of this thesis organization is summarized in Section 1.7.
1.1 Motivation and Overview
The idiom seeing is believing can no longer hold true. Digital images are loss-
lessly reproduced and undetectably manipulated (or tampered). Consider the
images shown in Fig. 1.1, which look very real, though in fact they are not, be-
cause it is obvious that a bird cannot have a head of a dog, nor a kangaroo can
have a head of a lion. However, in situations, where the reality is unknown, it
cannot be said, for sure, that an image has been modified or not.
The situation is even more critical for medical images, where clinical use of the
manipulated images can be life-threatening. Consider the case of medical image
manipulation in Fig. 1.2. A CT (computed tomography) scan presents liver dis-
ease of a patient, which is manipulated with changing the location of an infected
region of the liver. There can be many other instances of such manipulation of
the original images, but the question is how they can be detected? In fact, by
merely seeing the images, detecting such plausible manipulations that contain to-
tally fabricated abnormalities would be impossible. Concerns grow tremendously,
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Figure 1.1: Example of manipulated image (Courtesy: www.worth1000.com)
when some relevant occurrences are seen to actually happen, see for example, re-
cent medical insurance fraud casess [810]. Although those incidents were not
directly related to medical images, who would guarantee that similar problems
would not happen with medical images tomorrow? Who will make sure that for
insurance or other fraudulent activities, a medical image will not be tampered
with? Or, even if a patient is wrongly diagnosed from a tampered image, who
will take the responsibility?
Reinforcing the trustworthiness of digital images is therefore an open challenge
today, where conventional security tools are found insufficient (see Section 2.2.3).
Studies have shown that the Digital watermarkingan evolving information hid-
ing technologyis promising to complement other security protection of image
data depicting natural scenes or medical phenomena. [1120]. Digital watermark-
ing is a process that principally permits the adding of information as a watermark
 
Figure 1.2: Example of manipulated medical image [1]
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into an object (i.e., digital media like image, audio, etc.) such that the watermark
can be detected afterwards. The construction of a watermarking scheme signif-
icantly varies with its objectives (e.g ., content authentication, tamper detection
and recovery, annotation) and application scenarios (e.g ., image, audio, video).
The research presented in this thesis aimed to investigate digital watermarking
to provide a systematic way for designing, analysing, and applying it, with a
particular focus on medical image security.
Digital medical imagesas the outcome of advanced imaging technology
have created new practices for the professions and patients in the modern
health care sector. Digital imaging has acquired sufficient reliability and cost-
effectiveness that the film-based imaging technology has been shifted to film-less
technology for producing digital images. Thus the capacity for acquiring, stor-
ing, and dealing with medical images in digital archives increased significantly.
Use of digital medical images, on the other hand, has enabled remote access
to, and electronic transmission and interpretation of medical information across
multiple users and display stations. Thereby, in modern health care, hospital
information systems comprising radiology information system (RIS) and picture
archiving and communication systems (PACS), offer various distant medical ser-
vices (e.g ., teleradiology, telemedicine) with the potential to improve healthcare
access, delivery, and standards.
Dealing with digital medical imagesdespite its great usefulness in modern
health careis raising many new security problems with legal and ethical com-
plexities for local archiving and distant medical services. These mainly include
image retention and fraud, distrust and invasion of privacy, and malpractice in
credentials and contracts. Medical images and other radiology information (e.g .,
electronic personal health information) are sensitive and easily identifiable, and
thus their use (e.g ., for archiving or in any medical services) in an insecure en-
vironment and over public networks is dangerous. Such images and information
need not only to be managed properly for their uses, but also to be protected
with integrity and high confidentiality within a security framework.
A framework for digital medical image security generally requires: (i) a stan-
dard set of security profiles/policies and (ii) a set of measures by which the
security principles in the profile are fulfilled. There are various international stan-
dards and national legislative rules and directives (e.g ., ISO27799Security Man-
agement in Health Using ISO/IEC/17799) that define the security and privacy
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requirements for medical information. These requirements are being achieved
by different conventional security measures (e.g ., firewall, VPNvirtual private
network, file-header, encryption), which have been reported to be incapable of
individually providing the required security of medical images in the PACS/RIS
based hospital information systems [2123]. These standards and conventional se-
curity measures will be reviewed with more details, and thereby the applicability
of digital watermarking to medical images will be revisited in Chapter 2.
However, despite its great promise, digital watermarking has not been widely
adopted in all potential applications like medical imaging. Existing watermarking
schemes often suffer from technical and security flaws. Validation of the suitabil-
ity of those schemes for an application becomes more challenging. One main
reason for these problems is that no standard approach is undertaken for the
watermarking application. Particularly:
(i) There is also no known construction of a complete or formal generic water-
marking model that helps identify the state-of-the-art watermarking scheme
for the digital image (or other multimedia) application(s). In other words,
there is a lack of a watermarking model that gives a big picture of water-
marking and identifies all of its possible components, inputs, outputs, and
their properties.
(ii) There is a lack of proper definitions of watermarking properties and their
suitable evaluation metrics. This is an obvious consequence of the previous
gap (i.e., the lack of a watermarking model) in the literature. Therefore,
some watermarking properties (e.g ., robustness, security) are naturally mis-
interpreted in practice. Such a practice not only hinders the choice and use
of a suitable watermarking scheme for an application, but also leads to
debate about the state-of-the-art watermarking schemes for different appli-
cations.
(iii) Security levels of existing watermarking schemes are mostly unknown. Par-
ticularly, the set of adversary actions in different application scenarios has
not been studied yet. This also means that a complete security analysis of
a scheme is required before applying the scheme to medical image (or other
multimedia) application(s).
And, for medical image applications:
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(iv) Medical image requirements for digital watermarking are not well defined
and are considered with various implicit assumptions. For example, type
of embeddinghow are the pixels to be modified: using a non-invertible or
invertible transformation? ; region of embeddingare all pixels modifiable? ;
and level of modificationhow much modification is allowed in modifiable
pixels?. Consequently, justifying the choice of a watermarking scheme for
medical image applications remains a difficult task.
(v) There is no watermark embedding scheme available which is equally suit-
able for different modalities of medical images. For example, as will be
discussed in Section 5.2, reversible schemes can be computationally inef-
ficient for multi-modal medical images (with a relatively high embedding
capacity requirement), and can raise legal and ethical concerns about alter-
ing all pixels (despite their reversible embedding property). Other schemes
usually suffer from the fallible and modality1 dependent RONI (Region Of
Non-Interest, to the medical professionals) selection techniques. Since dif-
ferent modality images have varying ROI (Region Of Interest, counterpart
of RONI) properties (e.g ., shape, location, pixel intensity, etc.), generally
the performance of a RONI (or ROI) selection technique significantly vary
with the image modality.
All these gaps in the literature can have many serious consequences. An
immediate concern is the improper realizations to application scenarios that may
render a watermarking scheme unsuitable for its intended use. In other words, a
scheme without a formal model eventually can have technical flaws and security
vulnerabilities for an application. For example, a watermarking scheme proposed
for a content authentication (and tampering detection and recovery) purpose can
be easily broken soon after it is proposed (i.e., the scheme can be shown to be
not capable of detecting some unauthorized modifications).
Another concern is the rampant re-invention of watermarking schemes for dif-
ferent applications. Such an ad-hoc development of watermarking schemes may
not only cast doubt on their potential, but also make their justification to suit-
ability more challenging, for an application. For example, someone may choose
1There are many modalities of medical images [24]. In this thesis, we consider the
commonly used modalities: Computed Tomography (CT), Magnetic Resonance (MR),
X-ray, Digital Subtraction Angiography (DSA), Radio Fluoroscopy (RF), Ultrasound
(US), and Mammography (MG).
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to use a reversible watermarking scheme for medical image application, since the
original image can be restored back and thus there may not have any legal or
ethical impact. However, others may argue that reversible schemes discontinue
the security protection once the watermark is removed, thus irreversible RONI-
based schemes could be better. Similarly, there are many other requirements
(e.g ., computational complexity, security attacks), which may be left unattended
for the watermarking schemes.
Therefore it is necessary and makes sense to investigate the systematic de-
velopment and evaluation of digital watermarking schemes in general for digital
image applications and then their application to medical images, addressing the
identified research gaps.
1.2 Research Objectives
To address the above mentioned gaps in the literature, the research presented in
this thesis has the following objectives:
(i) To conduct a thorough review of requirements for medical images, and dig-
ital watermarking schemes and their suitability criteria for medical images.
(ii) To investigate and develop a formal generic watermarking model, and to
formally define watermarking properties using the model.
(iii) To develop the expected attack models for watermarking schemes using the
developed watermarking model, that will help analyse the potential threats
in an application scenario.
(iv) To analyse the security of watermarking schemes suitable for medical images
and determine their security levels.
(v) To develop a computationally efficient watermarking scheme and evalu-
ate its performance systematically for medical image application using the
above framework, i.e., using the watermarking model and its defining prop-
erties, and design and evaluation criteria for medical image requirements.
1.3 Research Questions
The following research questions are addressed in this thesis.
What is an appropriate model for describing and analysing a digital water-
marking scheme?
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This question entails an investigation aiming at identifying the main build-
ing blocks of a watermarking scheme. These blocks are often characterized by
their respective inputs, outputs, and various design requirements. Therefore, the
following sub-questions arise for finding an appropriate watermarking model:
(a) What are the main building blocks of a watermarking scheme?
(b) What are the defining properties of a watermarking scheme?
Moreover, watermarking has already been explored for digital image appli-
cations (e.g ., content authentication, tamper detection and recovery). All the
schemes, however, may not be equally suitable and thus, may not be directly ap-
plicable even to similar problems of medical images. The main reason is that med-
ical images of different modalities (e.g . MRmagnetic resonance, CTcomputed
tomography) have diverse properties and strict requirements that need to be
specifically considered. Therefore, applying an appropriate watermarking scheme
requires prior justification for the suitability to certain medical image types and
applications. This leads us to the next research question:
What type of a watermarking scheme best suits specific medical image modal-
ities?
This suitability of a watermarking scheme is based on how best it can satisfy
the medical image requirements. The requirements and their attainment can be
expressed and verified in terms of a set of design and evaluation criteria, for the
watermarking properties. A careful consideration of those properties and their
suitable measures is thus warranted for a complete assessment. To this end, an
investigation on the medical image requirements and verifying their attainment
leads to the following sub-questions:
(a) What are the requirements for medical images?
(b) How will suitability be assessed (what are the criteria)?
Developing a security framework for medical images stems from addressing
their rising security concerns through a suitable watermarking scheme. To de-
termine the suitability of watermarking in terms of medical images requirements,
the above research questions have been formulated. However, identifying secu-
rity attacks is another essential part in assessing how the security requirements of
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medical images are achieved. Hence, a complete security assessment of a water-
marking scheme can be conducted through the anticipated attack models. There-
fore, another key research question can be posed as follows:
What are the security attacks against medical images?
This question addresses the specific types of attacks, realistic adversaries and
their abilities, security structure, computational properties, etc., to handle secu-
rity concerns of various medical images. This further entails the investigation to
address the following sub-questions:
(a) What threats can be anticipated from an adversary trying to exploit
a medical image ( e.g., manipulation, forgery, disclosure of private
information)?
(b) What security requirements of medical images can be expected in a
typical application ( e.g., data integrity, non-repudiation, confiden-
tiality of data)?
(c) What data or tools may become available to an adversary ( e.g., im-
ages with and without watermarks, secret keys of other users, de-
coder, encoder, etc.)?
1.4 Research Scope
As discussed above, the research presented in this thesis mainly focuses on the
digital watermarking, its formal generic model and utilization of the model in
defining fundamental properties and security analysis, for the image data depict-
ing natural scenes or medical phenomena. Further, medical images are selected
as an area of watermarking application, since they represent a key component of
modern health care services and are subject to growing security threats with le-
gal and ethical complexities. More specific considerations of limiting the research
focus, within this thesis, are as follows.
(i) Any data, images, processes, algorithms, schemes or methods considered in
this thesis either are digital themselves, or deal with digital inputs and out-
puts. However, for readability, the word digital is often omitted in writing.
For example, digital watermarking, digital medical image, etc. are simply
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written as watermarking, medical image, etc., respectively without change
of their meaning and context.
(ii) For medical image security framework, a number of existing standards for
medical image security policy/profile are studied. However, this thesis has
no intention of developing or suggesting such a standard that defines the se-
curity and privacy requirements for medical information. A focus is mainly
given to reviewing and identifying the security requirements from the un-
derstanding of those standards.
(iii) Medical image security is a study of information security that mainly rec-
ognizes the value of information, and defines appropriate procedures and
protection requirements for the information at different levels (e.g ., network,
host, application). However, the use of digital watermarking in this thesis
is restricted to address the data and application level security of medical
images as a complementary security tool.
(iv) For media type, digital watermarking schemes studied in this thesis operate
on various digital image formats (e.g ., *.jpg, *.bmp, *.png) representing an
ordered array (e.g ., a rectangular array of 256×256 or 512×512). This also
includes the 2D-monochrome DICOM (Digital Imaging and Communication
in Medicine [25]) format of medical images. In addition, this study is not
limited to use of medical images of any particular modalities; rather, it aims
at justification of the proposed framework and scheme for all the common
modalities of medical images. The medical image databases such asMedical
Image Sample [2], MedPix [26], and Public Image Databases [27] are used.
(v) For the application scenario, this research aims at the medical image ap-
plication in teleradiology services. (Justification for choosing teleradiology
services as medical image application will be presented in Chapter 2). How-
ever, a typical digital image application scenario is initially considered for
the development of watermarking model, its defining properties, and ex-
pected threats, which is later considered for the medical image application.
(vi) The work in this thesis also aims to develop a suitable watermarking scheme
for the medical image application. A guiding principle of this work is to
consider important requirements of medical images, and to make realistic
assumptions for systematic development and evaluation (over few relevant
schemes) of the developed watermarking scheme.
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(vii) The terms framework and model are not interchangeably used in this the-
sis. The first term is used for presenting a set of procedures, rules, ideas
or guidelines to achieve a certain goal, whereas the latter is used for the
simplified representation of any process, system, algorithm or scheme. For
example, an attack-model in this thesis would illustrate the attack with its
inputs, outputs, and how it works in abstract level. In contrast, a security
framework for a watermarking application would provide a set of guidelines
to achieve the required security level in that application scenario.
1.5 Research Outcomes
In addressing the research objectives and research questions, this thesis presents
a number of original contributions and achievements in the field of digital wa-
termarking and its application to medical images. The research contributions
and findings that will be discussed in this thesis have been presented in several
reputable conferences, and published and submitted to leading journals (see Ap-
pendix D). The main contributions (with the chapters discussing them shown in
parenthesis) are summarized below.
(i) A novel watermarking model has been developed with its use in for-
mally defining fundamental watermarking parameters and expected attacks
(Chapter 3 & Publications in Appendices D.4, D.7). Specifically:
 A novel generic formal watermarking model for digital image appli-
cations has been developed to support systematically design, analyse,
and use a watermarking scheme for an application. Considering most
of the possible inputs and outputs, a basic watermarking model is
developed and then extended to a key-based model.
 A set of fundamental watermarking properties (e.g ., perceptual simi-
larity, blindness, robustness) has been formally defined. Their uses in
digital image applications have been illustrated with some examples.
 New models for a set of expected attacks in digital image applica-
tion scenarios have been developed using the proposed watermarking
model. These attacks are defined in three main categories: active
attacks, passive attacks, and system attacks, considering different in-
puts (e.g ., watermarked image), abilities (e.g ., unrestricted access to
the watermark verification device) and objectives (e.g ., to embed an
invalid watermark) of an attacker.
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(ii) New counterfeiting attack models (using the novel generic watermarking
model) have been developed for security analysis of an important case of
watermarking schemes (called self-authentication schemes that aim to de-
tect and localize any possible tampered region). Then a new self-authen-
tication model has been developed for the countermeasure (Chapter 4 &
Publications in Appendices D.1 and D.8). Specifically:
 Three new counterfeiting attack models have been developed and val-
idated its applicability The self-authentication schemes are analysed
and their general framework is formulated. How these schemes violate
the systematic definition of security is shown. Practical consequences
of the proposed attacks are also demonstrated through their imple-
mentations. A winning condition (that determines the success of an
attacker) is established, and the proposed attacks are shown to cap-
ture any possible counterfeiting instances in three different levels of
modifications.
 For defending against the counterfeiting attacks, a new self-authenti-
cation model is developed. Considering the weaknesses and objectives
of existing schemes, a set of fundamental requirements has been deter-
mined. The presented self-authentication model is based on a general
principle of combined using of the conventional security tools for at-
taining the requirements. Considering construction of this model, the
need for an efficient embedding scheme is pointed out, for example,
to compensate the computational cost of simultaneously using digital
signature and encryption schemes.
(iii) A new watermark embedding scheme (in light of this research's new self-au-
thentication model) for multi-modal medical images has been introduced,
which offers two original features: a general RONI approach and an adap-
tive computationally efficient capacity control (Chapter 5 & Publications
in Appendices D.2, D.5, D.9, and D.10). Specifically:
 A novel computationally efficient medical image watermarking scheme
is developed. A simple and general RONI embedding is introduced that
avoids the current complexity of segmentation, and offers modality in-
dependent embedding. This scheme uses a simple borderline embed-
ding approach and the least significant bit-planes to accommodate the
watermark bits. Experimental results demonstrate that the proposed
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scheme has higher capacity-distortion performance than some promi-
nent existing schemes, and is more practicable for different modality
medical images. Being irreversible and general RONI based, the pro-
posed scheme would help provide continuous security protection and
minimize legal-ethical impact, and thereby could be commercially vi-
able in future for different medical image applications.
 A new watermarking capacity control model is developed to address
the lack of computational efficiency in existing capacity control process
of watermarking schemes. The notion of watermarking capacity con-
trol is generalized to be the process of optimising for the combination
of minimum distortion and acceptable running time, while attaining
the required capacity. Presented capacity control model is validated
by the asymptotic analysis and the experiments with varying payload
size. Analysis and experimental evidence demonstrate that existing
reversible schemes have an inefficient capacity control, which is more
likely to affect the overall performance of a scheme. This not the case
of the proposed watermark embedding scheme, which have an efficient
and image content invariant capacity control ability for varying pay-
load size.
(iv) Additional contributions include the findings from the literature review of
watermarking schemes and theoretical analysis of watermarking properties.
Specifically:
 A comprehensive literature review has been conducted and published
on digital watermarking schemes and their applications to medical
images. This includes an in-depth look at: (a) the current inter-
national and national standards, (b) medical image security require-
ments, (c) expected attacks and conventional security measures and
(d) design and evaluation considerations for watermarking properties.
The findings of this investigation have come up with some objective
recommendations and design criteria for medical image watermarking.
(Chapter 2 & Publication in Appendix D.6)
 The current state of watermarking security has been reviewed and its
misunderstanding with the robustness property has been analysed. Se-
curity aspects of watermarking have drawn relatively little attention as
compared to the robustness aspects, in the research. The findings sug-
12
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gest that watermarking security is misinterpreted as the robustness,
in the signal and image processing paradigm. Theoretical analysis of
robustness and security has been presented to distinguish their require-
ments and avoid the existing confusion. Thereby, the need for devel-
oping attack models and complete security analysis of watermarking
schemes is also justified. (Chapter 4 & Publication in Appendix D.3)
1.6 Research Significance
This research advances knowledge in the area of digital image watermarking and
its application to medical images. Some potential significance of the research
outcomes are noted below.
(i) The new formal generic watermarking model and the formal definitions
of fundamental parameters and possible attacks presented in this thesis
(Chapter 3) are the foundation of a unified and intuitive watermarking
theory. The model is envisaged to give the big picture of watermarking
and helps identify all of its possible variants for digital image applications.
In other words, the presented model would allow a unified treatment of all
practically meaningful variants of digital image watermarking schemes.
(ii) The presented considerations, definitions, and discussions on the fundamen-
tal defining properties and possible attacks (Chapter 3) can help to under-
stand them, while avoiding potential confusions and taking a step forward
towards the systematic development of watermarking schemes. Thereby,
choosing a suitable scheme for an application would be easier.
(iii) The presented new attack models and their utilization for complete security
analysis of self-authentication schemes (Chapter 4) can be used as princi-
ples to determine the security levels of other watermarking schemes. In
light of the presented new self-authentication model, and with identifying
and understanding the properties and security requirements for different
watermarking objectives, would also allow a designer to design a more se-
cure variant of a self-authentication scheme, for a multimedia application
(e.g ., medical or other digital images, video, audio, etc.).
(iv) The presented watermark embedding scheme for medical images and its
validation (Chapter 5) has created a new, efficient, and general RONI-based
embedding approach, which can be used for different applications such as
13
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content authentication, and annotation.
(v) Further, the generalized notion of watermarking capacity control and the
use of asymptotic analysis for studying computational aspects of water-
marking schemes (Chapter 5) would create a new era in watermarking re-
search. This would promote necessary awareness for considering compu-
tational aspects in addition to conventional (i.e., distortion and capacity)
performance evaluation process to validate a watermarking scheme.
In summary, the findings, theoretical development and analyses, and exper-
imental evidence of this research are the comprehensive source of information,
which can be assimilated and disseminated towards standardizing future research
topics of formal modelling, complete security analysis and computational aspects,
of watermarking schemes.
1.7 Thesis Organization
The remainder of this thesis is organized as follows.
Chapter 2 captures the background of the proposed research of this thesis.
With an overview of the key research themes, namely digital watermarking
(Section 2.2) and medical image security (Section 2.3), their necessary and
relevant components are reviewed and the requirements of watermarking for
medical images are determined. Further, the lack of systematic way for de-
signing, analysing, and using watermarking schemes is identified. Thereby,
a further study towards developing a complete generic watermarking model
and formally defining watermarking properties and attacks is recommended.
(The contributions discussed in this chapter have been published in a jour-
nal, see Appendix D.6.)
Chapter 3 presents a novel formal generic model for digital image watermark-
ing, as the previous chapter pointed out the need for such a model. Con-
sidering possible inputs, outputs, and component functions, the initial con-
struction of a basic watermarking model is developed further to incorporate
the use of keys (Section 3.3). Using the developed model, the fundamental
watermarking properties and a set of possible attacks are defined (Sec-
tion 3.4 and 3.5). The work presented in this chapter has been supported
with meaningful examples, necessary explanations, and comparative stud-
ies. It is also pointed out in this chapter that, using the presented model,
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a set of complete attack models is also necessary for security analysis of
the existing watermarking schemes. (The original contributions discussed
in this chapter resulted in a number of publications, see Appendices D.4
and D.7.)
Chapter 4 captures the security aspects in digital watermarking and demon-
strates further utilization of the watermarking model introduced and dis-
cussed in the previous chapter. It starts with separating the considera-
tions of watermarking robustness and security requirements. An important
case of watermarking schemes (called self-authentication schemes) for digi-
tal image applications is considered. Three new counterfeiting attacks have
been developed, for which the security of the self-authentication schemes
are analysed (Section 4.4 and 4.6). Further, to counteract the proposed
attacks, a set of requirements for the self-authentication schemes are deter-
mined, and a new self-authentication model is developed for attaining them
(Section 4.7). (The original contributions discussed in this chapter resulted
in a number of publications, see Apeendices D.1, D.3 and D.8.)
Chapter 5 presents a new watermark embedding scheme (Section 5.4). In sup-
port of developing a suitable watermarking scheme for medical image appli-
cations, particularly in light of the new self-authentication model presented
in the previous chapter, such an embedding scheme has to address several
challenges such as capacity-distortion performance and legal-ethical impact.
A general region of non-interest (RONI) selection approach is introduced
to avoid the RONI segmentation problem for different modality of medical
images (Section 5.3). To also consider the computational aspects, a capac-
ity control model is developed. Performance of the proposed embedding
scheme is evaluated and analysed, and compared with two prominent wa-
termarking schemes. (The original contributions discussed in this chapter
resulted in a number of publications, see Appendix D.2, D.5, D.9 and D.10.)
Chapter 6 concludes the thesis with a summary of the original contributions
and future work.
15

Chapter 2
Watermarking for Medical Image
Security
Chapter Organization
This chapter captures the background of the proposed research of this
thesis, with an overview of the key research themes, namely digital water-
marking (Section 2.2) and medical image security (Section 2.3). Digital
watermarking advantages, design and evaluation criteria, objectives, and
applicability are presented. The standards for medical image security
management are reviewed and the threats and requirements for medical
images are investigated. Existing medical image watermarking schemes
are then reviewed in Section 2.4. In light of the research questions (Sec-
tion 1.3), the research findings presented in this chapter are discussed
in Section 2.5. Chapter summary is given in Section 2.6. (The contri-
butions discussed in this chapter have been published in a journal, see
Appendix D.6.)
2.1 Introduction
Digital watermarking has established its advantages in a range of applications due
to having a number of attractive attributes such as information hiding without
loss of (visual) semantics of the object (digital image) [28]. As discussed in the
previous chapter, it's potential has already been justified to address the multime-
dia security problems. For example, content authentication, copyright protection,
tamper detection and recovery, of digital images are a few that attracted much
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attention in the research. However, this promising technology has not been widely
adopted. This chapter investigates the possible reasons for this phenomenon by
looking at the development (i.e., design and evaluation) of existing watermarking
schemes, with a particular focus to medical image application.
Medical images are visual presentations of the human body (or its parts and
functions) for medical science or clinical purposes. Clinical use of medical images,
for example, include medical procedures seeking to reveal, diagnose, or examine
diseases. These images are a part of person's medical information and can be of
different modalities (e.g . MRImagnetic resonance imaging, X-ray, USultra
sound). Different modalities are the outcome of diverse imaging techniques and
have patient-specific evidence of a disease (e.g ., pathological features) for diag-
nosis [29]. For example, MRI of the head can help find tumours, bleeding and
other problems in the brain, while X-ray of the chest can reveal the abnormality
and damage in the structures of ribs, hearts, lungs, blood vessels, etc. Figure 2.1
shows examples of medical images in different modalities.
Moreover, some additional information (that sometimes appears in a header
or footer section) is generally appended in medical images for the patient identity
and link(s) to the record(s) in medical information databases/archives. Therefore,
medical image security captures the security of both the medical images and
appended information. All these personal information are sensitive and easily
identifiable, and thus their integrity and confidentiality need to be protected
for improved and reliable health care services. This chapter considers the distant
medical services such as teleradiology as a general medical image application area.
It is worth noting here that the choice of teleradiology for studying medical
image applications is based on the fact that it deals with a broad range of multi-
modal medical images, and thus it becomes one of the main areas, where many
new security and other legal-ethical problems are more likely to arise. Further,
security problems in radiology also affect the security of teleradiology. In other
words, medical image security requirements for teleradiology essentially captures
that for the radiology. Therefore, if the security requirements of medical images
in teleradiology are studied, most of the security problems of medical images can
be addressed.
Although radiology and teleradiology deal with similar medical information,
they have a sharp distinction in their services. When radiology employs the use
of imaging to both diagnose and treat disease, teleradiology has been for a long
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Input Image Watermarked image, PSNR 14.64, SSIM 0.999Input Image Watermarked image, PSNR 23.20, SSIM 0.999
(b) MR image (head) 
 
(a) CR image (chest) 
(c) CT image (ankle) 
Original Watermarked Image Tampered Watermarked Image Verified Image as Un-tampered
(d) OT image (retina) 
Input Image Watermarked image, PSNR -2.69, SSIM 0.998
Figure 2.1: Examples of medical images in different modalities. (Courtesy: Medical
Image Samples [2].)
time understood to be an eHealth service done through remote transmission of
[radiology] images [and information] over electronic networks and with an inter-
pretation of the transmitted images for diagnostic purpose [30]. Therefore, in
the following sections, digital watermarking and its applicability, fundamental
properties, and main objectives will be reviewed focusing on the medical image
security problems in teleradiology.
2.2 Digital Image Watermarking
Generally, digital watermarking consists of three major components: watermark
generator, embedder, and detector [31]. A watermark generator generates water-
mark(s) for a particular application, which is optionally dependent on some keys.
Watermark(s) are embedded into a cover-object by a watermark embedder, some-
times based on an embedding key. A cover-object can be any digital media such
as images, video and audio. As mentioned in the research scope (Section 1.4),
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for the work presented in this thesis, the digital images depicting natural and
medical phenomena are considered as the cover-object. A watermark detector,
on the other hand, is responsible for detecting the existence of some predefined
watermark in the cover-object. It is sometimes desirable to extract a message as
well.
In a target application, digital watermarking can deal with mainly two issues.
One is to address security (e.g ., authentication and integrity verification of the
cover object, and confidentiality of the information used in watermark), and the
other is to address system considerations (e.g ., saving memory and bandwidth,
avoiding detachmentannotation of useful information such as electronic patient
records (EPR), and electronic transaction records (ETR)). Furthermore, based on
the processing domain, watermarking schemes can be broadly categorized as: (i)
spatial domain watermarking and (ii) transform domain watermarking. Spatial
domain schemes include least significant bit (LSB) embedding, spread spectrum
technique, etc., and transform domain schemes are mainly based on discrete
cosine transform, discrete Fourier transform, and discrete wavelet transforms.
Watermarking in spatial and transform domains have different advantages and
disadvantages [32] [33], which are summarized in Table 2.1.
2.2.1 Advantages of Watermarking
Watermarking has received much attention recently for medical image applica-
tions because of its various attractive attributes [23,34,35], which are listed below:
Security and Privacy. Data-hiding capability is the fundamental and most
attractive watermarking attribute [36,37]. The confidentiality can be maintained
by hiding the private data into the images. To protect necessary medical in-
formation (e.g ., EPR including demographic data, diagnostic results, treatment
procedures, etc.) from malicious tampering, those information can be hidden in
medical images using watermarking schemes. Such a watermarking scheme, how-
ever, assumes that medical images without the patient information are not of
much interest to people [19,38]. For confidentiality, this assumption may require
encryptionfor exampleof the meta-data or any annotated EPR to be hidden
in the medical images.
Further, a tampered image can be detected and possibly recovered by using an
appropriate watermarking scheme [39, 40]. Coatrieux et al . [23] suggested three
main objectives of watermarking in the medical image applications: data-hiding,
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Table 2.1: Digital watermarking in spatial and transform domain.
Types of
Processing
Advantages Disadvantages
Spatial domain Comparatively simple
and faster
operation [32,33]
Vulnerable to
compression, geometric
distortion, and
filtering [32,33]
Transform domain Compression compatible
and robust against many
geometric distortions
(e.g ., rotation, scaling,
translation, cropping)
and filtering [32,33]
Comparatively higher
computational time and
complexity [32,33]
integrity control, and authenticity, which can provide the required security of
medical images. For example, the data-hiding objective of watermarking allows
inserting meta-data and other information into an image. The integrity verifica-
tion objective of watermarking ascertains that the image has not been modified in
an unauthorized manner, and authenticity traces the origin of an image. Digital
watermarking allows `permanent association of image content with proofs of its
reliability by modifying [some] image pixel values, independently of the image file
format' [41]. It can therefore also operate in a stand-alone environment.
Avoiding Detachment. The data-hiding capability of watermarking men-
tioned above further facilitates annotation of any necessary information to avoid
detachment. Millions of medical images are being produced in radiology depart-
ments around the world, which have immense value to medical professionals,
medical researchers, and students [34]. Researches in this field are being accus-
tomed to embed patient data to medical images [36, 42, 43]. If the EPR and the
images are separate, the chance of detachment of EPR from the image becomes
higher. For example, missing or misplacing an appropriate link between them
may lead to an incorrect set of medical image and EPR, and thus the use of that
set for medical decision can be dangerous or even life-threatening. To avoid this
misplacing or detachment, watermarking offers the necessary data embedding
(having a limited capacity though) within the image itself.
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Non-repudiation. Watermarking is also promising to support non-repudiation
in various multimedia applications [13, 44]. In distant medical services like tel-
eradiology, distribution of the watermarked images between HISs may cause non-
repudiation problem, where one party (e.g ., hospital personnel and clinician) may
deceitfully repudiate that they did not send the data or the other party may make
a fraudulent claim on the received data. Hence, the use of a public key-based
watermarking system may facilitate non-repudiation in tele-radiology.
Controlling Access. Provision for using keys in watermarking schemes fur-
ther provides an alternative to an access control mechanism, where confidential
meta-data can be accessed with the proper authoritative rights given in terms of
keys [34, 45].
Indexing. Another benefit stems from data-hiding capability of watermarking
is indexing, where relevant keywords or search-indexes can be embedded into the
images and used for effective archiving and retrieval of the images from data-
bases [34].
Memory and Bandwidth Saving. Storage space and bandwidth require-
ments are important decisive factors for the small-budget hospitals. The data-
storage requirement can be minimized in hospital information system (HIS) by
embedding the EPR in the image [43, 46]. Although a single EPR may take a
small amount of memory-space, it becomes reasonably high for thousands of such
EPR in the database. On the other hand, a huge amount of bandwidth is required
for the transmission of the image data in distant medical services. The additional
requirement of bandwidth for the transmission of the meta-data can be avoided
if the data is hidden in the image itself. Since the EPR and the image can be
integrated into one, bandwidth for their transmission in distant medical services
can be reduced [34].
2.2.2 Design and Evaluation Criteria
Watermarking requirements for medical images are mainly defined in terms of
security and privacy, fidelity, and computational properties. Hence, security and
privacy requirements characterize a watermarking scheme to achieve data-hiding,
integrity verification, and authenticity objectives as discussed in previous section.
Fidelity requirements guarantee that the watermarked medical images are usable
for diagnosis and other clinical uses. Additionally, the computational require-
ments help determine the cost benefit and feasibility of practical implementation
22
2.2 Digital Image Watermarking
Medical Image  
Requirements 
Digital  
Watermarking 
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Design  
Criteria 
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Criteria 
Figure 2.2: Link between digital watermarking and medical image applications from
a practical design perspective.
of a watermarking scheme. All these watermarking requirements, on the other
hand, define a set of design and evaluation criteria for various watermarking
properties in an application scenario. Design criteria help characterize the devel-
opment of a watermarking scheme, whereas the evaluation criteria help determine
the performance of a developed/existing scheme. Fundamental watermark gener-
ation and embedding properties include visibility, blindness, embedding capacity,
imperceptibility/perceptual similarity, etc. Similarly, blindness, invertibility, ro-
bustness, error probability, etc., properties are studied for the detection.
Moreover, deploying a watermarking scheme in medical image applications
broadly includes two phases, namely a development phase and a validation phase
as illustrated in Fig.2.2. In the development phase, optimum design criteria for
the system are to be defined properly according to the medical image require-
ments. Similarly, it is also necessary to carefully consider the evaluation criteria
and their suitable measures for the medical images in the validation phase, in
order to justify the suitability of existing/developing watermarking schemes for
medical image application.
The design and evaluation criteria for digital image watermarking are mainly
associated with its fundamental properties and core components: watermark gen-
eration, embedding, and detection. A watermarking model and its fundamen-
tal properties will be defined formally in Chapter 3. However, considering the
above-mentioned watermarking properties, the design and evaluation criteria are
reviewed below for a watermarking scheme. Determining these criteria play an
important role to achieve watermarking objectives for an application.
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Visibility. Visible watermarking are important in recognition and support of
possessing a digital image, where watermarking objectives are mainly to show
some necessary information such as logo, icon, courtesy, etc., through the wa-
termarked image. Contrariwise, invisible watermarks are used in digital image
applications, where watermarking objectives are to addressing security issues of
the images. Like various digital image applications [4755], invisibility of the
watermark appears to be the main interest in the medical image watermarking
research [1618,41,5660].
Robustness. Robustness, an important watermarking property for the detec-
tor, is defined in different ways in the literature. Robustness is defined as the
degree of resistance of a watermarking scheme to modifications of the host signal
due to either common signal processing, or operations devised specifically in order
to render the watermark undetectable [61]. Based on this property, watermarking
schemes can be robust, fragile, and semi-fragile. In robust watermarking, a water-
mark usually carries information regarding the owner in order to validate who the
image belongs to (e.g ., which person, which institute or organization, etc.). Thus,
these watermarking schemes are being used for content authentication purposes in
various digital image applications (e.g ., copyright protection) [47, 52, 60, 6266].
Semi-fragile and fragile watermarks are being used to carry much information
about itself, its owner's meta-data, its distribution, etc., and are thus used for
annotation (e.g ., hiding ETR or EPR, etc.) [19,36,38,43,46,60,67], and integrity
control (e.g ., tampering detection and recovery) [6, 16,40,68,69].
Blindness. Watermarking blindness refers to the ability of a component func-
tion (e.g ., watermark generation, detection) to work without any original version
of input (e.g ., image or watermark, etc.). Non-blindness in watermark generation
is important while an original image dependent watermark is required. An orig-
inal image-dependent watermark is helpful in addressing ambiguity and forgery
attacks (e.g ., copy attacks) [70]. Here, if the watermark is not dependent on
the original image, it can be easily copied to another image or forged to output
an invalid watermarked image [71]. Besides, blindness in detection is important,
where availability of the original image or watermark at the detector can thwart
watermarking objectives. Non-blindness in detection is used sometimes in devel-
oping tampering recovery watermarking schemes, where the recovery of tampered
regions is often difficult to achieve from the watermarked image itself.
Embedding Capacity. Embedding capacity, generally measured by the num-
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ber of embedding bits, means how many bits can be suitably modified or em-
bedded in an image. High embedding capacity is a fundamental problem in
developing annotation or integrity control watermarking schemes [72], which are
generally of fragile or semi-fragile nature. Achieving high embedding capacity of-
ten introduces more distortions to a watermarked image and thereby often makes
it difficult to preserve high imperceptibility. A robust copyright watermark re-
quires lower embedding capacity than that required for a fragile/semi-fragile an-
notating watermark [73, 74]. High embedding capacity is also required in other
fragile/semi-fragile watermarking for tampering detection and recovery. It has
been reported that LSB embedding techniques offer comparatively higher em-
bedding capacity [41,75].
Invertibility. An invertible watermarking scheme has the property that the
detection function is the inverse of the embedding function. Invertible (or some-
times referred to as reversible or lossless) watermarking is of special interest in
digital image applications where no distortions to the original image are allowed.
Therefore, an original image is required to be restored from respective water-
marked images by the detector. Invertibility seldom gets interest for non-blind
detector since detection itself requires the original image, although developing a
blind detector for invertible watermarking is more challenging, especially when a
high embedding capacity is desired. Developing invertible watermarking scheme
received much attention for medical image applications to avoid any misdiagnosis
from distortions in a watermarked image [5, 16,51,59].
Perceptual Similarity. Perceptual similarity determines the degree of imper-
ceptibility between the original image and its watermarked version, especially
in developing an invisible watermarking scheme [70]. Different similarity met-
rics can be used for perceptual similarity evaluation such as correlation quality;
signal-to-noise ratio (SNR), peak SNR (PSNR), weighted PSNR, mean square
error; structural similarity (SSIM), mean SSIM (MSSIM); and normalized cross-
correlation (NCC). In medical image watermarking research, keeping high per-
ceptual similarity is critical to avoid any risk of misdiagnosis.
Security. Security requirements of watermarking include the legitimate access,
use, disclosure, disruption, modification, or perusal of a watermarking scheme.
As will be discussed in the next chapter, a watermarking scheme can be described
in terms of its inputs (e.g ., image, key), component functions (e.g ., watermark
detection), and outputs (e.g ., watermarked image). With such a general setting
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of watermarking, possible threats need to be analysed for an application. De-
termining these security requirements in a target application is crucial for the
system design, and that can be determined through comprehensive risk manage-
ment (e.g ., examining security policy, access control, physical and environmental
security, operation managements, etc.) [76, 77]. Addressing watermarking secu-
rity however received a limited attention in the research [31, 78]. (To this end,
the security levels of some watermarking schemes will be studied in Chapter 4.)
Error Probability. Error probability plays a key role for assessing detection
performance of a watermarking scheme. Irrespective of application scenarios, a
zero error probability is always desirable, although achieving this is practically
difficult considering higher degrees of robustness to any distortions [14]. However,
similar to other digital image applications, keeping the error probabilities at a
minimum possible level is very important in a medical image application to ensure
a reliable detection. Some commonly used error probability metrics are bit error
rate (BER), false-positive rate (FPR), and false-negative rate (FNR).
2.2.3 Limitations of Conventional Security Measures
In this section, conventional security measures are investigated to verify the suit-
ability and potential of watermarking as a complementary tool. Various existing
security measures (illustrated in Table 2.3) are being used to protect the med-
ical images and information, and their communications. For example, virtual
private network (VPN), firewall, etc. as well as encryption, cryptographic hash
function or their derivatives such as digital signature (DS), machine authenti-
cation code (MAC), manipulation detection code (MDC), perceptual hashing,
etc., are a few that are commonly used. However, these conventional security
measures are considered to have limitations specially in protecting the medical
images [22,23,41,7984], and should be properly addressed for improved security.
Firewalls and VPNs. Among various network security measures, Firewalls
and VPNs are common. Along with intrusion detection systems, anti-virus sys-
tems, etc., those measures are implemented mainly for protecting the information
by securing the communications of a system.
A firewall is usually placed between two networks to act as a gateway, which
is a combination of hardware and software. It protects the company's network
and computers from possible intrusion by hackers from the external network [85].
Canavan [85] described this as a fundamental component of any perimeter defence
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that can have the following uses: (a) keeping unwanted and unauthorized traffic
from passing (in or out); (b) providing an efficient Internet access to internal
users; (c) monitoring for and notifying of intrusions and network problems; (d)
maintaining logs of all communication activities between two networks effectively
(e.g ., for identifying abnormal events). Canavan also described three principal
requirements for an effective firewall: (a) it must act as a door through which
all traffic must pass (incoming and outgoing); (b) it must allow only authorized
traffic to pass; and (c) it must be immune to penetration or compromise.
However, a firewall by itself does not assure a secure network and it represents
a single point of failure [85]. Firewalls need to be configured properly and need
to be monitored. Firewalls that are not properly configured may allow unautho-
rized users through. In addition, a denial-of-service attack that effectively shuts
down the firewall shuts down the network connection to the outside world [85].
Moreover, a firewall takes time to examine incoming and outgoing traffic, which
tends to degrade network performance.
As another significant limitation, firewalls are of no use to track activities on
the internal network. While a firewall does make it somewhat more difficult for
someone from the outside to get in, the majority of attacks on corporate systems
come from the inside, not from the outside [85]. In addition to the threat from
inside of an organization, firewalls can be circumvented by outsiders [85]. As a
result, critical systems should be configured to monitor logins, failed logins, and
all network activity of the internal systems.
A VPN, on the other hand, is a means of transporting traffic in a secure
manner over an unsecured network which is achieved by combined use of encryp-
tion, authentication, and tunnelling [86]. Tunnelling refers to the process of
encapsulating or embedding one network protocol to be carried within the pack-
ets of a second network. There are several different implementations of VPN
protocols such as point-to-point tunnelling protocol (PPTP), Internet protocol
security (IPSec), secure sockets layer (SSL), and secure shell (SSH).
While using a VPN service with a firewall secure the communication of a
systems, it does not ensure any protection of the data for the lifetime. In other
words, the data can be altered before/after any communications taken place. As
a result, other security measures such as encryption, hash function, and/or digital
signature are used to provide necessary protection.
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Ecncryption. In order to protect the privacy and confidentiality of electronic
meta-data like health information and medical record, encryption has been a
commonly accepted technology in the health care sector [87]. In cryptography,
encryption is the process of transforming information (called plain-text) using an
algorithm (called cipher) to make it unreadable to anyone except those possessing
special knowledge, usually referred to as a key [88]. The output is encrypted
information (called cipher-text). There are two types of encryption: symmetric
(also known as private- or secret-key) encryption (e.g ., DESdata encryption
standard, RC4Rivest Cipher#4) and asymmetric (or public-key) encryption
(e.g ., Diffie Hellman, DSAdigital signature algorithm).
The strength of the symmetric scheme largely depends on the size of the key
and on keeping it secret. Generally, the larger the key, the more secure the
scheme [89]. Furthermore, symmetric encryption is relatively fast and widely
understood. However, the main weakness of this type of encryption is that
the key or algorithm has to be shared [89]. That is why symmetric crypto-
systems are not well suited for spontaneous communication over open and un-
secured networks [89]. In addition, symmetric key provides no process for non-
repudiation [89]. Here, non-repudiation is the ability to prevent individuals or
entities from denying that a message was sent or received or that file was accessed
or altered, when in fact it was.
On the other hand, asymmetric encryption uses two keys as opposed to one
key in a symmetric system [89]. One of the keys is kept secret and called pri-
vate key, while the other is made public and called public key. A message is
encrypted with the private key and decrypted with the public key. The advan-
tages of this type of encryption include no secret sharing and providing a means
of authentication and non-repudiation with the help of digital certificates. Unlike
symmetric crypto-system, public key allows for secure spontaneous communica-
tion over an open network. Besides, it is more scalable for very large systems
than symmetric crypto-systems. Yet, asymmetric encryption is relatively slower
and computationally intensive, and requires a trusted certificate authority [89].
Here, a certificate authority issues a digital certificate to certify the ownership of
a public key by the named subject of the certificate.
Cryptographic Hash Functions. A cryptographic hash function is a deter-
ministic procedure. It takes an arbitrary block of data and returns a fixed-size
bit string the (cryptographic) hash value, such that an accidental or intentional
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change to the data will change the hash value [82]. The data to be hashed is often
called the message, and the hashes are sometimes called the message digest or
simply digest. The ideal cryptographic hash function has four main properties:
(i) it is easy to compute the hash value for any given message; (ii) it is infeasible
to find a message that has a given hash; (iii) it is infeasible to modify a message
without changing the hash; and (iv) it is infeasible to find two different messages
with the same hash.
Cryptographic hash functions have many information security applications,
notably in DS, MACs, MDCs, and other forms of integrity verifications [90].
They can also be used for other purposes such as indexing data in hash tables,
fingerprinting, detecting duplicate data and accidental data corruption, etc. [90].
Indeed, in information security contexts, cryptographic hash values are sometimes
called (digital) fingerprints or checksums even though all these terms stand for
functions with rather different properties and purposes. In addition, most of the
existing cryptographic hash function schemes unfortunately remain vulnerable
to incidental modifications (i.e., a one bit change in the input will change the
output hashes dramatically) [82]. This severely limits their practical utility in
robust content authentication of digital images (and also of other digital media).
Perceptual Hash Functions. Perceptual hash functions (or, robust percep-
tual hash function, or simply, perceptual hashing) are designated hash functions
for multimedia contents. This type of hash function takes a digital image as input,
and with constructing a content descriptor of the input, outputs a fixed length
binary vector known as perceptual hash or robust hash. This hash is required to be
`invariant under changes to the image that are perceptually insignificant', whereas
`on perceptually distinct inputs, the hash needs to be approximately independent
and hence different with high probability' [91]. A good perceptual hash function
should have the following properties [92]: (i) robust: manipulations that do not
change the perceptual information should not change the hash value; (ii) unique:
perceptually different inputs should have completely different hash values; and
(iii) secure: it should be very hard to find (forge) perceptually different inputs
having similar hash values.
Similar to cryptographic hash functions, perceptual hashing is required to
generate different hash values for different inputs. However, the definition of
difference is changed from bitwise difference to perceptual difference [93]. That
is, unlike getting a very different hash value from a single bit change in the input
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of the cryptographic hash function, perceptual hashes are expected to be different
only with the changes in the perceptual content of the input. For instance, for
a perceptual hash function, the perceptual hash value of an image and its JPEG
compressed version (with an acceptable image quality) should be the same,
since they have no perceptual difference, although their bit-string representation
is completely different [93].
Generally, perceptual hashing consists of feature extraction, randomization
that introduces non-invertibility, and compression followed by quantization and
binary encoding to produce a binary hash output. Most randomization methods
are linear, and this introduces security flaws because known input/hash pairs can
be used to recover a secret key [94]. Furthermore, the quantization and encod-
ing stages require the learning of appropriate quantization thresholds, and the
quantizer training as well as the storage of thresholds that introduce additional
security weaknesses.
Moreover, content-based feature extraction methods using signal processing
techniques are known to be robust but not secure [91]. Kalker [81] described
perceptual (or robust) hashing from the perspective of a neural archiving activities
using clever signal processing and database techniques. The former is responsible
for extracting essential perceptual features, the latter for storing and searching
large amounts of pre-computed hash values. Kalker also exemplified with a typical
scenario, where a local client (e.g ., a mobile phone) is responsible for capturing the
content and transmitting the content (possibly only the hash values if the client
is equipped with a feature extractor) to a central database. The central database
matches the hash values of the unidentified content with the pre-computed hash
values, retrieves the best match, and takes appropriate action (e.g ., sending an
artist name and song title in an SMS message to the requesting client).
File Header. In addition to using the above security measures, appending
meta-data (as a header with the data block) to medical images is a common
practice. Such a header meta-data contain owner ID, size, last modified time,
and location of all data blocks, etc. The size of the header varies depending on
how much header information is to be stored.
The DICOM standard allows a single DICOM file to contain both the image
(pixel data) and the meta-data of the image [95]. Conventionally, each DICOM
medical image is associated with a patient's private data such as patient's name,
age, results of examination/diagnosis, time taken, etc. All these private informa-
30
2.2 Digital Image Watermarking
tion are recorded into a meta-data or header file, which is appended to the image.
The DICOM standard stores the image data and the meta-data separately. This
is obviously dangerous as the link between the image and the textual information
is practically non-existent [57]. For example, for the images with plain-text file-
header, the major threat is the violation of the access rights and the alteration
in the daily logs by the intruder. Hence, breaking of the confidentiality implies
that integrity and authenticity of the data cannot be guaranteed anymore [23].
Furthermore, for an encrypted header, the bit error sensitivity may result
in loss of header and raise further complexity in managing the medical images.
Thus, at the least, the patients' private data in a DICOM image are at risk of
happenings of a mismatch (i.e., linking of meta-data with an incorrect medical
image) and of disclosure and loss of header or meta-data in an image undergoing
some intentional processing (e.g ., compression, file format conversion, etc.).
To conclude from the above discussion, conventional security measures can
be useful for some common security problems in transmission and distribution of
digital images over network. However, they are limited to protect digital images in
establishing their trustworthiness and in detection and localization of any possible
tampering. Particularly, for teleradiology, the limitations of these tools suggest
that they are not sufficient to provide the required security protection of medical
information. The security requirements of medical images will be reviewed in
Section 2.3, in light of the existing standards such as ISO27799 [96] and HIPAA
(Health Insurance Portability and Accountability) [97]. Therefore, as the new
security problems are arising with developments of PACS/RIS (Picture Archiving
and Communication System/Radiology Information System), new measures are
required to be developed and deployed for the improved security of medical images
and EPHI. To this end, digital watermarking can be a complementary tool to
facilitate medical information security protection [14, 98], which yet requires a
proper justification of watermarking applicability for medical images.
2.2.4 Watermarking vs. Other Security Measures/Tools
Digital watermarking has some unique advantages for protecting digital images
(and also other digital media like audio, video), which can be used along with
some existing security measures/tools. For example, encryption, cryptographic
hash function, digital signature, perceptual hashing, etc. can be used for achiev-
ing security properties. Watermarking and other relevant security measures/tools
have been discussed in previous sections (Section 2.2.3). In this section, a com-
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prehensive summary of those tools is presented. This comparison is based on
the key properties and requirements of medical images, which are presented in
Table 2.2.
As Table 2.2 illustrates, cryptographic/perceptual hashing has no impact on
quality of the host-signal, and is suitable for legacy content, but they are ei-
ther bit-sensitive (for cryptographic hash functions), or need access to a central
database to search for a match with a pre-computed hash (for perceptual hash-
ing). However, it is found that a carefully designed watermarking scheme does not
alter medical diagnosis [99]. Although watermarking has an impact, more or less,
on perceptual quality and difficulties with legacy content, Guo and Zhuang [100]
suggested three ways to overcome the distortion induced in images by watermark
embedding. They are: (i) defining acceptable range of distortion for watermark-
ing; (ii) separating an image into protection zone and insertion zone such as
ROI (region of interest) and RONI (region of non-interest); and (iii) considering
watermarking as an invertible manner to recover the original image at the water-
mark decoder site. Hence, ROI indicates the region significant for diagnosis and
other clinical uses, and RONI indicates the complementary region of ROI, which
has lesser or almost no significance in diagnosis.
Defining an acceptable range of distortion in general for different modality
medical images is challenging, since this may require a clinical validation. To
this, Zain et al . [99] validated their work through a clinical study, and shown that
their LSB embedding technique did not alter the medical decision. On the other
hand, separation of ROI and RONI in medical images is not straightforward and
may require the interaction/approval of doctor/radiologist. In addition, making
such separation is challenging, since the performance of the selection technique
may vary with the modality of medical images. However, ROI/RONI embedding
is used in several watermarking schemes [17,18,58]. Besides, developing reversible
watermarking is promising for medical image applications, while taking no risk
for sacrificing the diagnostic accuracy. Reversible schemes also possibly suffer
from discontinuity in security protection and computational overhead problems.
Coatrieux et al . [101] discussed two limitations of reversible watermarking:
(i) it imposes the watermark removal before the diagnosis, and (ii) it assumes a
secured environment because, once the watermark is removed, the image is not
protected anymore like in cryptography. All these suggest that a combination
of suitable type of watermarking schemes, where the concept of multiple water-
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marking stems from, should be developed in order to address the rising security
problems of medical images [58,102104]. Studies also show that incorporation of
asymmetric encryption and lossless compression can help attain additional con-
fidentiality, non-repudiation property, and high embedding capacity [19,51,100].
Watermarking allows the use of digital signature or perceptual hashing for
appropriate applications [59, 102, 110, 111]. It also allows employing encryption
for the additional confidentiality of meta-data (e.g ., in generating watermark).
Memon et al . [41] proposed a digital watermarking scheme, in which watermark
is comprised of patient information, hospital logo, and message authentication
code, computed using hash function. To ensure inaccessibility of embedded data
to the adversaries, BCH (Bose-Chaudhuri-Hocquenghem) encryption is used. For
the same purpose, Li-Qun et al . introduced DSA [112] and digital signature tech-
nology based on RSA public cryptosystem [111], integrating reversible digital
watermarking to form an image authentication scheme.
Furthermore, a few of the recent studies show the use of a compression tech-
nique for attaining the embedding capacity requirements of watermarking. Nam-
bakhsh et al . [113] presented a watermarking method on several computed to-
mography (CT) and magnetic resonance (MRI) images, where the original image
is compressed using the zero-tree wavelet (EZW) algorithm. Raul et al . [109] used
Huffman compression and RC4 method that respectively compress and encrypt
the meta-data in a blind watermarking scheme. Kundu et al . [19] presented a
watermarking scheme that combines lossless data compression and advanced en-
cryption standard for encryption of medical images. In addition, Sung-Jin et
al . [33] proposed an algorithm that utilizes both JPEG 2000 and robust water-
marking for protection and compression of the medical image. Thus, depending
on the application, a choice for the appropriate mixture of various technologies
can be made to devise a suitable watermarking scheme for medical images.
2.3 Medical Image Security
Security problems of medical images are rising with the technological advances.
As discussed in Chapter 1, new digital imaging facilities have not only increased
the image acquisition and storage capacity but also revitalised the medical sector
with various distant medical services; for instance, tele-medicine, tele-radiology,
tele-surgery, and cooperative working sessions. Those services have recently be-
come more useful for doctors and healthcare professionals to ensure high-quality
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Table 2.2: Digital watermarking vs. other security measures/tools.
Properties Digital watermarking Hash function Encryption
Perceptual Cryptographic
Objective Data and copyright
protection
Data protection Data protection Secure com-
munication
Host-signal/
cover-object
Mostly image or audio
data
Mostly image data Plain-text message1 Plain-text
message1
Secret data Watermark   Plain-text
Key Optional Optional Optional Necessary
Input Generally the watermark
and the cover-object or
host-signal
Block of host-signal Block of host-signal Block of host-
signal
Output Watermarked data Hash-values or
message-digest
Hash-values or
message-digest
Cipher-text
Detection type Blind, semi-blind, or
non-blind
Non-blind Non-blind Blind
Failure If an invalid
watermarked image is
detected as valid, or vice
versa (e.g ., from
unauthorized watermark
removal or embedding ).
If the message is
generated back from
the hashes, or if
another message is
found that gives the
same hashes.
Same as perceptual
hash function
If cipher-text
is illicitly de-
ciphered
Impact on cover
object ( e.g.,
quality
degradation)
Yes, but can be
managed by region of
non-interest (RONI)
embedding or reversible
watermarking [32,105,
106]
No No No
Sensitivity to bit
error
Low Low High High
Authentication/
integrity check
of cover data
Yes Yes Yes Yes, but as
long the data
are encrypted
Tampering
localization
Yes (also it offers
possible recovery
option [40,107])
No No No
Annotating
meta-data ( e.g.,
EPR, ETR)
Yes, but capacity is
limited
No No No
Confidentiality
of meta-data
Yesconsidering use of
encryption in
watermark [38,108,109]
No No Yes
Database
requirement
Not required, it can oper-
ate in a stand-alone envi-
ronment [16,81]
Required, for storing
precomputed
perceptual hashes [94]
Not required Not required
File-format
independence
Independent   
1 Image and audio data can be used, if they are represented as plain-text message.
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diagnosis or to seek second opinions all around the world. This also means that
the sharing and distribution of medical images and patients' medical records (or
EPRelectronic patient record) across multiple users thus have significantly been
increased. Consequently, this information is being subject to possible retention
and fraud, distrust and invasion of privacy, and many other legal and ethical
problems.
Additional complexities arise in security management of the medical informa-
tion with the multiple users ranging from administrations, medical professionals
and technologist to researchers and scientists. Different purposes of theses users
impose different requirements, which are generally defined by legislative rules and
widely accepted standards. Some of these standards are studied in the follow-
ing section, before investigating the medical image security requirements and the
expected threats and conventional security measures.
2.3.1 Overview of Security Standards
Medical information security requirements are generally defined by the strict
ethics and legislative rules of the security policy/profile, and concerned entities
must adhere to them. There are many widely used guidelines and standards for
protecting personal health information. The international standard developed for
security management of health information is the ISO27799 (Security Manage-
ment in Health Using ISO/IEC/17799) [96]. This standard provides guidance to
health organizations and other users of personal health information on how to
protect such information. It specifically covers the security management needs in
this sector considering the particular nature of the data involved.
Some countries have their own security and privacy policy; for exam-
ple, USA's Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) [97],
Code of Federal Regulations number 45 (CFR45) [114], and Europe's Directive
95/46/EC [115] are expressions of such a constraint. The HIPAA requires all
the cover entities (i.e., health plans, health care clearing-houses, and health-
care providers) to take measures to ensure the security of medical images and to
protect patient's privacy. Directive 95/46/EC states the legislative rules on the
protection of individuals privacy with regard to the processing and movement of
personal data. In addition, the CFR45 (part 164: security and privacy) includes
a set of standards for the protection of sensitive EPHIelectronic patient health
information.
There is no specialized standard similar to HIPAA or CFR45 in Australia at
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this time, although a similar set of standards is more likely to be required in the
future, if on-line and electronic health records are to be appropriately protected.
As the government regulations in relation to privacy grow throughout the world,
the security of medical images are forced to grow also. The Australian Law
Reform Commission [116] produced the Australian Privacy Law and Practice
Report that is a comprehensive review of the Privacy Act of 1988 (Australian
Law Reform Commission, 2008). That review incorporates privacy regulations
on electronic health information systems.
Digital Imaging and Communication in Medicine (DICOM) [25] was conceived
in 1983 by a joint committee formed by the American College of Radiology (ACR)
and the National Electrical Manufacturers Association (NEMA). Early standards
did not gain universal acceptance among manufacturers. In 1993, ACR-NEMA
version 3.0 was released, and at this time the standard was renamed DICOM 3.0.
This version of that standard has become universal within radiology and has been
adopted in other medical fields such as dentistry, pathology, and cardiology. It
is now commonly known as simply the DICOM standard, an eighteen-part docu-
ment. This standard aims to define a technical framework for application entities
involved in the exchange of medical data to adhere to a set of security profiles.
DICOM also warrants the inclusion of the imaging information as an integral part
of the patient record for the Electronic Health Record (EHR) systems, and has
incorporated digital signatures into DICOM object, which can be used to check
the integrity of medical images.
Huang et al . [29] reviewed a few other European guidelines (e.g . French code of
medical ethics, Informatique et Libertés law ) for security management of medical
data. Review of all these standards, recommendations and guidelines, including
the above mentioned, suggest the following:
(a) Information quality. Quality of all medical information is always to be
preserved and reliable from the both medical professionals and patients'
considerations. The term quality can have a range of specificities such as
relevance, accuracy, actuality etc. as reported in [29]
(b) Secrecy. All the medical information should be considered as highly sen-
sitive and confidential, and should be always protected in their uses. Any
disclosure of medical information, even with no intent to harm, is a breach
of secrecy.
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(c) Professional responsibilities. All the medical professionals and concerned
entities (e.g . doctors, radiologist, and others, who are not specifically identi-
fied) are obliged to keep professional secrecy along with other service guide-
lines.
(d) Patients' authority. A patient must have the authority of the information
and rights to consent for disclosure of any information.
2.3.2 General Security Requirements
The standards and their technical frameworks, strict ethics, and legislative rules,
as mentioned above, give rights to the patient and duties to the health profes-
sionals. Development and implementation of the security and privacy protection
services derived from the standards depend upon the health care model or in-
frastructure and its concerned entities. Different health care services may have
different infrastructure. As mentioned in Section 2.1, this chapter considers the
distant medical services such as teleradiology as a general medical image applica-
tion area.
Ruotsalainen [30] has studied two widely used models in today's teleradiol-
ogy to determine their security requirements. The most commonly used model
in teleradiology is based on off-line messaging. The other model incorporates
the on-line delivery of distributed imaging services and allows a radiological in-
formation system to be spread over an electronic network. Irrespective of the
communication type (i.e., off-line or on-line), three individual domains, namely:
(a) host organization/hospital's PACS/RIS (domain A), (b) communication net-
work (domain B), and (c) consultant (domain C ) are responsible to provide the
required security in a teleradiology system (see Fig. 2.3). On the other hand,
in radiology, security concerns arise only from domain A (e.g ., from acquisition
of medical images to storing them in PACS at the same hospital). Therefore, as
pointed out in Section 2.1, the security requirements for teleradiology also include
the security requirements for radiology.
In an off-line model, the security domains are isolated and communication is
made via interfaces, whereas on-line teleradiology maintains communication with
a remote consultant allowing access to the local PACS/RIS services of the legacy
system [30]. However, based on the technological and organisational models used
in teleradiology, their various security requirements can be outlined below [30,
117]:
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Figure 2.3: Teleradiology model.
(a) All concerned entities/domains (e.g ., the PACS/RIS in hospital or clinic,
communication network, and consultant/radiologist at distant place) must
have the same level of security and protection.
(b) In all domains, proper authorization processes must be employed with access
and user controls, transmission controls, and directive controls.
(c) Integrity, authenticity, and confidentiality of all radiological information
have to be ensured during teleradiology sessions, consultation processes,
and information processing, management, and preservation.
The principle of those requirements imposes three security properties for med-
ical information [23,29,117,118]: confidentiality, reliability, and availability.
(a) Confidentialityensures that only the entitled users have access to the per-
sonal medical information.
(b) Reliability based on the outcomes of: (i) authenticitya proof that the
information belongs to the correct patient and issued from the right source,
and (ii) integritythe information has not been modified by non-authorized
people.
(c) Availabilitywarrants an information system to be used in the normal
scheduled conditions of access.
On the other hand, the above security concept derived from the related stan-
dards, can be established through different stages. For example, Baur et al . [117]
outlined four major stages as follows.
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(a) Determination of the appropriate level of securitymay include determin-
ing security levels of all entities and objects (e.g ., IT applications and in-
formation sets) linked with the teleradiology system.
(b) Threat analysishelps determine the expected threats from the involved
objects (e.g ., infrastructure, hardware, software, paper-ware).
(c) Risk analysishelps quantify the damages for all the identified threats and
their occurring frequency.
(d) Establishment of security conceptdeals with either reducing the probabil-
ity of occurrence of the threats, or reducing the damage if an adverse event
is unavoidable. This includes selection of suitable measures that reduce the
risks to a tolerant level, evaluation of the selected measures, examining the
cost-effect relationship as well as analysing any further risk.
Therefore, as an important aspect of information security and risk manage-
ment, attention is given to recognizing the value of information and defining
appropriate procedures and protection requirements for the information in terms
of the expected threats in the medical image applications.
2.3.3 Expected Threats and Their Security Measures
Identifying the vulnerability of a system is important to define appropriate pro-
cedures or security-measures, since the strength of any system is no greater than
its weakest link. For example, medical images may pass through various image-
information processing systems over the networks, and thereby, the images can be
threatened throughout their lifetime in many different ways. A complete protec-
tion agaist those threats means having individual protection mechanisms for each
component of the processing system that the images may pass through. With
particular attention to the medical information, here the suitable measures that
provide the required security and privacy services for the information and the
communication are investigated.
Several existing security measures are currently being used such as access con-
trol services, firewall, encryption, de-identification services, certification services,
etc. Further, the possibilities of new measures such as digital watermarking, digi-
tal signature and robust image hashing are currently being studied. According to
the security requirements discussed in the previous section, a review of expected
threats and their conventional security measures are summarized in Table 2.3.
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Table 2.3: Security requirements for medical information.
Security
requirement
Threats Security measures
Confidentiality Disclosures and re-routing
of the information:
(a) during transmission:
interception and
illicit copying of files
and records
(b) in the database:
resulting in intrusion,
identity usurpation,
or Trojan Horse virus
that keeps an open
access through the
network
Encryption of the data
Limiting lifetime of data
Private communication network (e.g .,
virtual private network)
Access control services (against
unauthorized person, illegal copy,
identity usurpation, etc.) using
smart card, firewall, etc.
User control services for authenticating
and identifying the user against
identity usurpation, etc.
Reliability:
authenticity and
integrity
Illicit destruction,
production, and/
modification of the
contents of files and records
One-way hash function or robust hash
function or digital signature (DS)
Encryption of the data
File header, audit logs for recording of
data transmission
Certification of communication partners
Access control services for writing,
reading, and manipulation of data
User control services for authenticating
and identifying the user against
identity usurpation
Software accreditation and use of
anti-virus and firewall for virus and
malicious intrusion
Non-repudiation services and e-signing
Availability File management system
disablement, destruction of
a hard disk, or an attacker
who disrupts or alters
surreptitiously the
organization or content of
the data
Access control services for writing,
reading, and manipulation of data
User control services for authenticating
and identifying the user against
identity usurpation
Private communication network
Software accreditation, and use of
anti-virus and firewall for virus and
malicious intrusion
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2.4 Watermarking Schemes for Medical Images
Popularity of the Internet has become a boon to patients and small-budget hospi-
tals to utilize the facility to communicate with the clinicians for clinical diagnosis
purposes [35], where the security of medical images can presumably be addressed
to a considerable extent by inserting a properly selected additional data into med-
ical images by digital watermarking. The application to medical images is there-
fore one of the prospective target areas of digital watermarking research. Studies
show that various watermarking schemes can be used for (i) origin/content au-
thentication [17, 41, 57, 104, 119123], (ii) EPR annotation [38, 46, 68, 124], and
(iii) tampering detection and recovery of medical images [16, 32, 40, 125, 126].
Some important aspects of medical image watermarking schemes for their differ-
ent objectives are summarized below.
Origin/Content Authentication. Authentication has received much interest
in watermarking research for origin/content authentication of medical images.
Important details can be stored in images imperceptibly, causing no harm to the
ROI in the images. Such brief descriptions can be hidden in images immedi-
ately after the production of the images in the radiology departments. This can
be done by incorporating a watermarking process in different imaging devices
namely, CT or MRI scanners. Using the permanent association of watermarks,
the security of data in a database system can be ensured. For example, a suitably
designed watermark can be used for granting and revoking user privileges, and for
authorization control. The following requirements for this type of watermarking
in teleradiology have been determined, from understanding of the objectives and
realizing the application scenario: (i) the watermark should be invisible, blind,
and robust ; (ii) watermark should incorporate the minimum information required
for the origin authentication; (iii) embedding process must consider the RONI ;
and (iv) proper validation of a watermarking scheme such that the permanent
association of the watermark is reliable and safe for diagnosis.
For validation of a watermarking scheme, although it is generally required for
any scheme chosen for an application, extra care on watermarked image quality
is required for irreversible embedding. Additionally, this type of watermarking
should incorporate the RONI embedding for the reliable clinical uses of medical
images. However, if a reversible watermarking is used, respective security re-
quirements are to be reconsidered as reversible watermarking assumes a secure
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environment as discussed in Section 2.2.4.
EPR Annotation. The EPR (electronic patient record) and other useful medi-
cal information annotation is another key objective for medical image watermark-
ing. Navas et al . [127] suggested three key requirements for EPR data hiding and
transmission: (i) recovery of the EPR should be blind due to the unavailability
of the original image; (ii) zero bit-error rate (BER) is essential for EPR data;
and (iii) imperceptibility should not be compromised for any reason. These re-
quirements suggest necessary criteria of a medical image watermarking scheme
to be invisible, blind, and reversible. Such a watermarking scheme can be either
robust or semi-fragile. For higher capacity, the watermarking scheme can be semi-
fragile, although it requires defining the set of appropriate operations/processing,
to which the scheme needs to be robust or not to be robust. A bit-error correc-
tion technique can be used for attaining zero BER and improving watermarking
performance [128,129]. For additional confidentiality, encryption of the EPR can
also be used in watermark generation [129,130].
Tampering Detection and Recovery (Integrity Verification). Medical
images in different radiological modalities such as X-rays, US, and MRI contain
vital medical information that can be tampered with using easily available image
processing tools. Thus, their protection and authentication are of great impor-
tance, which will advance further with the future standardization of data exchange
between hospitals, or between patients and doctors [123]. Integrity of a medical
image can be verified in three levels [131]: (i) tampering detection, (ii) tamper-
ing localization, and (iii) possible recovery by approximating the tampered region.
Attaining this (and other) requirement(s) of medical images needs a watermark
to be (i) fragile and blind and (ii) reversible or RONI-based-embedding. Hence,
fragile watermarking helps locate the tampered region considering that a wa-
termark becomes invalid for any malicious or unintentional modifications in the
watermarked image.
If the origin authentication of a medical image is achieved by the robust wa-
termarking, fragile watermarking (in the form of multiple watermarking) can be
used to further locate and possibly recover any tampered region of the water-
marked image. This will allow the user to verify authenticity and integrity of
medical images at the same time. In this case, if the watermarking is RONI-
based instead of reversible, then the limit to additional distortion must be taken
care of. Similar to EPR annotative watermarking, LSB-embedding-based water-
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marking are usually considered for tampering detection and recovery, since high
capacity is required for the both applications.
2.5 Discussion
The study of security and privacy problems is a continuous process and is mainly
influenced by the technological advances in the field. It has been more than a
decade since digital watermarking was first studied for medical image applications
(i.e., finding relevance and suitability, and developing of new schemes and their
evaluation). Since then, much progress in digital watermarking has been evident.
However, in practice, watermarking for medical images has not been widely ac-
cepted yet. This study reveals that such a scepticism is mainly arising from the
both of: (i) not using a standard approach, and (ii) an incomplete justification,
of watermarking applicability for medical images.
The need for sharing medical images and information is growing rapidly for
improved healthcare access, delivery, and standards. Technology for web-based
services has recently been widely proposed and gradually adopted as a plat-
form for supporting systems' integration [132]. The DICOM standard as well
as ISO27799 and other government regulations such as HIPAA, CFR45, Direc-
tive 95/46/EC, etc., impose rules as national/international standards to protect
individuals' health information, highlighting security and privacy protection re-
quirements. Three mandatory requirements have been reported in the literature
for medical image security: confidentiality, reliability, and availability. The find-
ings of the investigation presented in this chapter supports previous research and
verifies that those three requirements are also equally applicable for teleradiology.
However, a complete solution for various security problems discussed so far
is still lacking. Although conventional security measures have their limitations,
they cannot be replaced with any individual measure. For example, authentica-
tion based on watermarking cannot replace classical cryptographic authentication
protocols that protect communication channels [133]. Further, well-known cryp-
tographic algorithms can be used as a building block in watermarking to guaran-
tee the privacy, authenticity, and integrity of messages embedded in multimedia
content like digital images [134]. Along with conventional tools, watermarking
thus can complement the security of medical data. Particularly, watermarking
provides a great prospect for teleradiology, since it functions as a communica-
tion tool towards attaining the required security properties like authenticity and
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integrity.
This investigation also captures the non-security requirements for watermark-
ing of medical images. In general, one observation is that a watermarking scheme
can be invisible and blind for medical image applications. Additionally, the ro-
bustness, reversibility, RONI-based-embedding, and other design criteria can be
considered depending on the target application. Although it is not identified as
a general requirement, a prior clinical validation of a watermarking scheme may
always be subject to its medical image application irrespective of the type and
properties of the watermark(s). Thus, any permanent or temporary (in other
words, lossy or lossless respectively) modifications resulting from the watermark
embedding will remain reliable and safe for diagnosis.
In the literature, authentication (e.g ., origin or content) is found to be the
primary objective for medical images [17,41,57,104,119123]. Authentication of
medical images is important because of (i) its importance from patients' correct
diagnosis, and also (ii) the possibility of frauds. EPR annotation and integrity
verification (or, tampering detection and recovery) can be the secondary goal(s)
to form a multiple watermarking scheme. Thereby, a properly designed multiple
watermarking scheme can be capable of addressing the rising security problems
in teleradiology. However, the concept of a multiple watermarking scheme is not
new, and its applicability to medical images naturally requires further considera-
tion regarding overall computational complexity, speed, and cost-benefit analysis,
performance and security needs.
Further, in watermarking research, a number of criteria that are commonly
considered in performance evaluation of watermarking schemes, have been identi-
fied; for example, (i) the higher is the betterfor evaluating embedding capacity,
perceptual similarity, etc., and (ii) the lower is the betterfor evaluating dis-
tortion, error probabilities, etc. These criteria are quite usual in practice for
validating a new scheme. But, if there is no specific thresholds for those eval-
uation criteria, a watermarking scheme for any applications cannot be properly
validated (at least, without comparing it with the existing schemes and where
there is no standard reference). In other words, these thresholds help determine
if different design and evaluation criteria are fulfilled, in an application scenario.
However, determining the thresholds for watermarking performance evalua-
tion is challenging as it depends not only on the technical validation, but also
on a general acceptance by the medical professionals and patients. For exam-
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ple, in medical image compression research [135, 136], it was reported that the
minimum distortion (of about 40dB in terms of PSNR) may not affect the clin-
ical decision. But, later evaluating subjective quality using PSNR is found
to be not always reliable [137]. In addition, a watermarking scheme that al-
ters all the pixels in either reversibly or irreversibly, may not win over the legal
and ethical restrictions of the medical images. Here, RONI-based-embedding can
be advantageous, but proper selection and its clinical approval can be an ad-
ditional problem. Therefore, choosing suitable measures for evaluation criteria
and finding their thresholds have remained as fundamental problems in medical
image watermarking. This problem also means that until a complete validation
of watermarking schemes becomes possible, ad-hoc developments of the schemes
may continue to grow however, are less likely to be commercially viable for any
applications.
In support of addressing these problems, it can be expected that sufficient
technical evidence and strong opinions on the watermarking applicability for
medical images would change the perspective of medical professionals and pa-
tients, and thus change the standards and legislative guidelines as well. However,
attaining this would require: (i) making realistic assumptions for systematic de-
velopment of medical image watermarking schemes, and (ii) complete evaluation
with a properly defined set of evaluation criteria. Hence, a complete watermark-
ing model, well-defined watermarking properties, expected attack models, and
complete security analysis can be a set of milestones for the current research.
This is what the following chapters in this thesis will seek to address.
2.6 Chapter Summary
This chapter has presented a comprehensive literature review and the findings
of the initial investigation in two parts; namely, (i) digital watermarking and its
application to medical images, and (ii) medical images and their security require-
ments. Specifically:
• The suitability of digital watermarking have been justified for the multi-
modal medical image applications. Conventional security measures have
been studied and their general limitations are identified. None of those
measures are found capable to individually address the rising security con-
cerns of medical images, where digital watermarking are found promising to
address the limitations and thereby to complement the security protection
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of the images.
• Using teleradiology as an appropriate example of distant medical services
and reviewing some widely used standards, the security and non-security
requirements of watermarking for medical images (i.e., confidentiality, re-
liability : integrity and authenticity, and availability) have been discussed.
This chapter has also outlined the expected threats and discussed their
possible security measures in medical image applications.
• The design and evaluation criteria have been studied and some objective
recommendations have been made to characterize a watermarking scheme.
A watermarking scheme for the medical image application can be generally
invisible and blind. A prior clinical validation may also be required, along
with a proper consideration of other necessary criteria. However, no clearly
defined thresholds for the performance evaluation criteria and no standard
approach to use them have been identified. This would naturally make it
difficult to choose a suitable watermarking scheme for an application.
• This chapter has also discussed how an incomplete consideration of de-
sign and evaluation criteria are affecting the development of watermarking
schemes to be commercially viable for medical image applications. To ad-
dress this problem, the need for developing watermarking model, defining
fundamental watermarking properties, defining attack models, etc. have
been pointed out.
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Chapter Organization
This chapter presents a novel formal generic model for digital image wa-
termarking, as the previous chapter pointed out the need for such a model.
The use of this model in defining fundamental watermarking properties
and possible attacks are also demonstrated. Section 3.2 reviews the related
works. Considering possible inputs, outputs, and component functions, a
basic watermarking model and its further development to incorporate the
use of keys, are presented in Section 3.3. On the basis of the developed
model, Section 3.4 presents the definitions of fundamental watermarking
properties and their roles and significance for image applications. Sec-
tion 3.5 presents a set of possible attacks showing winning scenarios de-
pending on capabilities of the adversary. In section 3.6, research findings
and contributions of this chapter are discussed. Section 3.7 presents the
chapter summary. (The original contributions discussed in this chapter
resulted in a number of publications, see Appendices D.4 and D.7.)
3.1 Introduction
Digital watermarking has already justified its suitability for different multime-
dia applications as discussed in the previous chapter (Section 2.2). Once again,
watermarking generally operates on digital media or cover objects (e.g ., image,
audio, video) and is considered to have three major components: watermark
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generation, embedding, and detection. Watermark generation yields the desired
watermark, which can optionally depend on some keys. The generated water-
mark is embedded into the cover object by the watermark embedding, sometimes
based on an embedding key. During detection, the embedded watermark in a
cover object is extracted and verified. The basic realization of watermarking may
be valid for other multimedia applications; however, as discussed in the research
scope (Section 1.4), attention is restricted in this thesis only to the digital image
applications.
An image watermarking application may have different objectives, which de-
termines necessary watermarking properties for the application. As discussed
in last chapter (Section 2.2), these objectives can be of two types: (i) security
objectives (e.g ., authentication of the watermarked image) and (ii) non-security
objectives (e.g ., annotation for an efficient image-database management). Achiev-
ing these objectives requires determining and considering necessary properties of
the individual watermarking components. The watermark generation and em-
bedding properties generally include visibility, blindness, embedding capacity, and
perceptual similarity. Similarly, blindness, robustness, error probability, etc. are
studied for the watermark detection. (These properties will be formally defined
later in Section 3.4. Until then, inverted commas are used in referring to them for
their abstract meaning.) A general consideration of these properties, however, is
difficult due to the diverse requirements of the applications. Consequently, with-
out a proper consideration of the properties and the application scenarios, various
watermarking schemes are being developed (i.e., designed and evaluated).
Proper consideration of watermarking properties and application scenarios,
on the other hand, is highly critical for the development and use of a water-
marking scheme. A loose consideration of the properties may affect the overall
watermarking performance. Similarly, an improper realization of an application
scenario may leave security vulnerabilities. For example, if the development (i.e.,
design and evaluation) of a scheme is motivated by the high embedding capacity
and high perceptual similarity requirements (and thus ignores the other prop-
erties), the scheme may eventually require high embedding time. On the other
hand, in an image content authentication application, if the scenario is not con-
sidered properly (e.g ., a watermark is generated without considering the required
properties such as collision resistance property), the scheme can have security
flaws and may not be reliable in practice (Chapter 4). Therefore, a systematic
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development of watermarking schemes is essential.
A systematic development means to have mathematical formalism and oper-
ation determination for watermarking schemes. Here, operation determination
helps identify the objectives and properties of a watermarking scheme with their
explicit considerations for an application scenario, and mathematical formalism
is used to specify them. An informal study of watermarking is easier to grasp
first, but its formal study is desirable since formalism has several benefits: (i) the
potential to provide rigorous analysis of the required watermarking properties,
(ii) the completeness for resolving ambiguities and misconceptions, and (iii) the
readiness for supporting a computer aided fashion of analysis.
However, the present development of watermarking schemes is rather informal,
ad hoc, and usually omits the realization of the application scenarios as mentioned
above. This practice not only hinders watermarking applications from choosing a
suitable scheme, but also leads to debate about the state-of-the-art for different
watermarking applications. Addressing this problem requires a formal generic
model with well defined properties of digital watermarking as a basis for its formal
study. Since watermarking may also need to achieve various security properties
(along with any non-security objectives), the expected adversary capabilities must
also be considered.
In support of a systematic development (i.e., design and evaluation) of the
watermarking schemes, this chapter aims at developing a formal generic model of
digital image watermarking. As mentioned in Chapter 1, a generic and formally
defined watermarking model gives the big picture of watermarking and helps
identify all of its possible variants for different (image, video, etc.) applications.
In other words, by determining the required (watermarking) inputs, outputs, and
properties for different objectives, this model helps characterize a watermarking
scheme. Using the presented model, a set of watermarking properties based
on the application requirements is sought to be defined. The presented model
also helps thorough analysis of watermarking schemes. An incomplete model
here may lead to an inadequate computational analysis of a scheme resulting in
various technical flaws and protocol weaknesses, which can be exploited later by
an adversary. To this end, a set of possible attacks are also be studied to show
the winning conditions for an adversary in different scenarios.
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3.2 Current State of Watermarking Models
The construction of an appropriate general model is a fundamental need for wa-
termarking, for its systematic development and use as discussed above; however,
some relevant research covers the adjoining fields of steganography and data-
hiding [138150]. This section reviews different models proposed for watermark-
ing (or its adjoining fields) and thoroughly considers a set of selected criteria to
study them. Considering objectives, inputs-outputs, component functions, and
underlying theory, those models are studied below. Table 3.1 presents the review
summary of those models.
Jian and Koch [139] presented a model for the abstraction of digital water-
marking schemes. From the steganography and spread spectrum communication
concepts, that model provides a common basis for performance evaluation of some
earlier schemes. However, the inputs and outputs are incomplete for a general
watermarking scenario. For example, a watermark is not clearly defined and
considered as an identification code using bit-noisethe bit-stream of noise-like
signals. Therefore, analysing various security issues (e.g ., vector quantization
attacks [71] arising from an input image independent watermark generation),
and abstraction of new schemes (which are not spread-spectrum communication
based) may require a further development of that model.
Petitcolas et al . [138] illustrated a digital watermark embedding and recov-
ery model from an information hiding viewpoint. To give an overview of the
technique, a simplified data-hiding scenario is considered and thus any formal
definition of the inputs, outputs, and component functions are omitted. The
model, therefore, remains limited to describe a watermarking scheme in a more
complete sense. For example, how the watermarking key and/or the mark (which
represents either a fingerprinthidden serial number, or a watermarkhidden
copyright message) is chosen/generated needs to be explicitly defined.
In order to analyse watermarking as a classical communication system for
digital multimedia data, Cox et al . [145] introduced a generic communication
model of watermarking. In that model, individual vectors generalize cover-data
and distortion. Distortion is assumed to be additive, and a real valued function is
considered to measure perceptual distance between content vectors. That model
is suitable to describe an optimal embedding scheme that embeds a watermark
with its largest possible size (in bits) to offer the highest possible detection ability.
There may be some variants of such an embedding scheme (depending upon
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Table 3.1: Summary of models used in relevant studies.
Model in
Use
Objectives Inputs & Outputs Component
Functions
Underlying
Theory
Limitations
Jian and
Koch et
al . [139]
To describe digital
watermarking schemes
Original data
Watermarked data
Degraded data (as a
copy of
watermarked data)
Identification code (as
watermark)
Embedding (bit-carrier
selector, bit-noise
generator, bit-carrier
modifier)
Extraction (bit-carrier
selector, bit-pattern
matching)
Steganography
Spread-
spectrum
communica-
tions
Signal
processing
Limited consideration of the inputs,
outputs, component-functions, and
watermarking properties for image
applications
Limited to spread-spectrum
communication based watermarking
schemes
O'Sullivan
et al . [142]
To determine the optimal hiding
strategy, where watermarking
is considered as a game
between an attacker and
information hider
Input and output data
(e.g ., images, audio,
etc. as a vector)
Message (as
watermark)
Encoder
Decoder
Information
theory
Steganography
Limited consideration of the image
application scenarios, inputs,
outputs, component-functions, and
watermarking properties
Cox et
al . [145]
To examine the similarities
between watermarking and
traditional communication
models
Cover-data (as a
vector)
Watermark message
Watermarked
cover-data
Perceptual distance
function
Encoding function
Extraction function
Mixing function
Spread-
spectrum
communica-
tions
Limited consideration of image
application scenarios (e.g ., that use
only spread spectrum based
schemes), inputs, outputs,
component functions, and
watermarking properties
Petitcolas
et al . [138]
To illustrate a simplified case of
watermarking concept
Mark (as fingerpring
or watermark)
Stego-image
Marked-image
Embedding
Recovery
Information
hiding
Limited consideration of inputs,
outputs, and components
May not be useful to study image
watermarking schemes rigorously
Cohen and
Lapidoth
et al . [143]
To compute the coding capacity
of the watermarking game for
a Gaussian cover text and
squared mean error distortions
Cover-text
Message
Stego-text
Secret key
Encoder
Decoder
Game theory
Information
theory
Limited consideration of inputs,
outputs, and components
Watermarking is considered as a game
in a copyright application scenario
Continued on next page
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Table 3.1: Summary of models  continued.
Model in
Use
Objectives Inputs & Outputs Component
Functions
Underlying
Theory
Limitations
Adelsbach
et al . [146]
To analyse security of
watermarking schemes
against protocol attacks (e.g .,
copy, ambiguity attacks)
Unwatermarked object
Watermarked object
Watermark
Key
Key generation
Embedding
Detection
Cryptography Limited consideration of inputs,
outputs, and components
Application scenarios are limited
to dispute resolving protocols
Barni et
al . [148]
To provide a general security
framework for robust
watermark
Original content
Watermark
Watermarked content
Key (for embedding
and detection)
Embedding (feature
extraction and mixing,
watermark generation
Decoding
Information
theory
Cryptography
Signal
processing
The concept of fair and unfair
attacks may not be realistic
Limited consideration of inputs,
outputs, and components (e.g .,
what original content includes)
Li et
al . [147]
To illustrate the formulation of
the security definitions and
the attacker models
Original and
watermarked work
(as a vector)
Watermark (as bit
sequence)
Watermark generation
Watermark embedding
Watermark detector
Perceptual distance
function
Data-hiding
Cryptography
Signal
processing
Limited consideration of inputs
and outputs
The model is represents only a
simplified case of watermarking
Moulin et
al . [150]
To evaluate hiding capacity in
an optimal attack context (as
a data-hiding game)
Host-data (image,
audio, video, etc.)
Message
Side information
Composite data
(contains hidden
message)
Encoder
Decoder
Information
theory
Data-hiding
Game theory
Limited consideration of inputs,
outputs, and component
functions (e.g ., inputs and
outputs are not conventional
for watermarking)
Mittel-
holzer [140]
To characterize embedding
process and attacked
stego-image (for analysing
secrecy and robustness in
terms of mutual information)
Cover-data
Key
Secret message
Stego-encoder
Stego-channel
Stego-decoder
Information
theory
Steganography
Limited consideration of inputs,
outputs, and component
functions
More related to steganography
schemes
Continued on next page
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Table 3.1: Summary of models  continued.
Model in
Use
Objectives Inputs & Outputs Component
Functions
Underlying
Theory
Limitations
Cachin [144] To quantify
steganographic
security
Cover-text
Stego-text
Secret key
Key generation
Embedding
Extraction
Information
theory
Steganography
Limited consideration of inputs,
outputs, and component functions
More related to steganography schemes
Limited to the passive attack scenarios
Adelsbach et
al . [141]
To formalize
robustness
considered as a
core security
property, of
watermarking
Cover-data
Stego-data
Watermark
Key (for embedding
and detection)
Secret parameter
(used as key-
generation input)
Key generation
Embedding
Detection
Cryptography Limited consideration of inputs,
outputs, and component functions
Limited to robust watermarking
schemes
53
Chapter 3. Watermarking Model, Properties and Attacks
different watermarking properties like blindness, robustness etc.). that can
also be described using that model (by defining the functions in different ways).
However, that model may not help to define and analyse an image watermarking
scheme completely, because of its limited consideration of the inputs, outputs,
and/or use of keys, in some application scenarios (e.g ., authentication, tampering
detection and recovery, etc.).
Mittelholzer [140] developed a theoretical model to define a case of the em-
bedding process and malicious modification, of a stego-message. The embedding
process considers hiding a secret stego-message (as watermark), and thus mainly
aims at achieving confidentiality and robustness properties in terms of mutual
information. That model provides a theoretical basis for designing some water-
marking schemes, for example, where the cover images have statistically Gaussian
components. The model, however, may not be able to address many other wa-
termarking properties due to limited considerations of the inputs, outputs and
component functions. For example, the blindness property that helps determine
the requirements of other inputs (different from the input image and watermark),
which are not considered in the model.
Following a thorough security analysis, Li et al . [147] referred to a general
watermarking model. Unlike many other models, that model considers the basic
component functions more completely using the signal processing paradigm. It
also allows a more structured approach to define various threat models. However,
the model still has limited specifications of the inputs and outputs of its compo-
nents. For example, a watermarking scheme may have other inputs (in addition
to the input image and other multimedia signal referred to as work) to generate
the watermark, which are not present in the model. As a result, it represents only
a simplified case of watermarking and may not help realize the overall scenarios
completely for the security or other watermarking requirements.
Barni et al . [148] presented a watermarking model to generally tackle the se-
curity analysis using an attack classification inspired by cryptographic models.
Their model includes two main functions: watermark embedding and decoding.
The embedding function has three steps: feature extraction from the original
content; watermark generation from the message using a key; and feature mixing
with the watermark. The decoding function decodes the hidden message from wa-
termarked version using a decoding key. This realization indeed presents a basic
watermarking application scenario. However, a more complete set of inputs and
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outputs, and the separation of functions (for example, separating watermark gen-
eration from embedding, and message decoding from watermark detection) may
help describe a watermarking scheme with more insights for a broader application
scenario. Besides, although modelling the watermark as a game is compelling for
the security analysis, the concept of fair and unfair attacks may not be realistic.
Watermarking has also been studied [142,143,149,150] using the formal con-
cepts of game theory and information theory. O'Sullivan et al . [142] suggested
watermarking can be defined as a game played between an information hider and
an adversary. The attacker and information hider scenarios are further studied
for watermarking [143,149]. Later, Moulin and O'Sullivan [150] formalized a dis-
tortion function, watermarking code, and attack channel. The main limitation of
the models used to demonstrate the game scenarios in those studies is that they
only represent a set of cases of watermarking. Such an approach of defining a
model can help address particular problems for an application, but may not be
able to represent the overall watermarking scenario (which is required to develop
a unified watermarking theory). In other studies [141,146], watermarking models
are used as an abstraction of security proofs.
Different models, discussed so far, are generalized in different ways for digital
media in support of the respective studies. Some of them are influenced by the un-
derlying concept of steganography [139,140,142,144], cryptography [141,146148],
information theory [140,142144,150], or spread spectrum communication [145].
In many cases [138141, 146, 148], a key is used but their respective properties
are not clearly defined, especially in achieving a specific security property. Wa-
termark generation and its general inputs-outputs are not considered in most of
them [138141, 146]. A few researchers [139141, 145] define necessary proper-
ties for their model, while others do not. All the above mentioned schemes are
mainly motivated by the robust watermarking scenarios (e.g ., copyright pro-
tection), where unauthorized removal is of core interest. Moreover, the general
models studied so far are mostly incomplete either in terms of: (i) considering the
inputs, outputs, and basic components, (ii) defining necessary properties, and/or
(iii) realizing the application scenarios. It is therefore concluded that despite
having a basic need for it, a formal generic image watermarking model is still
lacking.
Addressing the identified gap in watermarking literature, in the following sec-
tions, a formal generic watermarking model is developed, the need for it is ex-
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plored, and the necessary explanations and clarifications are incorporated. A
relatively complete set of fundamental watermarking properties and wide range
of application scenarios are considered, for digital images. With the aid of some
practical examples, the uses of the properties addressing a few hidden assump-
tions in current practice are also shown. Further, the set of expected adversaries
are considered to show how they can win with a particular attack. These contribu-
tions are presented in three parts: (i) a formal watermarking model (Section 3.3),
(ii) definitions and uses of fundamental properties (Section 3.4), and (iii) possible
attacks on the watermarking security (Section 3.5).
3.3 A Novel Formal Generic Watermarking
Model
A formal generic watermarking model is of great importance. It is one of the most
fundamental requirements for conceptualizing, systematic development and eval-
uation of the watermarking schemes, as discussed in Section 3.1. It helps avoid
any confusion and misconceptions by defining the necessary inputs, outputs, and
component functions of a watermarking scheme. The watermarking schemes de-
scribed using a formal model offer the readiness for implementation and computer
aided fashion of analysis. The required properties and design criteria of a water-
marking application can also be defined by the model, which helps characterize a
watermarking scheme for the application. The model provides a means for defin-
ing attack models and thus for carrying out a rigorous analysis of a watermarking
scheme. Moreover, a generic watermarking model creates a common platform for
all possible watermarking schemes. Such a platform is expected not only to give
a designer sufficient flexibility to describe any watermarking scheme, but also to
help others understand the scheme in a systematic way. However, as concluded
in Section 3.2, a formal generic image watermarking model is still lacking.
This section therefore presents a construction of a novel formal generic water-
marking model in two stages, namely the basic model and the key-based model.
The challenge here is to consider a complete set of watermarking inputs, out-
puts, and component functions in general from their specific information domains
and function families. However, the problem can be reduced to a watermarking
application(s), where a set of possible inputs, outputs and component functions
can be defined in general to capture the fundamental properties of prominent
schemes proposed today for the application(s). The research scope is therefore
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narrowed down to only the watermarking applications in digital images, and
start constructing a basic model with considering the possible watermarking in-
puts, outputs, component functions used in the applications. Later, a key-based
model is developed by incorporating keys to the basic model for completeness
(Section 3.3.2). This would allow a designer to achieve any required security
properties (e.g ., authentication, confidentiality) and to employ any suitable cryp-
tographic technique as a building block in a watermarking scheme.
3.3.1 Construction of a Basic Model
A basic model, as it implies, is expected to represent a basic scenario for the
image watermarking applications. As will be discussed in Section 4.1, the early
developments of watermarking schemes mainly considered that if the watermark
is kept hidden, it can be secure. Although use of keys are essential for the
security requirements, we start with developing a model that represents the earlier
watermarking schemes. We then extend the model that incorporates keys to study
the state-of-the-art watermarking schemes.
Therefore, the fundamental components and their possible inputs and out-
puts of a basic watermarking scheme are firstly identified. Irrespective of the
system and security requirements, a watermarking scheme can have three funda-
mental components as mentioned in Section 3.1 and shown in Fig. 3.1. In order
for their systematic definition, three functions are considered: watermark gener-
ation, G (·), embedding, E (·), and detection, DX (·), and define their possible
inputs and outputs as shown in Table 3.2. The primary roles of these functions
in an image watermarking application are described below. To denote different
data (e.g ., inputs and outputs) within this context, in what follows, plain-letters
indicate the original versions, and respective single-bar letters and tilde-letters
indicate their watermarked and estimated versions accordingly.
Watermark Generation, G (·). This function generates a suitable watermark
according to the watermarking objectives in an application. In a simple data-
hiding application, a watermark can be the embedding-data such as the message,
m or the other image-data, j itself (along with any side information). In an
advanced application, a watermark may be required to have certain properties
(depending upon the watermarking objectives). For example, in a copyright
protection application, a watermark may need to be robust against certain
processing techniques and/or attacks. Failure to consider those properties may
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Figure 3.1: Fundamental components of (digital) image watermarking: (a) watermark
generation, (b) watermark embedding, and (c) watermark detection.
result in technical flaws and security vulnerabilities (as discussed in Section 3.1).
Although watermark generation is mainly constrained by the required properties,
it starts with necessary inputs and their properties. For an image application,
the generation function, G (·), can take image-data, i, and message, m and/or
other image data, j as input, and outputs a watermark, w.
Watermark Embedding, E (·). As the data-hiding component, watermark
embedding function considers where and how to embed the watermark satisfying
various requirements of the cover objects (here, digital images). For example, a
perceptual similarity requirements (that controls which pixels can be modified
to what extent) of medical images may limit the embedding region. There are
different domains (e.g ., spatial, transform) for embedding, which are computed
directly from an input image. Embedding types may also be different (e.g .,
invisible, invertible or reversible, blind, etc.will be discussed in Section 3.4).
Irrespective of the embedding region, domain and type, however, an embedding
function E (·) can take a watermark, w and the original image-data, i as input
to output the watermarked image-data, i¯.
Watermark Detection, DX (·). This function helps make an objective de-
cision (e.g ., to declare whether the content is authentic) and/or initiate further
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Table 3.2: Components of a basic watermarking model.
Components Inputs Outputs
Watermark
generation, G (·)
image-data, i
message, m
other image-data, (j : j 6= i)
watermark, w
Watermark
embedding, E (·)
image-data, i
watermark, w
watermarked image data, i¯
Watermark
detection, DX (·)
watermarked image-data, i¯
image-data, i
watermark, w

estimated image-data, i˜
estimated message, m˜
estimated other image-data, j˜
or, failure, ⊥
actions (e.g ., to extract the embedded data, to engage and retain users of the wa-
termarked objects). In different application scenarios, the additional tasks may
vary and depend on the binary decision (i.e., pass or fail). The basic idea is that
DX (·) extracts the embedded watermark and regenerates another version of the
watermark, from the inputs. If the regenerated version matches the extracted
version, a pass signal is returned. (The pass signal is considered to pass the
parameters such as the valid watermark, the estimated image-data, etc. to its
dependent module that performs the additional tasks, which will be shown later
in Fig. 3.3.) Otherwise a failure is output. The main constraints for this function
thus can be the minimum error probabilities (e.g ., false negative/positive rates)
and computation time. Like the functions, G (·) and E (·), the internal design of
DX (·) can also vary, but it generally takes watermarked image-data, i¯, original
image-data, i and a watermark, w to yield either an estimated image-data, i˜,
message m˜ and other image-data, j˜, or a failure, ⊥.
Thus, a basic watermarking scheme for digital images can be defined as a
6-tuple (I,M,W, G,E,DX) such that:
(i) I, the image-data space, is a set of tuples with value in the positive integers
Z+ = {|a| ≥ 0 : a ∈ Z}. Each tuple is a set of coordinates, (x, y) for 2D-
space, or (x, y, z) for 3D-space with x, y, z ∈ Z+. An element of I is called
an image of a × b size for 2D-space, and of a × b × c for 3D-space, where
a, b, c ∈ Z+ and x = {1, 2, 3 · · · a}, y = {1, 2, 3 · · · b}, and z = {1, 2, 3 · · · c}.
I,J ,I¯, and I˜ are the subsets of I, where:
• I is the set of original unwatermarked image-data;
• J is the set of other image-data used for watermark generation and
J ∩ I = φ;
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• I¯ is the set of watermarked image-data;
• I˜ is the set of estimated original image-data;
• J˜ is the set of estimated other image-data.
(ii) M is the plaintext space, and W = {0, 1}+ is the watermark space. A
message is a string of plaintext symbols. M ⊂ M is the set of original
messages, and W ⊂ W is the set of original watermarks. M˜ ⊂ M and
W˜ ⊂W are the sets of respective estimates.
(iii) G is a function G : I ×M × J → W that is used for watermark generation.
(iv) E is a function E : I ×W → I¯ that is used for watermark embedding.
(v) DX is a function DX : I¯ × I ×W → I˜ × M˜ × J˜ ∪ {⊥} that is used for
watermark detection, where ⊥ indicates a failure.
(vi) a watermark w is valid if and only if it is obtained from valid inputs,
(i,m, j) using the valid watermark generation function, G (·) such that,
G(i,m, j) = w. Similarly, a watermarked image, i¯ ∈ I¯ is valid if and only
if E(i, w) = i¯ for valid inputs, (i, w) ∈ I × W . More formally, a digital
image watermarking scheme can be defined to be complete, if the following
is true: for all (i,m, j) ∈ I×M×J there exists (˜i, m˜, j˜) ∈ I˜×M˜× J˜ , where
i˜ ≈ i, j˜ ≈ j, such that DX (E (i, G (i,m, j)) , i, G (i,m, j)) = (˜i, m˜, j˜).
Here, the symbol ≈ denotes the perceptual similarity between two im-
ages. For example, i˜ ≈ i implies that the perceptual content of i and i˜
are sufficiently similar to each other. (For more complete definition of
perceptual similarity property, see Definition 3.1.)
It is worth noting here that the original (unwatermarked) version of an image
is considered as the input image for the watermarking functions. In most cases,
original images are used for watermarking. However, there may be cases where
a (valid) watermarked version of an image can be used as an input image. For
example, to update/re-embed a watermark in an existing watermarked image,
one may need to use the present (or any earlier) watermarked version, rather
than using the original image. It depends upon the application scenario which
version of images are to be used (and how any restrictions on using them should
be dealt with). However, this variation (in input image versions) can be studied
as a special case of the presented model, where the model may accept either an
original image or its existing watermarked versions as an input. Therefore, a
fundamental scenario is considered for the presented model, where an (original)
image is watermarked for the first time.
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Figure 3.2: Deploying keys in the detection function of the basic model.
As mentioned in the beginning of this section, the construction of the above
basic model is suitable for realizing a basic watermarking scenario, but it may not
be sufficient to capture the recent watermarking advances. Although study of a
formal generic watermarking model is still lacking, many advances are evident [55,
151154] in the present watermarking context. For example, the concepts of
using keys and deploying cryptographic techniques are prominent in addressing
different levels of security in various application scenarios such as content/owner
authentication and copy-control. Such developments help obtain the combined
benefits from the fusion of data-hiding and cryptographic techniques.
3.3.2 Towards a Complete Formal Watermarking Model
To adopt and generalize the use of keys, the basic scenario is extended to a key-
based scenario. Two individual keys, generation key, g and embedding key, e
are used for G (·) and E (·), respectively. Although in the basic construction, for
simplicity, DX (·) is considered to perform the detection and extraction tasks in-
herently, this should naturally be split into separate functions for security reasons.
The computation of extraction is therefore separated from that of the detection,
and they are denoted by X (·) and D (·), respectively. Thus, an individual detec-
tion key, d and extraction key, x can be used as shown in Fig. 3.2. These two
functions, D (·) and X (·) can be further defined as sub-functions of watermark
decoding (to resemble the basic construction) as shown in Table 3.3. The other
two functions, G (·) and E (·) can similarly be the sub-functions of watermark
encoding. Fig. 3.3 illustrates the watermark encoding and decoding processes.
Note that the outputs
(˜
i, w˜
)
of D (·) and (m˜, j˜) of X (·) can be an exact
estimate of their original versions respectively for a non-blind decoder (see Defini-
tion 3.3 for blindness property). Here, exact estimates of (m, j) are obtainable
at X (·) from an exact estimate of w as D (·) outputs. For a blind decoder, to get
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an exact estimate of the input image, original information (that is compromised
for embedding) is required by D (·). This requirement leads to the construction
of E (·) as an invertible (or reversible) function, a major recent watermarking
trend. Further, how exactly i˜, w˜, m˜ and j˜ can be produced depends on how
much error is allowed in their estimation  an error in estimating w˜ at D (·)
propagates through to yielding m˜ and j˜ at X (·). However, w˜ and m˜ are defined
as bit strings, and for any decoder (blind or non-blind), they should be an exact
estimate except for a few bit errors that can be handled by error correction codes.
Further, as shown in Fig. 3.3(b), the detection function in the watermark
decoding invokes the extraction function, once the detection is completed. Note
here that the detection function is executed independently, and may only output
a pass or fail signal depending upon the existence of a valid watermark. This also
means that, the extraction is not always required (depending upon the applica-
tions such as image content authentication). However, the extraction function
can be performed after the detection, when required for the applications like
image annotation, since extraction of the information carried by the watermark
will make sense, only if the image is passed by the detection (e.g ., ensuring the
authenticity or integrity of the watermarked image).
The construction of a basic watermarking model is thus developed (for digital
images) further to incorporate the use of keys. A key-based watermarking scheme
is defined here as a 8-tuple (I,M,W, K,G,E,D,X) such that:
(i) I,J ,I¯,I˜, and J˜ are subsets of I. Definition for the image-data space, I, the
plain text space, M, the watermark space, W, and their respective subsets
are the same as defined in the basic model of Section 3.3.1.
(ii) K is the set of all keys and a key is a sequence of m binary bits, where
m ∈ Z+. Sets of watermark generation keys, Kg, embedding keys, Ke,
extraction keys, Kx, and decoding keys, Kd are subsets of K (i.e., Kg ⊂ K,
Ke ⊂ K, Kx ⊂ K, and Kd ⊂ K).
(iii) G = {Gg|g ∈ Kg} is a family of functions Gg : I×M ×J → W that is used
for watermark generation.
(iv) E = {Ee|e ∈ Ke} is a family of functions Ee : I ×W → I¯ that is used for
watermark embedding.
(v) D = {Dd|d ∈ Kd} is a family of functions Dd : I¯ × I ×W → I˜ × W˜ ∪ {⊥}
that is used for watermark detection.
(vi) X = {Xx|x ∈ Kx} is a family of functions Xx : I¯ × I × W˜ → M˜ × J˜ ∪ {⊥}
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Table 3.3: Components of a key-based watermarking model.
Components Inputs Outputs
Key generation,
Key (·)
image-data, i
message, m
other image-
data, (j : j 6= i)
generation key, g
embedding key, e
detection key, d
extraction key, x
Watermark
encoding
Generation,
G (·)
generation key, g
image-data, i
message, m
other image-
data, (j : j 6= i)
watermark, w
Embedding,
E (·)
embedding-key, e
image-data, i
watermark, w
watermarked
image-data, i¯
Watermark
decoding
Detection,
D (·)
detection-key, d
watermarked
image-data, i¯
image-data, i
watermark, w

estimated
image-data, i˜
estimated
watermark, w˜
or, failure, ⊥
Extraction,
X (·)
extraction key, x
watermarked
image-data, w¯
image-data, i
estimated
watermark, w˜

estimated
message, m˜
estimated other
image-data, j˜
or, failure, ⊥
that is used for watermark extraction.
(vii) For each key, g ∈ Kg and e ∈ Ke there exists d ∈ Kd and x ∈ Kx respectively
i.e., for all (i,m, j) ∈ I ×M × J , there exists (˜i, w˜) ∈ I˜ × W˜ |˜i ≈ i such
that Dd (Ee (i, Gg (i,m, j)) , i, Gg (i,m, j)) =
(˜
i, w˜
)
, and for all w˜ ∈ W˜ ,
there exists
(
m˜, j˜
) ∈ M˜ × J˜ |J˜ ≈ j such that Xx (Ee (i, Gg (i,m, j)) , i, w˜)
=
(
m˜, j˜
)
.
At this point, stress is given on the properties of the keys that can differenti-
ate between private and public watermarking schemes. A watermarking scheme
is defined as a private key (or simply private or symmetric) scheme if d = e,
and x = g (i.e., if d and x can at least be easily computed from e and g, re-
spectively). Otherwise, the scheme is called a public key (or simply public or
asymmetric) scheme if d 6= e and x 6= g, and if computing d and x from e and
g is computationally infeasible in practice respectively. (The phrase compu-
tationally infeasible follows the standard definition in cryptography.) Here, d
and x are the private keys and e and g are the public keys. Similar to the wa-
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Figure 3.3: Key-based digital watermarking model: (a) watermark encoding, and
(b) watermark decoding.
termarking keys, watermarking itself has many properties that may lead to its
many practically meaningful variants for different applications. Before discussing
these properties and defining them in following Section 3.4, a comparative study
in support of the presented watermarking model is presented below.
3.3.3 A Comparative Study of the Formal Model
In comparison with the summary of existing models' features (Table 3.1), features
of the presented novel watermarking model are summarized in Table 3.4. As dis-
cussed in Section 3.2, a common limitation is the narrow focus on a particular type
of data-hiding, steganography or watermarking scenario with different objectives,
in developing a watermarking model. This leads to considering a simplified set of
inputs, outputs, and component functions. Although such a simplified and gen-
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eralized model helps realize the application scenarios of some relevant schemes,
in the formal watermarking context, they are incomplete and thus need to be
re-defined to be used as a general model for image applications.
The presented formal watermarking model addresses the major limitations
of relevant models for studying image watermarking schemes. This model is a
first step towards a formalized conception of image watermarking, and allows a
unified treatment of all its practically meaningful variants. Considering this, a
set of fundamental properties is defined using this model in following sections to
set forth the formal watermarking model in the image application context.
3.4 Formal Definitions of Watermarking
Properties
Defining the properties of watermarking plays an important role in the systematic
development of various schemes. For example, in developing a new scheme, the
watermarking objectives determine a set of criteria (as discussed in Section 3.1).
Each criterion can be expressed in terms of the minimum requirements for a
relevant watermarking property. In the design phase, those requirements help
characterize the scheme (e.g ., by setting constraints for the construction of wa-
termarking functions). In the evaluation phase, measuring (with a suite of tests)
how those requirements are fulfilled gives the merit of the scheme. The relative
importance of each property, thus, can be determined based on the application
requirements. This also means that the interpretation and significance of water-
marking properties can vary with the application. These properties, in practice,
can be interpreted in terms of the inputs and outputs of watermarking compo-
nents, use of keys, etc. They can also be mutually dependent, which requires a
trade-off among the improvements in the properties [155] for an application.
In the image watermarking context, a number of defining properties (consider-
ing their relative importance) are studied below: perceptual similarity, visibility,
blindness, invertibility, robustness, embedding capacity, error probabilities, and se-
curity. For these properties, the design and evaluation criteria have been studied
in Section 2.2.2. In the following sections, these properties are formally defined,
using the developed watermarking model (Section 3.3) and showing how they can
be interpreted and used in a real application scenario. To simplify reading, from
now on, the notations are used without explicitly giving their domains. For exam-
ple, `for all a, b, c, · · · ' will be used to mean `for all (a, b, c, · · · ) ∈ A×B ×C · · · '.
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Table 3.4: Summary of the novel formal generic watermarking model.
Model
in Use
Objectives Inputs & Outputs Component
Functions
Underlying
Theory
Limitations
Novel
generic
model
To provide a means for the
systematic development,
and thus to develop a
unified and more realistic
theory, of digital image
watermarking
Image-data (with
different properties,
e.g ., original,
watermarked, etc., see
Fig. 3.3)
Watermark
Message
Key (for each function)
Key generation
Watermark
generation
Watermark
embedding
Watermark
detection
Watermark
extraction
Digital image
and signal
processing
Cryptography
May not be suitable for
studying steganography
schemes
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3.4.1 Perceptual Similarity
The perceptual similarity (or imperceptibility) is one of the most important prop-
erties for the image applications. Since embedding distortion is inevitable, E (·)
exploits the (relatively) redundant information of an image intelligently for a
minimum of visual artefacts. In almost any image application, therefore, keep-
ing a watermarked image perceptually similar to the original image becomes an
important criterion. Perceptual similarity means the perceptual contents of the
two images are sufficiently similar to each other, (and thus it is mainly stud-
ied for the invisible watermarking schemes; the visibility property is discussed
below). The requirements for this property may vary with the application sce-
nario. In order to ease the problem of dealing with these varying requirements,
the perceptual similarity property is now defined using a quantitative approach.
Definition 3.1 (Perceptual Similarity). Any two images, i1 and i2, are said to
be (d, t) perceptually similar, if dj (i1, i2) ≤ tj for all similarity measures dj ∈
d ≡ {d1, d2, · · · , dn} and thresholds tj ∈ t ≡ {t1, t2, · · · , tn}.
Various measures can be used to quantify the requirements for the perceptual
similarity, as mentioned in Section 2.2.2 [Perceptual Similarity]. For example, cor-
relation quality (CQ), signal to noise ratio (SNR), peak or weighted SNR (PSNR
or WPSNR), mean square error (MSE), structural similarity index (SSIM), mean
or weighted SSIM (MSSIM or WSSIM), normalized cross-correlation (NCC), etc.
However, no globally agreed and effective measures for visual quality currently
exist [156]. In addition, not all the measures give the similar estimation. There-
fore, perceptual similarity is defined using a similarity measure, which is a set of
suitable measures that help quantify the perceptual distance between two images.
Now, two images is defined to be perceptually similar (or imperceptible) for an
acceptable value returned by all suitable measures defined for similarity.
As an example to use the above definition, consider two measures (i.e., n = 2):
PSNR and MSSIM, for the similarity measure, d = {d1, d2}, where d1 = PSNR
and d2 = MSSIM. The given thresholds are: t1 = 60 (dB) and t2 = 0.995. Two
images i1 and i2 are said to be perceptually similar if both d1 (i1, i2) ≥ 60 and
d2 (i1, i2) ≥ 0.995 are satisfied.
67
Chapter 3. Watermarking Model, Properties and Attacks
3.4.2 Visibility
A visible watermarking scheme deliberately inserts a watermark such that it ap-
pears noticeably on the watermarked image to show some necessary information
such as company logo, icon, or courtesy. However, in order that the watermark
does not become so strongly pronounced that it takes over the main image, the
level of visibility can be controlled, for example, by a parameter α. Visible water-
marks are important in recognition and support of possessing a digital image. In
contrast, invisible watermarks are embedded by keeping the perceptual content
of the watermarked images similar to that of the original images to address secu-
rity problems in different application scenarios. Therefore, a visible and invisible
watermarking scheme can be defined (see Definition 3.2) based on the watermark
appearance on a watermarked image.
Definition 3.2 (Visibility). A watermarking scheme is called visible or percep-
tible, if E (·) embeds a given watermark, w, into an image, i such that the w
appears at least noticeably in i¯. That is, |Ee (i, w)− i| = αw for all i, w. Here, α
is weight factor that controls the degree of visibility.
A watermarking scheme is called invisible or imperceptible, if E (·) embeds
w into i such that the i¯ is perceptually similar to the original image, i. That is
Ee (i, w) ≈ i for all i, w.
Although the visibility and perceptual similarity properties share some per-
ceptual aspects of a watermarked image, they need not to be confused with each
other. As stated in Def. 3.1, the perceptual similarity property determines if an
original image and its watermarked version remain perceptually the same. On
the other hand, Def. 3.2 states that a visible watermark appears on a watermarked
image with a predefined degree of visibility, α, and thus strictly speaking for the
visible watermarking, the watermarked image is not perceptually similar to the
original image. Perceptual similarity property is thus studied for the invisible
watermarking schemes.
An invisible watermarking scheme usually differs from a visible watermarking
scheme, not only in the visibility factor, but also in their embedding processes.
Invisible embedding of a watermark aims at keeping the perceptual difference
(resulting from the embedding distortion) at a minimum level such that the
watermarked and original images remain perceptually the same. Their percep-
tual similarity is verified by quantifying the perceptual difference using similarity
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measures. The commonly used similarity measures do not indicate any subjec-
tive quality degradation, rather they quantify the overall perceptual difference
either by their local (e.g ., block-wise or kernel-based) or global (e.g ., whole im-
age based) operations. As a result, the defined perceptual similarity does not
directly indicate whether a watermarking scheme is visible or invisible. How-
ever, for an invisible watermarking scheme, the quantified perceptual difference
between an original image and its watermarked version would naturally be much
lower than that for a visible watermarking scheme.
In short, an invisible scheme may be considered a variant of visible water-
marking with a negligible (i.e., approaching zero) α, and having an additional
(and even more strict) perceptual similarity requirement. Visible watermarking is
present in a few applications such as video broadcasting. However, recent research
is mainly focussed on invisible watermarking with a high perceptual similarity in
various image applications [5, 39,47,50,52,53,59,60,157164].
3.4.3 Blindness
Another important watermarking property is blindness that helps characterize a
scheme to be blind, non-blind, or semi-blind. The term blindness (or oblivious) is
generally used in cryptography to define a detection process independent of any
side information. More specifically, blindness is used to define a computational
property of information retrieval (e.g ., to define the computational independence
on the original information or its derivatives to retrieve the required information).
Similarly, blindness defines the detection and extraction process in digital water-
marking, although there is no complete definition for a watermarking scheme to
be blind or non-blind.
As a requirement for blindness, some schemes consider that no original in-
put image and the information derived from the input image should be required,
whereas other schemes consider only avoiding the original input requirement dur-
ing the detection. Although schemes in both categories are often considered as
blind, with a more strict blindness requirement, the schemes in the latter cate-
gory may eventually fail to achieve the overall design requirements in an image
application (e.g ., image authentication). Additionally, confusion arises when a
scheme is defined as semi-blind. Sometimes, it is considered that if the detection
and extraction processes can operate objectively without the original image and
its derived information, but still require the original watermark, then the scheme
can be semi-blind.
69
Chapter 3. Watermarking Model, Properties and Attacks
Cox et al . [14] informally defined a blind or oblivious watermark detector in
such a way that the detector does not require access to the original (i.e., unwater-
marked) image, or some information derived from the original image. Otherwise,
the detector is called non-blind or informed. However, their definition is not suf-
ficient to realize three different cases associated with the blindness property. The
watermarking blindness is defined below to distinguish the dependency of D (·)
and X (·) on any of the original input data that is used in G (·) and E (·), and
thereby three different cases of this watermarking property are distinguished.
Definition 3.3 (Blindness). A watermarking scheme is called blind (or oblivi-
ous) if both D (·) and X (·) are independent of the original image, i and water-
mark, w. Formally, for all images i1, i2 and watermarks w1, w2, hold both
Dd (¯i, i1, w1) = Dd (¯i, i2, w2)
and Xx (¯i, i1, w˜) = Xx (¯i, i2, w˜) .
A watermarking scheme is called semi-blind if either one of D (·) and X (·)
is independent of i and/or w. Thus, for semi-blind watermarking, for all images
i1, i2 and watermarks w1, w2 either
Dd (¯i, i1, w1) = Dd (¯i, i2, w2)
and Xx (¯i, i, w˜) 6= Xx (¯i, i1, w˜)
or
Dd (¯i, i, w) 6= Dd (¯i, i1, w1)
and Xx (¯i, i1, w˜) = Xx (¯i, i2, w˜) .
Otherwise a watermarking scheme is called non-blind (or non-oblivious or
informed) if both of D (·) and X (·) are dependent on i and/or w. Thus, for all
images i, i1 and watermarks w,w1, hold both
Dd (¯i, i, w) 6= Dd (¯i, i1, w1)
and Xx (¯i, i, w˜) 6= Xx (¯i, i1, w˜) .
Note that, strictly speaking, the detection function, D (·) and the extraction
function X (·) must have all three inputs: i¯, i, and w. However, for instances of
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blind and semi-blind watermarking, some inputs (e.g ., i and w) are not used in
D (·) and X (·), and thus they can be optionally omitted.
It can also be noted that the blindness property, as defined in Definition 3.3 in
terms of the watermark detection and extraction functions, can also be considered
for the watermark generation function. As pointed out in Section 2.2.2 [Blind-
ness], a non-blind (i.e., an original image dependent) G (·) can be helpful in
resisting copy attacks (that aims at counterfeiting the D (·) for any invalid modifi-
cations, or invalid watermarked images; see Section 3.5.1 for the definition of copy
attack). The blindness for D (·) is also important, where availability of the origi-
nal image, watermark or other side information at D (·) can thwart watermarking
objectives. Blind and non-blind watermarking schemes are sometimes confused
with private and public watermarking respectively. However, it is stressed to de-
fine a watermarking scheme to be private and public in terms of their keys (as
defined in Section 3.3.2) to avoid any confusion.
3.4.4 Invertibility
Invertibility (or reversibility or losslessness) is a computational property of wa-
termarking. The meaning of this property is quite intuitive; however, defining
invertibility in the current context would help realize its mutual relation with
other properties. In an image application, invertibility is expected to restore any
watermarked images to their original versions, where no embedding distortion is
allowed in the original image. Such a watermarking criterion motivates construc-
tion of an invertible E (·) that helps D (·) to reproduce an original image from
the watermarked image [5, 59, 106, 162181]. An invertible watermarking scheme
is defined here such that it allows inverse computation of E (·) during detection.
Definition 3.4 (Invertibility). A watermarking scheme is invertible (or re-
versible or lossless) if the inverse of E (·) is computationally feasible to compute
and is used in D (·) to estimate an exact original image, i, from the respective wa-
termarked image, i¯. Otherwise, the scheme is called non-invertible watermarking
scheme.
From the above definition, if Ee (i, w) = i¯, then for an invertible watermark-
ing scheme, E−1e the detection must exist and satisfy E
−1
e (¯i) = (i, w). Therefore,
such watermarking schemes can be either blind or a semi-blind (according to
Definition 3.3). Since, in image applications, an invertible watermarking scheme
is mainly designed to reverse the effect of embedding on the original image, the
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embedding function is only considered to define invertibility of the scheme. How-
ever, the concept of an invertible function can also be extended for X (·), if an
invertible G (·) is computationally feasible.
3.4.5 Robustness
Robustness in watermarking is often confused with its meaning from cryptog-
raphy (Chapter 4). A main reason is probably that watermarking has to con-
sider some spatial or perceptual properties (e.g ., perceptual similarity, visibility).
Several attempts have been made to informally define the robustness property
of watermarking. For example, Piper and Safavi-Naini [182] considered a wa-
termarking scheme as robust if it can successfully detect the watermark in the
processed images. The strength of this definition depends on how the pro-
cessed image is defined. In contrast, Cox et al . [14] referred to robustness as
the ability to detect the watermark after common signal processing techniques.
More specifically, robustness can be defined as the degree of resistance of a water-
marking scheme to modifications of the host signal due to either common signal
processing techniques or operations devised specifically in order to render the
watermark undetectable [61]. In summary, watermarking robustness has to deal
with: (i) defining a set of processing techniques, and (ii) the detection ability for
the processed images.
The concept of watermarking robustness is now formalized in terms of the
set of processing techniques and the detection ability. Firstly, a set of processing
techniques (i.e., various operations/transforms) is defined below to define a pro-
cessed image for an application. Here, the same set of processing techniques may
not be valid for different watermarking applications, and thus a general consider-
ation of the techniques may not be always useful. Secondly, a detection condition
is defined that determines the detection ability, for the set of processed images.
Definition 3.5 (Processed Image). A processed image is an image that is not
essentially perceptually similar to its original, but a certain amount of distortion,
δ is incurred by a processing technique, p ∈ P . That is, if any image, l ∈ I is
processed by p then, for the processed image, p (l) the following is true: p (l) =
l + δ. Here, P is the set of applicable processing techniques for an application
such that P ⊂ P, where P is the space of processing techniques.
It is worth noting that a processed image can be either perceptually simi-
lar or not perceptually similar, to its unprocessed version. In other words, a
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processed image can be of either completely different perceptual content, or the
modified perceptual content with an the distortion beyond the perceptual simi-
larity requirement. Thus a processed image can be the output of an attack or a
legitimate processing as a system requirement (e.g ., use of compression, file for-
mat conversion, etc.). This perceptual similarity consideration for the processed
image is realistic and would help avoid the confusion between the robustness and
security requirements (This confusion will be discussed later in Section 3.4.8).
With the Definition 3.5, the detection condition now can be defined for the
robustness property. Suppose a processing technique, p ∈ P , causes distortion
to a watermarked image, i¯. As defined in the presented model, Dd (·) accepts
with the property: Dd (p (¯i) , i, w) =
(˜
i, w˜
) ∪ ⊥ for all p (¯i) , i, w|p (¯i) ∈ I¯. Here,
the pass that returns with
(˜
i, w˜
)
and the failure, ⊥ can be used to define two
potential variants, robust and fragile respectively, of watermarking schemes for
different P . Another variant, semi-fragile watermarking scheme can also be de-
fined considering a suitable subset of P . The robustness property is thus defined
in Definition 3.6 considering detection ability at three different levels.
Definition 3.6 (Robustness). A watermarking scheme are defined for the fol-
lowing levels of robustness:
Robust. A watermarking scheme is called robust if Dd (p (¯i) , i, w) =(˜
i, w˜
)
for all p ∈ P .
Fragile. A watermarking scheme is called fragile if Dd (p (¯i) , i, w) = ⊥
for all p ∈ P .
Semi-fragile. A watermarking scheme is called semi-fragile if Dd (p (¯i) , i, w) =(˜
i, w˜
)
for all p ∈ P1 and Dd (p (¯i) , i, w) = ⊥ for all p ∈ (P\P1),
where P1 ⊂ P .
As stated in Definition 3.6, a successful detection (i.e., Dd (·) 6= ⊥) is the basic
criterion for a watermarking scheme to be robust to p ∈ P . However, there is no
absolute robustness for watermarking, since taking all known/available process-
ing techniques into consideration (for robustness) is not realistic. It is therefore
reasonable to identify only the set of applicable processing techniques for the
robustness requirements in an application (like knowing the set of potential ad-
versaries for the security requirements in an application, see Section 3.4.8 below).
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As Definition 3.6 suggests, it is stressed that one must have an explicit consider-
ation on P for design and evaluation of a watermarking scheme in a particular
application scenario.
Note that different processing techniques (e.g ., compression, de-noising) have
different parameters (e.g ., compression ratio, down sampling rate, type and rank
of filter). These parameter settings give different strengths to a processing tech-
nique. Therefore, in defining P (the set of applicable processing techniques), a
processing technique, p ∈ P , is to be defined with its all required parameter
settings. The technique with other settings thus remains outside of P .
3.4.6 Embedding Capacity
Embedding capacity (or simply capacity) is an important, and maybe the most-
studied, property for watermarking schemes. A lot of studies have reported re-
cently on improving this property maintaining the required perceptual similarity
in different ways [5, 59, 106, 162, 164, 172180]. A number of ways to estimate
the steganographic/watermarking embedding capacity using information theo-
retic and perceptual model based methods, and detection theory are also present
in the literature [74, 183188]. Capacity estimation is a fundamental problem of
steganography [187], where the question is how much data can safely be hidden
without being detected? However, in watermarking, the primary constraint for
the capacity is its mutual dependence on a few others properties (e.g ., perceptual
similarity, robustness) rather than the detection problem as in steganography. So,
watermarking capacity is defined on the basis of perceptual similarity of (i, i¯), for
which the scheme works objectively (e.g ., without a failure).
Definition 3.7 (Embedding Capacity.). Watermarking embedding capacity for
an image, i is the maximum size of any watermark, w = Gg (i,m, j) for all m
and j, to be embedded in i, such that Ee (i, w) ≈ i, Dd (Ee (i, w) , i, w) =
(˜
i, w˜
)
,
and there exists m˜, j˜|j˜ ≈ j such that Xx (Ee (i, w) , i, w˜) =
(
m˜, j˜
)
.
Definition 3.7 suggests that to know the capacity of a watermarking scheme
for an image, one needs to know how many bits can be embedded in the image
with achieving the perceptual similarity and error probability (e.g ., successful
detection) requirements. This capacity estimation method may vary with the
type of watermarking schemes. Although several attempts have already been
made [74, 183188] to know the capacity bound as mentioned above, developing
a general method for capacity estimation of each type of watermarking schemes
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could still be interesting. This may also help solve other capacity related problems
like the capacity control [172].
In image applications, embedding capacity is usually expressed as a ratio,
bit-per-pixel (bpp). According to Definition 3.7, if the watermarking embedding
capacity is n-bit, and the size of watermark is m-bit (i.e., w = {1, 0}m), then
the necessary condition for an invisible watermarking scheme is: m < n. This
condition suggests that there can be a hidden assumption of recursive embedding
(see Section 5.2) in developing an invisible schemeif the required capacity is
not achievable in first run of E (·), the remaining bits can be re-embedded recur-
sively. That assumption may severely affect the performance of a watermarking
scheme in practice, and thus needs to be explicitly stated, if applicable. The
watermarking capacity control process and its influence on overall watermarking
performance will be studied in Chapter 5.
3.4.7 Error Probability
Error probability is an important property that helps determine the reliability
of a watermarking scheme in practice. Some of the important and commonly
used measures of error probability are: bit error rate (BER), false positive rate
(FPR), false negative rate (FNR). However, this property is often disregarded in
developing a watermarking scheme, assuming a reliable (operating) environment
where communication errors are negligible and can be managed, for example,
by using a suitable error correction code. This assumption is useful to simplify
the application scenarios, but for some applications (e.g ., proof of ownership),
this property needs to be studied explicitly. For example, the BER (bit error
rate) can be considered to evaluate the performance of the functions D (·) and
X (·) in obtaining (˜i, w˜) and (m˜, j˜) respectively. (Here, BER follows its standard
definition in communication system.)
In the presented model, D (·) is defined in such a way that the absence of a
valid watermark, w in a watermarked image, i¯ outputs a detection failure. Oth-
erwise, D (·) returns (˜i, w˜), which indicates that the input image is watermarked.
Following this, the false positive and false negative can be defined as follows.
Definition 3.8 (False Positive and False Negative). A watermarking detection
in a normal condition is said to be a false positive if Dd (i, w) 6= ⊥ for some i.
Conversely, a watermarking detection is a false negative if Dd (¯i, i, w) = ⊥ for
some i¯. Here, the normal condition allows the scheme to run with all of its valid
75
Chapter 3. Watermarking Model, Properties and Attacks
inputs, outputs, and functions.
Irrespective of application scenarios, ideally, a zero FNR and FPR represents
a reliable detection. Particularly, a watermarking scheme can be of no use if
a scheme is unable to detect a valid watermark in normal condition of opera-
tion. Achieving a zero FNR and FPR in practice, however, may not be realistic
for many reasons like communication errors. So, it is reasonable here to define
a highly accurate detection for an application scenario in terms of a very low
probability (e.g ., in the order of 10−6) of detection failure.
However, error probability may be confused with other watermarking proper-
ties. Other properties (e.g ., security, robustness, perceptual similarity) may also
deal with errors, which can be of different types; for example, bit-errors (often
termed as distortion) in a valid watermarked/unwatermarked image, which can be
incurred maliciously, unintentionally, or as a system requirement, may also cause
a detection failure. Further, the function E (·) itself utilizes the error signal, e.g .,
exploiting the redundant bit-planes of an image, for embedding. This embedding
error can be considered as a system requirement and thus can be addressed in
terms of perceptual similarity requirement. Specifically, while error probability
measures can be used to determine the system error rate for the reliability of a
watermarking scheme, the other perceptual errors (i.e., distortion) can be studied
in terms of the security, robustness and perceptual similarity properties.
3.4.8 Security
Security property of watermarking schemes as a whole may be far from easy to
conceptualize (and may not be always necessary in practice) [78, 189, 190]. Two
main possible reasons are: (i) application dependent properties, and (ii) the
confusion between security and robustness requirements. In practice, different
image applications may require different levels of security. Some applications do
not need to be secure at all since there is no ultimate benefit in circumvention
of watermarking objectives. For example, where a watermark is used only to
add value in which they are embedded rather than to restrict uses for some
device control applications [14]. Therefore, these types of watermarks do not
need to be secure against any hostile attacks, although they still need to be robust
against common processing techniques used in those applications. (This is how
the robustness property is defined in Definition 3.6.) Although the requirements
for robustness and security properties of a watermarking scheme may overlap,
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they need to be considered separately. For security properties, in contrast to
robustness, all possible attacks that an adversary may attempt with in a particular
scenario are to be studied. (This separate consideration of robustness and security
properties will be analysed and verified in Chapter 4.)
Definition 3.9 (Security). A watermarking scheme is called A secure if the
scheme retains the security against the attack A (i.e., if it is hard to succeed
with the set of adversary actions mounted by the attack A ).
An application-specific analytical approach is often considered to study wa-
termarking security [71, 191197]. In a broad sense, this practice suggests that
the security property can be studied for two main types of watermarking schemes:
robust and fragile. The security of specific watermarking schemes will be anal-
ysed in Chapter 4. However, in this chapter (Section 3.5), instead of focusing on
a specific type of watermarking schemes, general attack scenarios are studied (in
an abstract level) for the image applications. The main idea is to demonstrate
how an adversary of different capabilities may win with different conditions. This
condition is called here win condition. Knowing the inputs, outputs, and the win-
conditions would eventually help visualize the possible attacks in an application.
(With that visualization, conducting an application-specific security analysis can
be easier and more efficient). Identifying the set of attacks in a specific appli-
cation and defining them in the model are considered here as the first steps to
defining the watermarking security.
3.5 Formal Models of Watermarking Security
Attacks
In the watermarking context, an attack can be informally defined as any ma-
licious attempt to perform unauthorized embedding, removal, or detection of a
(valid or invalid) watermark. An adversary that makes such attempts can be
of different capabilities (e.g ., can have different inputs, and access to the water-
marking functions). In practice, it is quite reasonable to assume the capabilities
of expected adversaries in modelling attacks. For example, an adversary knowing
nothing may assume an image is watermarked and may want to remove the water-
mark by applying a distortion attack (see Definition 3.13). Having access to the
embedding function, an adversary can also find and exploit the weakness of the
detection function in applying different active attacks including elimination and
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masking attacks, (see Definition 3.10 and Definition 3.12, respectively). Further,
more difficult security problems may arise if the adversary has both embedding
and detection functions and knows how they work.
Attacks on the watermarking security can be mainly divided in two cate-
gories [14]: (i) active (i.e., unauthorized embedding and removal) and (ii) passive
(i.e., unauthorized detection). An active attack attempts to alter the watermark-
ing resources or to affect their operation, whereas a passive attack, without doing
that, attempts to know or exploit watermarking information. Some active attacks
that circumvent the scheme directly are often referred to as system or protocol
attacks. Different attacks are defined below using the presented watermarking
model. Depending on which inputs are available to the adversary, however, there
may be different flavours of the definitions. In what follows, the original (valid)
watermark is defined as w0 ∈ W to distinguish it from other modified versions in
an attack. Any other new notations will be defined accordingly.
3.5.1 Active Attacks
Elimination Attack. In an elimination attack, an adversary tries to output
an image, which is perceptually similar to the watermarked image and not be
detected as containing the watermark. Thus, the attacked watermarked image
cannot be considered to contain a watermark at all. It is important to consider
that eliminating the watermark does not necessarily mean reconstructing (or
inverting) the watermarked image [14]. Rather, the adversary may output a new
image that is perceptually similar to the watermarked image.
Definition 3.10 (Elimination Attack).
Input. Watermarked image, i = Ee (i, w0), where w0 ∈ W
Output. Attacked image, ia ∈ I˜ such that ia ≈ i¯
Win Condition. Dd (ia, i, w) = ⊥ for all w
Here, for a stronger adversary, the input can also include w0 and the adversary
can have access to Ee (·).
Collusion Attack. In a collusion attack, an adversary obtains several water-
marked versions of an original image, each with a different or same watermark to
obtain a close approximation of the watermarked image and thereby, produces a
copy with no watermark.
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Definition 3.11 (Collusion Attack).
Input. n copies (where n ≥ 2) of watermarked image, i¯j =
Ee (i, wj), where j = {1, · · · , n}
Output. ia ∈ I˜ such that ia ≈ i¯j
Win Condition. Dd (ia, i, w) = ⊥ for all w
As in Definition 3.11, for example, an adversary has n copies (where n ≥ 2)
of watermarked image, i¯j = Ee (i, wj), where j = {1, · · · , n}. In the form of an
elimination attack, the adversary outputs ia ∈ I˜ such that ia ≈ i¯j, and wins if for
all w, Dd (ia, i, w) = ⊥.
Masking Attack. Masking of a watermark means that the attacked water-
marked image can still have the watermark, which is, however, undetectable by
existing detectors. More sophisticated detectors might be able to detect it.
Let an adversary have a watermarked image, i¯ = Ee (i, w0), where w0 ∈ W .
Here, the adversary aims to output ia ∈ I¯ such that ia ≈ i¯. The adversary wins if
Dd (ia, i, w0) = ⊥ but there exists w 6= w0 such that Dd (ia, i, w) 6= ⊥, as defined
in Definition 3.12.
Definition 3.12 (Masking Attack).
Input. A watermarked image, i¯ = Ee (i, w0), where w0 ∈ W
Output. ia ∈ I¯ such that ia ≈ i¯
Win Condition. Dd (ia, i, w0) = ⊥, but there exists w 6= w0 such that
Dd (ia, i, w) 6= ⊥
Distortion Attack. In some masking attacks, an adversary applies some pro-
cessing techniques uniformly over the watermarked image or some part of it, in
order to degrade the watermark, so that the embedded watermark becomes un-
detectable or unreadable. This sub-class of masking attack has special merit in
image processing and is referred to as distortion attack. De-noising attacks and
synchronization attacks are two common attacks in this category.
Given a watermarked image, i¯ = Ee (i, w0), an adversary applies a process-
ing technique, q ∈ Q uniformly over the whole i¯, or selected object/region
of i¯, and outputs q (¯i). According to Definition 3.13, the adversary wins if
Dd (q (¯i) , i, w0) = ⊥ but there exists w 6= w0 such that Dd (q (¯i) , i, w) 6= ⊥.
Q is the set of applicable processing techniques such that Q ⊂ P.
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Definition 3.13 (Distortion Attack).
Input. A watermarked image, i¯ = Ee (i, w0), and a processing tech-
nique, q (·) ∈ Q. where Q is the set of applicable processing
techniques such that Q ⊂ P
Output. A processed image, q (¯i)
Win Condition. Dd (q (¯i) , i, w0) = ⊥ but there exists w 6= w0 such that
Dd (q (¯i) , i, w) 6= ⊥
Forgery Attack. In a forgery attack, an adversary outputs an invalid water-
marked image in the form of unauthorized embedding. An adversary with the
ability to perform unauthorized embedding can be presumed able to cause the
detector to falsely authenticate an invalid watermarked image.
Given access to Ee (·), an adversary chooses a new unwatermarked image,
ia ∈ I and a new watermark, wa ∈ W to output the watermarked image, i¯a ∈ I¯.
As in Definition 3.14, the adversary wins with the output (i¯a, ia) if there exists
wa ∈ W such that Dd (i¯a, ia, wa) 6= ⊥, and also, possibly, there exists w˜a ∈ W˜
such that Xx (i¯a, ia, w˜a) 6= ⊥.
Definition 3.14 (Forgery Attack).
Input. A new unwatermarked image, ia ∈ I, a new watermark,
wa ∈ W , and the access to Ee (·)
Output. A new watermarked image, i¯a
Win Condition. There exists wa ∈ W such that Dd (i¯a, ia, wa) 6= ⊥
This attack is accomplished in two parts. During the first part, the adversary
has access to Ee (·). In the second part, the adversary has to output a forgery,
which is different from all the outputs from Ee (·) in the first part. A stronger
adversary may also have access to Gg (·) to obtain wa (and possibly, choose m
and j), and thus to output i¯a = Ee (ia, Gg (ia,m, j)) that makes the adversary
more likely to win, specially over Xx (·).
Copy Attack. In a copy attack, an adversary outputs an invalid watermarked
image as in a forgery attack. However, the adversary copies a watermark from one
valid watermarked image into another to falsely authenticate an invalid water-
marked image. In principle, an adversary initially tries to estimate the unwater-
marked image from its watermarked version and then estimates the original wa-
termark from the estimated unwatermarked image and the original watermarked
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image. Finally, the estimated watermark is embedded to a new unwatermarked
image to get a forged watermarked copy.
Suppose an adversary is given a valid watermarked image, i¯ = Ee (i, w0) and
the access to Ee (·). The adversary obtains the estimated original watermark, w˜0,
and chooses an unwatermarked image, ia to output a new watermarked image,
i¯a = Ee (ia, w˜0). Finally, as given in Definition 3.15, the adversary wins with
output (i¯a, ia) if there exists w˜0 ∈ W such that Dd (i¯a, ia, w˜0) 6= ⊥. Also possibly,
there exists ˜˜w0 ∈ W˜ such that Xx
(
i¯a, ia, ˜˜w0
) 6= ⊥, where ˜˜w0 is the estimate of
w˜0.
Definition 3.15 (Copy Attack).
Input. A valid watermarked image, i¯ = Ee (i, w0), a new unwater-
marked image, ia ∈ I, and the access to Ee (·)
Output. A new watermarked image, i¯a = Ee (ia, w˜0)
Win Condition. There exists w˜0 ∈ W such that Dd (i¯a, ia, w˜0) 6= ⊥, where
˜˜w0 is the estimate of w˜0
An adversary can win with the copy attack if the original watermark, w0 is
independent of the image, i such that w0 = Gg (m, j). In addition, obtaining w˜0
from i˜ and i¯ can be easier for the adversary if the watermark embedding is simply
additive. such that, w˜0 ∼=
∣∣¯i− i˜∣∣. Thus, without having an access to Gg (·), the
adversary can find w˜0 and output a forged watermarked image, i¯a.
3.5.2 System Attacks
Ambiguity Attack. In a successful ambiguity attack, an adversary outputs a
forgery, where a valid watermarked image is forged (i.e., illegally watermarked)
with a chosen watermark. The output forgery later can be verified as valid for the
chosen (not for the originally embedded) watermark. Therefore, unlike a copy or
forgery attack, it has a direct impact on the scheme.
Suppose a valid watermarked image, i¯ and access to Ee (·) are given to an ad-
versary. An ambiguity attack outputs a new watermarked image, i¯a = Ee (¯i, wa)
and the adversary wins if there exists wa ∈ W such that Dd (i¯a, i¯, wa) 6= ⊥ (Def-
inition 3.16). Also possibly, there exists (w˜a) ∈ W˜ such that Xx (i¯a, i¯, w˜a) 6= ⊥.
Similar to forgery attack, a stronger adversary may have access to Gg (·) to obtain
wa = Gg (i,m, j) |i = i¯.
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Definition 3.16 (Ambiguity Attack).
Input. Valid watermarked image, i¯ and the access to Ee (·)
Output. A new watermarked image, i¯a = Ee (¯i, wa)
Win Condition. There exists wa ∈ W such that Dd (i¯a, i¯, wa) 6= ⊥
Scrambling Attack. The objective of an adversary in applying a scrambling
attack is similar to that of masking attack (i.e., to falsify the detection of a valid
watermarked image). However, in this attack, the samples of a watermarked
image are scrambled prior to being presenting to the detector and subsequently
descrambled. The type of scrambling can be a simple sample permutation or
a more sophisticated pseudo-random scrambling [14]. A well-known scrambling
attack is the mosaic attack, in which an image is broken into many small rect-
angular patches, each too small for reliable watermark detection. These image
segments are then displayed in a table such that the segment edges are adjacent.
The resulting table of small images is perceptually identical to the image prior to
subdivision.
Given input to an adversary includes a watermarked image, i¯ = Ee (i, w0),
where w0 ∈ W . The adversary outputs an image, i¯a ∈ I¯ from scrambling the
samples of i¯ ∈ I¯ before detection, and descrambles back to i¯ after detection such
that ia ≈ i¯. The adversary wins with a suitable scrambler and descrambler, if
Dd (ia, i, w0) = ⊥ but there exists w 6= w0 such that Dd (ia, i, w) 6= ⊥, as in
Definition 3.17.
Definition 3.17 (Scrambling Attack).
Input. A watermarked image, i¯ = Ee (i, w0), where w0 ∈ W , and
the access to `suitable' scrambling and descrambling func-
tions
Output. An image, i¯a ∈ I¯ from scrambling the samples of i¯ ∈ I¯
(before detection, and descrambles back to i¯ ∈ I¯ after de-
tection)
Win Condition. Dd (ia, i, w0) = ⊥ but there exists w 6= w0 such that
Dd (ia, i, w) 6= ⊥
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3.5.3 Passive Attacks
Passive attacks can have different objectives such as detecting the presence of a
valid watermark or knowing the associated information being carried by it. As
mentioned in the beginning of this section, unlike active attacks, passive attacks
do not attempt to alter the watermarking resources. However, a passive attack
aims at knowing or exploiting the watermarking information and can have dif-
ferent level of consequences depending upon what it tries to achieve. Therefore,
three different levels for the passive attacks are defined considering their differ-
ent objectives. These levels (to classify the passive attacks in each level) are
called comprehensive detection attack, incisive detection attack, and detection
only attack.
In a comprehensive detection attack, an adversary wins by achieving all the
three levels of target given in Definition 3.18. Similarly, to win an incisive detec-
tion attack, an adversary achieves the first two levels of target but fails to achieve
target level 3. In the basic form of passive attack, a detection only attack, an
adversary wins only with the target level 1.
Definition 3.18 (Passive Attacks).
Level 1. (Detection only). An adversary only detects the presence of valid wa-
termark, w ∈ W in a watermarked image, i¯ ∈ I¯.
Level 2. (Incisive detection). An adversary distinguishes the watermark, w ∈
W from that of other watermarked image(s), l¯ ∈ I¯|l¯ 6= i¯.
Level 3. (Comprehensive detection). An adversary obtains information at least
partially (e.g ., the message, m ∈ M and other image data, j ∈ J
etc.) that the valid watermark, w ∈ W carries, without modifying the
watermarked image, i¯ ∈ I¯.
3.6 Discussion
The study of digital watermarking is by no means new [11, 198]. Although it
has received tremendous attention in different applications, a formal concept in
their systematic development is yet to be established. Addressing this gap, in
this chapter, research contributions are presented in three main parts: (i) a
formal watermarking model (Section 3.3), (ii) definitions and uses of fundamental
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properties (Section 3.4), and (iii) possible attacks on the watermarking security
(Section 3.5).
A novel formal generic watermarking model is developed for image applica-
tions. Due to the high application variant properties of watermarking, focus is re-
stricted to the image applications. The complete sets of possible inputs, outputs,
and component functions have been determined by studying the watermarking
schemes proposed for different image applications. Thereby, a basic watermark-
ing model has initially been developed and later extended to a key-based model
for completeness. Using the novel formal model and its inputs, outputs, and func-
tional properties, all possible variants of digital image watermarking schemes can
be characterized and described (for example, for security analysis). Additionally,
the presented watermarking model can usefully be extended to other applications
later.
In addition, a set of defining properties of watermarking has been highlighted
and defined with their practical interpretation in different image applications.
Particularly, the robustness and security properties of watermarking have been
defined using a set of (signal and image based) processing techniques and of pos-
sible attacks, respectively. Although robustness can be interpreted as a security
property, the given definition would help avoid any potential confusion between
them in the signal and image processing contexts. Some other properties, such
as computational complexity and cost, are important; however, in this chapter,
those properties have mainly been considered, which can vary with the applica-
tion. Thus, addressing some hidden assumptions and associated confusions, the
necessary corrections and clarifications with examples have also been presented.
Moreover, a set of possible attacks have been defined with their win condi-
tions using the presented watermarking model. Knowing the inputs, outputs,
and win conditions helps one to visualize the possible attack scenarios, and thus
helps conduct an application-specific security analysis more efficiently. Depend-
ing upon the application scenario and available data (e.g ., watermarked image,
watermark) and tools (e.g ., embedding function), the attack-scenarios can be de-
fined for a stronger or weaker adversary. However, as a notion of stronger security
requirements, a weaker adversary has been considered, and the adversary actions
have been classified into two categories: active and passive. Some active attacks,
known as system attacks, aim at the protocols of the schemes. Two prominent
system attacks, ambiguity and scrambling attacks, in addition to the common
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active attacks, have also been defined. The passive attacks have been defined at
three different levels (i.e., detection only, incisive detection, and comprehensive
detection attacks) to illustrate the win conditions for an adversary. With all these
attack definitions, it has been shown how an adversary of different capabilities
may win with different conditions.
As a final remark, the contributions presented in this chapter are a first step
towards a unified and intuitive theory for digital image watermarking. The pre-
sented formal generic model of watermarking also allows a unified treatment of
all practically meaningful variants of digital image watermarking. Additionally,
the given considerations, definitions, and discussions help to further understand
the fundamental defining properties and attacks, while avoiding some potential
confusions and taking a step forward towards the systematic development of wa-
termarking schemes. The work presented in this chapter has been supported with
meaningful examples, necessary explanations, and comparative studies.
However, following up the current research to analyse the security of water-
marking schemes using the presented watermarking model duly requires: (i) de-
veloping complete attack models and (ii) defining security levels (in terms of
possible attacks), for different image (and other) applications, which the next
chapter will aim to address. Thereby, the following chapter will demonstrate
another use of the presented novel formal generic watermarking model.
3.7 Chapter Summary
This chapter has captured the theoretical aspects of watermarking with their
practical interpretations for the image applications. Two main components of
the systematic approach (i.e., mathematical formalism and operation determi-
nation) have been considered for watermarking. Thereby, a new formal generic
watermarking model and formal definitions of fundamental watermarking prop-
erties and possible attacks have been presented. More specifically:
• The state of the watermarking model is substantially reviewed. Despite
having the fundamental need for it in systemic development of watermark-
ing schemes, a formal generic watermarking model is found lacking in the
literature. Some common limitations of existing models (which are mostly
watermarking scheme specific) have been identified: (i) incomplete consid-
eration of inputs, outputs, and functions, (ii) lack of definitions for the
watermarking properties, and (iii) incomplete realization of the application
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scenarios.
• With a novel formal generic model, the watermarking principle has been
formally conceptualized for the image applications, in terms of neces-
sary inputs, outputs, and component functions. Four functions, namely,
watermark-generation, -embedding, -detection and -extraction, have been
considered demonstrating the use of individual keys for security purposes.
• Formal definition of a set of fundamental watermarking properties (e.g .,
blindness, robustness, perceptual similarity, etc.) have been given using the
presented watermarking model, with necessary examples and explanation.
The given definitions help contextualize the usual literal meaning of the
properties for the image applications.
• This chapter has presented a set of watermarking attacks giving their gen-
eral context for image applications. Considering different capabilities, win-
ning scenarios of adversary actions have been illustrated. This includes a
number of active attacks (e.g ., masking-, distortion-, forgery-, etc., attacks)
and passive attacks (i.e., detection only, incisive detection and comprehen-
sive detection).
• Finally, this chapter has recapitulated the presented facts and findings, dis-
cussed their significance and pointed out the necessary tasks to be followed
up in the research presented in the next chapters of this thesis.
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Security Analysis of Watermarking
Schemes
Chapter Organization
This chapter captures the security aspects in watermarking and demon-
strates further utilization of the watermarking model presented in the
previous chapter. Before presenting the security analysis of an important
case of watermarking schemes (called self-authentication schemes), water-
marking security and robustness requirements are studied in Section 4.2
to avoid their confusion. A generalized model of the self-authentication
schemes is then developed and their general weaknesses are discussed in
Section 4.3. To demonstrate how these weaknesses can be exploited by
an attacker, three new counterfeiting attacks are presented in Section 4.4.
Experimental results (Section 4.6) for the presented attacks show how the
current self-authentication schemes violate the systematic definition of se-
curity. For countermeasures, a new self-authentication model is presented
(Section 4.7). Section 4.8 discusses the findings and contributions pre-
sented in this chapter. Section 4.9 outlines the chapter summary. (The
original contributions discussed in this chapter resulted in a number of
publications, see Apeendices D.1, D.3 and D.8.)
4.1 Introduction
Watermarking schemes in their early days, building on the steganography or in-
formation hiding concept, were assumed to be secure if a watermark could not
be seen (i.e., hidden) and could not be removed from audio-visual objects by
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using common processing tools [189]. In digital image watermarking, such an
assumption motivates developers: (i) to hide the watermark in the cover image
imperceptibly, and (ii) to achieve the robustness to common image processing
techniques (e.g ., de-noising, cropping). These motivations are usually expressed
and fulfilled in terms of imperceptibility and robustness criteria. Thus, more at-
tention is given to improve robustness to the image processing operations, with an
acceptable imperceptibility (or perceptual similarity), which underpins several
watermarking schemes [47,49,5254,199204].
With the influence of the above mentioned assumption, however, the water-
marking schemes usually fail to justify an explicit consideration of the security
requirements. While the assumption may be valid for an application having no
strict security requirements, it obviously becomes invalid for many watermarking
applications having different specific security requirements. In other words, for
attaining security requirements, only consideration of high imperceptibility and
robustness to the image processing operations are insufficient for applications like
copyright protection, content authentication etc., where security problems mainly
arise from the underlying protocol weaknesses. Thus with such an incomplete se-
curity consideration, the watermarking schemes are more likely to suffer from
technical flaws and security weaknesses for those applications.
To address the problem, this chapter starts with verifying and formulating
the problem in the understanding of watermarking security and robustness. Con-
sidering overall status of their consideration in watermarking literature, their
requirements in the signal and image processing context are distinguished. The
bulk of this chapter then provides analysis of individual watermarking schemes
using the proposed watermarking model (Chapter 3), to demonstrate the need
for a dedicated security analysis paradigm for watermarking. General weaknesses
of the schemes are discussed and potential threats are validated by developing
three new counterfeiting attacks and their implementations. Guiding principles
are then presented and a new self-authentication model is developed to avoid the
weaknesses and thus to counteract the proposed attacks.
4.2 Watermarking Security and Robustness
Watermarking security is the ability of the watermark(s) to withstand against
different types of attacks (as discussed in Section 3.4.8). In watermarking ter-
minology, an attack is any processing (or activities) that may impair detection
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of the watermark (or communication of the information conveyed by the water-
mark) [205]. An active attack directly modifies the watermarked image, where
passive attacks do not. Some active attacks thwart the watermarking system
directly, and are often categorized as system attacks.
In cryptography, security is usually studied in terms of robustness. For ex-
ample, if an encryption scheme is robust to a particular attack, the scheme is
meant to retain security against that attack. With this cryptographic analogy,
watermarking robustness is studied in the signal and image processing context
and often confused with some legitimate image processing operations.
As defined in the previous chapter (Section 3.4.5), watermarking robustness
is the ability of a watermark to survive image (and signal) processing operations.
This notion of robustness is desirable for multimedia applications, where certain
operations (e.g ., compression, file-format-conversion, etc. that do not change the
semantic of the multimedia contents but their bit-wise representations) are al-
lowed and considered legitimate. (Section 4.7.2 will discuss this further in view
of strict and selective security services.)
Therefore, irrespective of application scenarios, it can be stated that when
watermarking security addresses malicious attacks, watermarking robustness is
concerned with some legitimate image processing operations resulting in accept-
able distortions. This also means that a watermarking scheme being robust to
those operations may not be secure against the attacks fabricated with those
operations.
The above observation suggests a boundary for the two properties, robust-
ness and security, in watermarking applications. Although the difference in their
meanings and definitions are quite certain, their considerations are not clear and
mostly incomplete in the watermarking research. To demonstrate this problem,
their overall status is investigated below and thereby the source of confusion is
identified. Guidelines for their appropriate considerations are also discussed to
tackle the problem revealing the ultimate need for dedicated security analysis of
watermarking schemes.
4.2.1 Research Trends and Overall Status
This section surveys relevant research literature to identify the research trends in
addressing watermarking robustness and the security problems and their current
status. This gives the big-picture of the problem domain, highlighting the general
interest in those two individual research directions.
89
Chapter 4. Security Analysis of Watermarking Schemes
Literature Identification and Classification. It is more than difficult to
perfectly separate all the published research literature into the two areas of inter-
est, i.e., robustness and security issues. However, to make the study manageable,
six key databases have been considered that mostly cover the watermarking stud-
ies. They are IEEE Xplore, Compendex, Inspec, ScienceDirect, Scopus, and Web
of Science. As of primary source of information, mainly book chapters, journal
articles, conference papers in those databases are sought out. The literature is
categorized into robustness issues and security issues based on their research fo-
cus, which is determined mainly by their title and abstract. Introduction and
conclusion have been occasionally reviewed for any further clarification. Finally,
year-wise interpretation is made from the number of publications in each area.
This survey was conducted in 2011, and has therefore considered publications up
to 2010.
Significance of the Findings. The trends and status of the watermarking
research in the two particular areas of robustness and security are illustrated in
Fig. 4.1, with yearly published articles over the last decade. There has been an
upward trend in the research addressing both the watermarking robustness and
security since the early days of watermarking. However, an increasing gap be-
tween them has been also evident at the same time. This gap roughly represents
the lack of interest in security with respect to the robustness in watermarking
research, which further gives an indication to the continuous influence of the
primitive assumption that this chapter begins with. Consequently, having quite
similar significance in practice, security and robustness problems have not been
similarly addressed in the research This suggests a wrong perception on the secu-
rity in watermarking context. All this becomes clearer if the evaluation practice of
individual watermarking schemes are reviewed. Although watermarking security
is getting comparatively more attention recently, fundamental points of confusion
with robustness have not been identified yet.
4.2.2 Problems in Individual Schemes
In various digital image applications, watermarking robustness and security are
being addressed without an explicit consideration of their individual require-
ments. In the early stage of watermarking, Nikolaidis and Pitas [50] presented
a digital image watermarking scheme for copyright protection based on the data
hiding concept that is immune to geometric distortions. In evaluating robustness
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Figure 4.1: Yearly published literature in digital image watermarking research ad-
dressing robustness and security problems.
of that scheme, only JPEG compression and low-pass filtering were considered.
There was no clear indication on how the proposed scheme is secure to any hostile
attacks in copyright protection. Here, it can be noted that copyright protection
is one of the main target applications for robust watermarking, where the range
of hostile attacks is not limited to those that use only JPEG compression and
low-pass filtering.
On the other hand, Petitcolas et al . [138] identified the problem in improving
watermarking robustness more clearly from concurrent studies. Authors showed
that the robustness criteria used so far are often inadequate in watermarking or
fingerprinting. They expressed their concern that even if a copyright marking
system is robust against signal processing, bad engineering can provide other av-
enues of attacks. This certainly shows a limit for the consideration of robustness,
where respective security matters come in.
However, subsequent general practice in assessing watermarking robustness
has not changed. In an earlier fashion, Liu et al . [49] evaluated robustness of
their proposed scheme to JPEG compression, filtering, and noise addition. Simi-
topoulos et al . [54] proposed an image watermarking scheme using geometrically
significant feature points, where robustness is evaluated for geometric transforma-
tions, and thereby the scheme is expected to be secure against geometric attacks
(rotation, scaling, and translation). Qi et al . [52] and Deng et al . [47] applied a
similar watermarking approach, where the robustness of their schemes are also
evaluated against geometric distortions and various common image-processing
operations such as JPEG compression, filtering, enhancement, and quantization.
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There are many other watermarking schemes (e.g ., [200203]) based on different
principles for developing robustness, but most of them follow the similar perspec-
tive to robustness evaluation.
In contrast, watermarking security considerations and assessment are often
disregarded in the literature. Specifically, attention is very limited where an
adversary can produce an attacked image, which is perceptually similar to the
valid watermarked or original image. To the security issues, however, Cayre et
al . [78] theorize the watermarking security from a cryptanalysis point of view
indicating the scarcity of a complete analysis of robust watermarking security.
Furon [206] highlights the concerns of watermarking security with the help of
some useful signal processing tools to hack watermarking schemes, which shows
the pathway to analysing security problems in watermarking. However, an appli-
cation-based thorough-analysis is required for watermarking schemes, since wa-
termarking properties and requirements significantly vary with the application.
Later, Li et al . [147] ascertained that due to lack of necessary security con-
siderations in the design process, most of the proposed watermarking schemes
fall short of achieving their intended goals even if their robustness problems were
completely resolved. They suggested some threat models to addressing security
requirements, and attack models for a few broad categories of watermarking ap-
plications. Some recent works also addressed the security problems in terms of
deploying keys or cryptographic tools as building blocks in watermarking, but
many of them (e.g ., [32, 55, 207]) are lacking a complete security analysis (i.e.,
how a watermarking scheme can meet the security requirements in a target ap-
plication is not justified).
4.2.3 Fundamental Problem Realization
The problem discussed so far, in consideration of watermarking security and ro-
bustness, presumably stems from (i) confusion between legitimate (signal and
image processing) operations and malicious attacks, and their unjustified con-
sideration for an application, and (ii) an improper realization of the target ap-
plications. For further realization and understanding of the problem in view of
the above causes, a key question in the problem domain is formulated. To seek
answer of the question, a theoretical analysis is presented below with necessary
hypotheses and observations.
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Problem domain. The importance of security in watermarking has already
been realized and a few authors tried to address that from different perspectives
of steganalysis [192, 206] or cryptanalysis [78, 147, 189] or, using an information
theoretic model [148]. However, the security of watermarking in a digital image
application is not properly defined yet, and thus attaining the required security
in terms of achieving robustness remains as an implicit convention. Hence, there
is a primary question yet to be addressed: how much a robust watermark can be
secure? In other words, how does the watermarking security vary in watermarks
of different robustness? Addressing this fundamental question naturally poses
another question to answer: what does a watermark need to be secure against and
robust to? Are they correlated? If so, how much?
Security and robustness requirements. From an image processing perspec-
tive, the requirements of security and robustness can be individually determined
from the attack and distortion spaces, respectively. As discussed above in Sec-
tion 4.2, watermarking robustness is considered as the ability of the watermarks
to withstand any distortions. The robustness requirements thus mainly iden-
tify the specific processes that cause distortions and are likely to occur between
embedding and detection. For example, lossy compression, noise reduction, file
conversion, rotation, contrast adjustment, and so on. Watermarking security, on
the other hand, is considered as the ability of the watermarks to resist any hostile
attacks that may circumvent the watermarking objectives. Security requirements
thus identify the range of expected attacks for an application scenario.
Fig. 4.2(a) illustrates the correlations between attacks and distortions high-
lighting that both of them can void the watermarking objectives. Some active
attacks and all the passive attacks can void watermarking purpose directly, while
other active attacks cause some sort of malicious distortions in doing that. Unlike
any attack, applicable image/signal processing operations/transforms, for exam-
ple, image compression in transmission, may introduce unintentional distortions
that can also destroy a valid watermark.
Hypothesis and observation. Consider a requirement space, P for a digital
image watermarking scheme, where two sub-sets, S and R represents the require-
ments for security and robustness respectively such that, S ⊂ P and R ⊂ P .
This is shown in Fig. 4.2(b). Note here that S and R are derived from corre-
sponding attack and distortion space as illustrated in Fig. 4.2(a). It can also
be noted that different sets for requirements of other properties may be present
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Figure 4.2: Realization of watermarking security and robustness in terms of their re-
quirements.
in the requirement space. However, the attention is restricted here to only the
robustness and security requirements in demonstrating their correlation towards
the question posed.
Further, the set Q
∆
= S∩R represents the requirements that can be attainable
by either S or R. Here, the problem being addressed is valid when S 6= φ and
R 6= φ . This means that if there is no security requirement for a watermark-
ing scheme, there is no confusion with its counterpart, and vice-versa. Besides,
Fig. 4.2(a) suggests that S 6= R, which means that the requirements of security
and robustness are not equal (since not all attacks cause distortions). Further,
there are some active attacks that cause distortions, for which, Q 6= φ. Here, it
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can be noted that if Q = φ, then requirements of robustness and security be-
come completely separate, which gives no room for confusion between these two
properties, and completes the quest.
From the above discussion, the hypotheses can be outlined as follows:
Hypothesis 4.1. The sets of security requirements, S, robustness requirements,
R, and their mutual requirements, Q = S ∩R are the subsets of the requirements
space, P (i.e., S ⊂ P , R ⊂ P , and Q ⊂ P ).
Hypothesis 4.2. The sets of security requirements, S, robustness requirements,
R, and their mutual requirements Q are non-empty sets (i.e., S 6= φ, R 6= φ, and
Q 6= φ).
Hypothesis 4.3. The sets of security requirements, S and robustness require-
ments, R are not equal (i.e., S 6= R).
The above hypotheses suggest that neither S nor R can be achieved by only
attaining any one of them in a particular application scenario. This correlation
between S and R is demonstrated by the following statements being true:
Statement 4.1. The mutual requirements, Q = S ∩ R do not help attain the
complete security requirements, S in the requirement space, P such that S 6= Q.
(Proof of this statement is given in Appendix A.1.)
Statement 4.2. If the requirements of robustness, R are completely attained, the
security requirements, S is partially fulfilled such that R 6= R− S. (Proof of this
statement is given in Appendix A.2.)
Statement 4.3. The security requirements, S cannot be completely attained
either by completely or partially attaining the requirements of robustness, R
and vice-versa in an application scenario such that S 6= Q ∪ (R− S) and
R 6= Q ∪ (S −R). (Proof of this statement is given in Appendix A.3.)
Given statements also imply that the robustness and security requirements
are to be individually considered for both in developing and evaluating a water-
marking scheme.
4.2.4 Guidelines for Security and Robustness Assessment
This section recommends some general guidelines for the watermarking robustness
and security assessment. Since the evaluation criteria for the security and robust-
ness may vary and depends on the application scenario, an individual framework
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is to be used for their assessment in a digital image application. Robustness can
be evaluated by the conventional approach provided that the set of all applicable
processes (i.e., image/signal processing operations) are carefully considered for
the application scenario. Similarly, for the required security, one needs to consider
different types of attacks that can thwart the watermarking objectives.
Watermarking security is outlined in terms of attacks in Fig. 4.3. (These at-
tacks have been discussed in the last chapter, Section 3.5.) This outline suggests
that being robust, a watermarking scheme may ideally be secure against only the
distortion attacks (marked as deep-grey-shaded boxes) in the category of unau-
thorized removal. In other words, if one develops a watermarking scheme robust
enough to any distortions, the scheme may be secure against only those attacks
that cause malicious distortions in a valid watermarked image. As illustrated in
Fig. 4.2(a), it is not necessary for all attacks to cause distortions to circumvent
the watermarking purpose(s). Rather, an attacker can achieve the target without
introducing any noticeable distortions, for example, by keeping the output image
perceptually similar to the original/watermarked image (in some active attacks),
or without applying any processing directly on the image (in passive attacks).
These types of attacks on the scheme can be left unattended, if the security is
only considered to be achieved in terms of robustness.
Therefore, irrespective of the level of robustness (i.e., robust, fragile, semi-
fragile), a watermarking scheme must have a separate consideration of security
requirements. Further, due the variation in security requirements from one ap-
plication to the other, a dedicated security analysis of the scheme is required for
the intended application. To this, in what follows, the security of a particular
type of watermarking schemes used for image authentication is investigated.
4.3 Analysis of Self-Authentication Schemes
This section focuses on the watermarking based image authentication schemes,
to demonstrate a new paradigm for their dedicated security analysis using the
proposed watermarking model (Chapter 3). With the tremendous growth in mul-
timedia applications, a number of serious security concerns are rising [208212].
An immediate threat that the ready availability of sophisticated multimedia pro-
cessing tools pose, is the diminishing trustworthiness of multimedia information.
As a result, developing self-authentication schemes has attracted much attention
in the research [6, 7, 56,165,213217].
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Figure 4.3: Attacks for digital image watermarking.
Self-authentication schemes, as a general form of multimedia authentication
tool, authenticate the semantic content of multimedia information such as images
and videos using self-embedded watermark(s), with the localisation and recovery
of any possible alteration. There are different flavours in their construction (e.g .,
content authentication, self-embedding, self-recovery schemes) and application
areas (e.g ., image and video surveillance, forensics). However, attention is re-
stricted on the block-wise dependent fragile watermarking based schemes and
their image applications. (To simply refer to those schemes, in what follows,
the term self-authentication scheme(s) is used.) Although their general model
97
Chapter 4. Security Analysis of Watermarking Schemes
is described in Section 4.3.3, the basic idea is that an input image is divided
into non-overlapping blocks, and a watermark for each block is embedded into
its mapped block. A mapping transform is used to generate the block-mapping
sequence for a given set of block indexes. In the detection process, any possible
alteration in an image is detected by comparing the embedded watermark(s) with
the regenerated watermark(s). For a match, a detector authenticates the input
image, otherwise it marks the image as tampered and attempts to localise and
recover the tampered blocks.
Despite the continuing interest in developing new self-authentication schemes,
disregard for their security analysis may cast serious doubt on their potential. One
reason behind this disregard perhaps is the wrong consideration of active attacks.
Self-authentication schemes are usually based on the fragile watermarking, where
active attacks that directly alter image contents are usually ignored. It is consid-
ered by the fragile watermarking property that the watermarks would be invalid
for minimum possible changes in a watermarked image, and thus those attacks can
be detected. This consideration, however, leaves an opportunity for the attackers
to deceive a detector, by keeping the embedded watermarks valid for the alter-
ations. Those active attacks are called counterfeiting attacks. Consequences of
those attacks, though can be unarguably severe, have not been properly analysed
yet. As a result, the security level of many self-authentication schemes remains
undetermined.
Therefore, the analysis starts with determining any counterfeiting weaknesses
of, and studying any known attacks on, the self-authentication schemes. To show
how several adversary actions may apply and win in different levels of counter-
feiting instances by exploiting those weaknesses, three counterfeiting attacks are
developed. The experimental results demonstrate how such a scheme may violate
a systematic definition of security. Finally, a set of requirements are determined
and in light of those requirements, a self-authentication model is presented, to
avoid the weaknesses and thus to counteract the proposed attacks.
4.3.1 Weaknesses of the Self-Authentication Schemes
Self-authentication schemes are promising for image content authentication and
integrity verification with possible localisation and recovery of tampered image
blocks. Without rigorous security analysis, their present development aims at
improving localization-accuracy and restoration-quality. Consequently, they often
suffer from a number of weaknesses, which is now discussed.
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Weak block-mapping transform. In self-authentication schemes, a block-
mapping sequence is used to achieve block-wise dependence. (The block-wise
dependence property helps avoid vector quantisation (VQ) weaknesses, which
will be discussed below in Section 4.3.2.) For developing the block-mapping
transform, although a non-linear transform is recently studied in [218], a common
approach is to use a linear transform; for example, using fixed offset [219], 1D-
transformation [6, 7, 56, 69], or 2D-transformation [220]. Given a set of block-
indexes, a linear block-mapping transform yields another set of mapped block-
indexes. Here, the total number of block-indexes is limited and depends on both
the input image size and its block size. For example, an image of size 512× 512
and a block of size 4×4 gives a total of 16384 (i.e., 512
4
× 512
4
) image-block indexes.
For such a limited number of indexes, their mapping sequence however becomes
easily recoverable. This weakness in block-mapping transform mainly stems
from choosing a key from an incongruously small key-space (e.g ., [1, 16384]
for the above example), which speeds up the process of block-mapping sequence
recovery to only a fraction of a second considering a typical key search time for
the key-space using a Brute-force attack [82]. (The effect of small key size will
be further discussed in Section 4.5.3.)
Lack of collision resistance. A self-authentication scheme assumes that any
alteration in a valid watermarked image makes the embedded watermark invalid,
as mentioned in Section 4.3. However, a detector can be deceived, if the embedded
watermark remains valid for any possible alteration. Various local features (e.g .,
average intensity, transform or quantisation coefficients) of an image are used for
the authentication watermark generation. Although these features facilitate the
recovery option, they posses no or little collision resistance. Such authentication
schemes therefore may no longer be reliable and in a more strict sense, may violate
the systematic definition of security.
Collision resistance is mainly studied for cryptographic hash functions [82].
A watermark can be informally defined as collision resistant if for a given image
block, it is hard to find another image block, which will have the same wa-
termark. This is a notion of weak collision resistance, whereas for a watermark
being strong collision resistant, it is hard to find two image blocks for a given
watermark. However, consideration of these different notions of collision resis-
tance may depend on the requirements of an application scenario, which will be
discussed in Section 4.7.
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4.3.2 Counterfeiting Attacks on the Self-Authentication
Schemes
Section 4.2.1 has demonstrated that the overall security aspects in watermarking
have attracted a limited attention in the research. This means that the literature
on the security aspects of self-authentication schemes is also limited. Only a
few works [71, 221223] have studied some counterfeiting possibilities for earlier
self-authentication schemes as follows.
The vector quantisation attack [71] (or VQ attack) is most probably the first
counterfeiting attack on a particular type of self-authentication schemes, which
are based on the block-wise independent fragile watermarking. Holliman and
Memon [71] described an embedding property, which embeds a watermark into
a host image in a block-wise independent fashion, resulting in the VQ weak-
ness. The authors have shown that there exists equivalence classes for each block
containing a similar watermark for a given key. Although the equivalence class
principle is the key idea in mounting the counterfeiting attacks, the definition
of an equivalence class does not apply, if the watermarks are block-wise depen-
dent, and thus the VQ attack becomes invalid. It will be shown, however, in
Section 4.4.3 that, in certain scenarios, the equivalence class principle can be
extended to the block-wise dependent watermarks.
A collage attack [221], which is a variation of the VQ attack (for a relatively
weak attacker) has been studied. Unlike a VQ attack, the collage attack assumes
that an attacker has no valid secret-data (i.e., key, and logoas the watermark
independent of the input image blocks) but a set of (large number) valid water-
marked images with the same key and logo. An attacker replaces a set of valid
image blocks with a set of collage blocks (i.e., a set of chosen blocks from the
equivalence class) and wishes to validate those collage blocks for the key and
original watermarks. However, like the VQ attack, such a collage attack is not
valid for the block-wise dependence property of a self-authentication scheme.
To avoid the VQ attack and collage attack, later self-authentication schemes
are designed to have the block-wise dependence; however, counterfeiting weak-
nesses in those schemes have also been reported afterwards. He et al . [222] have
shown the possibility of unauthorised recovery of the mapping sequence and secret
key by using verification device attack and exhaustive key search, respectively. Af-
terwards, Chang et al . [223] proposed a four-scanning attack to obtain the secret
mapping sequence.
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In a verification device attack, the attacker tampers with the embedded wa-
termark of a block, and observes corresponding location of the mapped block as
detected tampered. In a self-authentication scheme, a detector usually cannot
determine whether an image block or its watermark (which is embedded into cor-
responding mapped image block) is tampered. Consequently, the corresponding
mapped image block is marked as tampered and the attacker comes to know which
block it is mapped to, for a given block. The attacker thus continues verification
for a set of input blocks of a valid watermarked image to know their mapping
sequence. In an exhaustive key search, on the other hand, an attacker tries all
possible keys to find the correct mapping sequence, for which the regenerated
watermark of each block will match with its original watermark embedded in the
respective mapped block.
In a four-scanning attack, like the exhaustive key search, an attacker applies
an exhaustive search, but not for the secret key; rather the attacker aims to
recover the mapping sequence. Basically, if the regenerated watermark of one
block matches with the extracted watermark of another block (or vice versa), then
those two blocks form a mapped pair. Knowledge of all (or selected) mapped pairs
reveals the complete (or partial) mapping sequence of the image blocks. But, some
ambiguous mapped pairs may exist that can be corrected using some principles.
For example, if one mapped block of any ambiguous mapped pair belongs to
another mapped pair (as a mapped block), which is not ambiguous, then the
ambiguous pair can be assumed invalid. To illustrate this, consider an original
mapping sequence a1 → a2 → a4 → a3 → a1, which actually should have the
following set of mapped pairs: {(a1, a2), (a2, a4), (a4, a3), (a3, a1)}, where (a1, a2)
indicates block a1 is mapped to the block a2 and so on. An attacker however
obtains the following set: {(a1, a2), (a2, a4), (a4, a3), (a3, a2), (a3, a1)}, where the
pairs (a3, a2) and (a3, a1) are ambiguous. Based on the said principle, the block
a2 of (a3, a2) also belongs to (a1, a2) as a mapped block, which is not ambiguous
to other pairs thus the pair (a3, a2) can be invalid and discarded.
In addition to the above secret recovery attacks, some particular counterfeit-
ing scenarios have also been studied. He et al . [222] illustrated a counterfeiting
scenario called synchronous attack, where knowing the secret mapping, an at-
tacker modifies the block a valid watermarked image keeping their original water-
mark valid for the modification. He et al . validated their attack for the schemes
in [224, 225]. Similarly, Chang et al . [223] illustrated a counterfeiting scenario
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using constant-average attack, which first modifies a block and then adjusts the
pixels of the block such that their average intensity matches that of the original
block. The attack was validated for the Lin et al . scheme [56].
The above studies [222, 223] mainly aimed at the unauthorised recovery of
secret parameters (i.e., key or mapping sequence) exploiting the weaknesses of
some schemes. However, neither the weaknesses themselves nor the recovery
of a secret mapping sequence demonstrate how they can affect a target applica-
tion. Although, those studies also illustrated particular instances of counterfeiting
scenarios, there can be many other counterfeiting possibilities for their studied
schemes [56,224,225] and other similar schemes as well.
Therefore, to generalise all possible counterfeiting instances at three levels
of modification of a valid watermarked image, three new counterfeiting attack
models are developed and their win conditions are defined. Before presenting the
proposed attack models and their applicability and validation in Section 4.4  4.6,
the general model of the self-authentication schemes is developed and presented
below.
4.3.3 General Model of the Self-Authentication Schemes
The realisation of the self-authentication schemes is simplified as a specific case
of block-wise dependent fragile watermarking based schemes, as mentioned in
Section 4.3 and illustrated in Model 4.1. To construct the self-authentication
model, necessary notations are adopted from the general watermarking model
discussed in Chapter 3.
A self-authentication scheme is defined with three basic functions: watermark
generation, G (·), watermark embedding, E (·), and watermark detection, D (·).
The generation function generates the watermark: w = G (i) = {0, 1}+. The
embedding function embeds the watermark, w in an input image, i with a secret
key, k, and thus outputs a watermarked image, i¯ such that Ek (i, w) = i¯. The
detection function, on the other hand, verifies a given (watermarked) image with
the detection key, k such that Dk (¯i) 6= ⊥, where `⊥' denotes a failure. Addi-
tionally, D (·) is usually designed to perform a few other tasks (e.g ., tampering
localisation and recovery as illustrated in Step 10 and 11 in Model 4.1). However,
attention is restricted to the verification step that outputs a failure for an invalid
watermark(s), where an attacker is particularly interested to break in.
A self-authentication scheme operates on image blocks. The scheme divides a
given input image, i into non-overlapping blocks, {Bn} and sub-blocks,
{
Bln
}
such
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Model 4.1 Generalized Self-Authentication Scheme
Watermark Generation, G (·)
Input: (i) an input image, i = {Bln}, where {n} = {1, 2, · · · , Nb} and Nb is the
total number of blocks.
Output: (i) watermark, w = {wln}.
Begin
1: a set of watermarks are generated using (non-overlapping) block features of
the input image blocks, {Bln} such that {wln} ← G : {Bln}.
End
Watermark Embedding, E (·)
Input: (i) an input image, i = {Bln}; (ii) key, k; (iii) mapping function Map (·),
and (iv) watermark, w = {wln}.
Output: (i) watermarked image, i¯ = {B¯ln}.
Begin
2: Map (·) generates a set of mapped block indexes, {q} for the original set of
indexes {n} and rearrange the input blocks (e.g ., watermark or image)
according to {q}, e.g ., {wlq} ←Map
({wln}, k).
3: the mapped watermarks, {wlq} are embedded into the image blocks such
that {B¯ln} ← E : {Bln} × {wlq} = E
({Bln},Map({wln}, k)).
End
Watermark Detection, D (·)
Input: (i) a watermarked image, i¯ = {B¯ln}; (ii) key, k; (iii) generation function,
G (·), (iv) extraction function, E−1 (·); (v) verification function, V erify (·);
and (vi) recovery function, Recover (·).
Output: (i) a pass, > or the tampering localized and recovered images,
i¯ = {B¯ln1} ∩ {B¯ln−n1} and i˜ = {B˜ln1} ∩ {B¯ln−n1} respectively, and where
{n1} ⊆ {n}.
Begin
4: extract the embedded watermark: {w˜ln} ← E−1
({B¯ln},Map (·) , k)
5: regenerate watermark for the input image: {wnewln} ← G : {B¯ln}
6: verify image blocks: {B¯ln1} ∩ {B¯ln−n1} ← V erify
({B¯ln}, {w˜ln}, {wnewln}). .
{B¯ln1} and {B¯ln−n1} are the sets of tampered and un-tampered blocks,
respectively.
7: if {n1} = φ then
8: return a pass, > . the image is authentic and un-tampered
9: else
10: recover the tampered block such that {B˜ln1} ← Recover
(
{B¯ln1}, {w˜ln1}
)
11: return i¯ = {B¯ln1} ∩ {B¯ln−n1} and i˜ = {B˜ln1} ∩ {B¯ln−n1}.
12: end if
End
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that i = {Bn} =
{
Bln
}
. Similarly, w = {wn} =
{
wln
}
, and i¯ =
{
B¯n
}
=
{
B¯ln
}
.
Here, l and n denote the indexes of the sub-blocks and blocks respectively. For
example, l ∈ {1, . . . , 4} and n ∈ {1, 2, . . . , Nb} are the indexes of the 4 × 4 sub-
block and 8× 8 image block, where Nb =
(
M
8
× N
8
)
and M ×N is the image size.
Note here that not all self-authentication schemes operate on the sub-blocks,
where l = 1 and an image is thus simply a set of image blocks, i.e., i = {Bn} or
i¯ =
{
B¯n
}
. Also, the number of image blocks, Nb can vary from one scheme to
another depending on the image block size, for the same input images.
In embedding, a mapping function, Map (·) is used to achieve the inter-
block dependence. This function generates a mapping sequence and rearrange
its input blocks according to the generated mapping sequence such that i.e.,
{wlq} ← Map
({wln}, k) or {Blq} ← Map ({Bln}, k). Although Map (·) can oper-
ate on either image blocks or corresponding watermark blocks, the case of wa-
termark block is considered here for simplicity and avoiding confusion, as shown
in the Model 4.1. For generating mapping sequence in Map (·), different map-
ping transform can be used, as discussed in Section 4.3.1 [Weak block-mapping
transform.]. However, for the considered case of self-authentication schemes, the
mapping sequence, {q} is generated for the block indexes, {n} using the secret
key, k such that q = [(k × n)mod Nb] + 1 for all n, where k is a prime num-
ber and usually chosen from the range of [2, Nb]. Finally, block-wise dependence
is achieved by embedding the mapped blocks' watermarks into the input image
blocks, i.e., E :
{
Bln
} × {wlq} → {B¯ln} . For completeness, this can be written
as E
({Bln},Map ({wln}, k)) = {B¯ln} for all l and n.
To verify a watermarked image, i¯, a detector regenerates watermarks and
extracts their original version from i¯ such that G :
{
B¯ln
} → {wnewln}, and
E−1
({B¯ln},Map (·) , k) → {w˜ln}, for all l and n. Here, {wnewln} = wnew
and
{
w˜ln
}
= w˜ denote the regenerated and extracted versions of w. Ideally,
wnew = w˜ = w, but assuming a few possible bit errors in w˜ (which can be ad-
dressed by some error correction code) and possible adversary actions leading to
a different wnew, they are distinguished using different notations. The extraction
function, E−1 (·) is the inverse of E such that E−1 (·) extracts the bits (assuming
as watermark) from the input (watermarked) image, i¯ in the reverse way (i.e.,
from the same embedding locations, where the watermark bits are suppose to be
embedded in by the E (·)). As the Model 4.1 illustrates, the detector D (·) then
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block-wise authenticates the input image, i¯ using V erify (·) as follows:
For all l and n, V erify
(
B¯ln, w˜
l
n, wnew
l
n
)
=
B¯
l
n, for w˜
l
n = wnew
l
n
B¯ln, otherwise
(4.1)
Any tampered blocks
{
B¯ln1
}
, where {n1} ⊆ {n}, are then recovered using the
recovery function, Recover (·) such that {B˜ln1} ← Recover
(
{B¯ln1}, {w˜ln1}
)
. If no
tampered blocks are found, D (·) returns a pass, > indicating the input image is
authentic and un-tampered. Otherwise, the tampering localized and recovered
images, i¯ = {B¯ln1} ∩ {B¯ln−n1} and i˜ = {B˜ln1} ∩ {B¯ln−n1} are output respectively.
Therefore, in self-authentication schemes, the function D (·) performs verifi-
cation in two phases: authentication, and tampering localization and recovery.
For the security analysis, however, only the authentication phase is considered
here, where an attacker is particularly interested to break in. For an authentic
and untampered watermarked image, i¯, thus there exists a match between
{
w˜ln
}
and
{
wnewln
}
such that Dk :
{
B¯ln
} 6= ⊥ or simply Dk (¯i) 6= ⊥. Thereby, it is
shown in the following sections, how an attacker may modify a valid watermarked
image in different counterfeiting scenarios without a detection failure.
4.4 New Counterfeiting Attacks
In a general counterfeiting scenario, a valid watermarked image is maliciously
manipulated to get undetectably verified. In other words, an attacker outputs
an attacked image (from a set of valid watermarked images) and wishes to verify
the attacked image as authentic. Consider an attacker outputting an attacked
image, i¯a, which is a maliciously modified version of the original watermarked
image, i¯ = Ek {i, w}. Note here that, i¯a and i¯ may or may not be perceptually
similar to each other depending on the intended use of i¯a. (Perceptual similarity
is a watermarking property that defines the minimum distances or dissimilarities
between the perceptual content of two images. For more precise definition, see
Definition 3.1.) Additionally, the attacked image may have either an original or
new watermark, w or wa respectively. As explained in last section, a detector
authenticates a valid watermarked image with Dk (¯i) 6= ⊥, a general win condi-
tion (irrespective of the attacker's capability) can be defined now to determine a
successful counterfeiting attack.
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Definition 4.1 (Win condition). An attacker outputs an attacked image, i¯a for
a self-authentication scheme, and wins with Dk (¯ia) 6= ⊥.
An attacker's capability and intention, however, play an important role in
counterfeiting attacks. Attackers of different capabilities (e.g ., to choose input
image(s) with/without watermark(s), to access to component functions or to
know the secret parameters of a scheme) and intentions (e.g ., what the attacked
image is to be used for) may output an attacked image in different ways to satisfy
the win condition. In practice, it is reasonable in attack modelling to assume the
expected capabilities of an attacker. While a strong attacker may have access
to all functions of a watermarking scheme and can choose a watermark or a set
of watermarked images, a weak attacker may only work on a single (or a set of)
watermarked image(s) and with any disclosed secret information.
Depending upon the capability and intention, an attacker may recover the
key or mapping sequence using different methods: exhaustive key search [222],
verification device attack [222], or a four-scanning attack [223] as discussed in Sec-
tion 4.3.2. The four-scanning attack is combined with the verification device at-
tack and thereby the mapping sequence recovery model, Getmap (·) is developed.
In the proposed Getmap (·), the exhaustive search principle of four-scanning at-
tack is used to generate initial mapping sequence, and then the verification device
attack principle is used to correct the sequence. The main difference between the
Getmap (·) and those above mentioned methods is that Getmap (·) can operate
on a set of watermarked images (watermarked with the same key), instead of
only one watermarked image for mapping sequence recovery. The output ob-
tained from Getmap (·) can be exploited in different ways to modify a (valid)
watermarked image and to satisfy the win condition. Addressing this, three at-
tacks are proposed, namely; Counterfeiting Attack 1, Counterfeiting Attack 2,
and Counterfeiting Attack 3. The Getmap (·) and the proposed attacks are dis-
cussed below. (As discussed in Chapter 3, X ≈ Y denotes that two images X
and Y are perceptually similar, and X 0 Y denotes that they are not.)
4.4.1 Mapping Sequence Recovery Method, Getmap
The block mapping sequence of the self-authentication schemes can be recov-
ered in an unauthorised manner (i.e., without knowing the secret key). To this,
Getmap (·) is developed that outputs a complete (or partial) set of mapped block
indexes usingG (·) and the inverse of the modified embedding function, Embed (·).
106
4.4 New Counterfeiting Attacks
Model 4.2 Proposed Mapping-Sequence Recovery Method, Getmap (·)
Input: (i) watermarked image, i¯ =
{
B¯ln
}
with watermark, w =
{
wln
}
; (ii) set of
selected block indexes, {u} ⊆ {n}; (iii) generation function, G (·); and
(iv) extraction function, Embed−1 (·).
Output: (i) set of mapped blocks' indexes, {uu} ⊆ {q}, for respective set of indexes,
{u} of the selected blocks.
Begin
1: regenerate the watermark for all the selected blocks,
{
Blu
}
(i.e.,{
wnewlu
}← G : {Blu} ) . wnew is the regenerated version of the w
2: extract the embedded watermark from the selected blocks,
{
Blu
}
(i.e.,{
w˜lu
}← Embed−1 : {B¯lu}) . w˜ is the extracted version of the w
3: for all index ∈ {u} do . generating mapping sequence
if w˜lindex = wnew
l
u then
uu← index
end if
end for
4: for all index ∈ {u} do . correcting ambiguous pair
if there exists {ambiguous_index} ⊂ {uu} then
for all ambiguous_index do
if wnewlambiguous_index = w˜
l
another_index where,
another_index ∈ {n} : another_index 6= index
then
{uu} ← {uu} \ambiguous_index
end if
end for
end if
end for
5: return set of mapped block indexes, {uu}
End
The watermark is generated using G (·) such that G (·) : {B¯lu} → {wnewlu},
where wnew is the regenerated version of the w. Here, {u} ⊆ {n} is the set of
indexes of the selected blocks
{
Blu
}
that the attacker wants to modify. Further,
Embed−1 (·) is used to extract the original watermarks, w embedded in the blocks{
B¯lu
}
such that Embed−1 :
{
B¯lu
} → {w˜lu}, where w˜ is the extracted version of
the w. It is worth noting here that, unlike Ek (·), Embed (·) embeds the water-
mark(s) directly into the blocks without the secret mapping sequence (and thus
without the key) such that Embed :
{
Blu
} × {wlu} → {B¯lu}. So, the extracted
watermark(s) using Embed−1 (·) remains in the order as they were embedded,
which suggests that the match between two versions of block-wise watermarks,{
wnewlu
}
and
{
w˜lu
}
may lead to the secret mapping sequence.
The basic functional steps of Getmap (·) are as follows. As illustrated in
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Model 4.2, the Getmap (·) starts with finding all possible pairs of original and
mapped block indexes. Here, if the regenerated watermark of one block matches
with the extracted watermark of another block, the indexes of those two blocks
form an index pair. Then Getmap (·) checks for any ambiguous pairs (i.e., an
index pair is ambiguous to another pair, when they have a common mapped
block index). For a few ambiguous pairs, an attacker may try to correct them
with the detection function directly. Otherwise, the attacker may seek and use
another image(s), which is watermarked with the same key, to correct any existing
ambiguous pairs.
The model, Getmap (·) is shown here as one of a few different options to
recover the mapping sequence. As a distinctive feature, Getmap (·) allows an
attacker to use a set of watermarked images to obtain an unambiguous mapping
sequence. In Model 4.2, the basic Getmap (·) model is shown to operate on a
single watermarked image, i¯. However, note that it can also operate on a set of V 
valid watermarked images, {¯iv : i¯v = Ek (iv, wv)} for all v ∈ {1, · · · , V }. In other
words, when an attacker has a set of watermarked images, which are watermarked
using the same embedding key, Getmap (·) can operate on the images {¯iv} to get
the mapped indexes of the selected image blocks more efficiently. Once the key
or mapping sequence is known, there is an open opportunity for an attacker to
output successful attacked images with many meaningful modifications.
4.4.2 Counterfeiting Attack 1
An attacker, without any specific use of the attacked image in mind, may wish
to modify a watermarked image simply with manipulating the pixel locations.
The image pixels can be rearranged such that original watermarks remain valid
for the new orientation of original pixels. An attacker modifies neither any pixels
nor their watermarks to output an attacked image. However, the attacked image
may be perceptually different from the input (valid watermarked) image for the
new orientation of original pixels. The adversary actions in this scenario form
the Counterfeiting Attack 1. Two cases can be studied here.
Entire block swap. In this case, an attacker is interested in all image blocks and
swaps all of them with their mapped blocks. Thus, the pixels of an image (or
image blocks) remain the same as the watermarked image but with different ori-
entation (i.e., their original block indexes become their mapped indexes, and vice
versa). This swap of all image blocks is called entire block swap. Fig. 4.4 illus-
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Original 
Block 
Index 
Mapped 
Block 
Index 
1 2 
2 4 
4 3 
3 1 
(a) Mapping sequence
 
 
 
 
 ࡮ഥ૚࢒  
 ࡮ഥ૜࢒  
 ࡮ഥ૛࢒  
 ࡮ഥ૝࢒  
(b) Input blocks
 
 
 
 
 
 ࡮ഥ૜࢒   ࡮ഥ૚࢒  
 ࡮ഥ૝࢒   ࡮ഥ૛
࢒  
(c) Output blocks
Original blocks with original watermarks 
Index:      1                         2                          4                                     3 
࢝૚
࢒  
 ࡮ഥ૛࢒  
࢝૜
࢒  
 ࡮ഥ૚࢒  
࢝૝࢒  
 ࡮ഥ૜࢒  Block: 
Watermark: ࢝૛࢒  
 ࡮ഥ૝࢒    
Index:      1                          2                          4                         3 
Block: 
Watermark: 
Swapped blocks with original watermarks 
࢝૝࢒  
 ࡮ഥ૜࢒  
࢝૜
࢒  
 ࡮ഥ૚࢒  
࢝૚
࢒  
 ࡮ഥ૛࢒  
࢝૛
࢒  
 ࡮ഥ૝࢒    
(d) General steps
Figure 4.4: Entire block swap. (A part of cameraman image [3] is used.)
trates an entire block swap scenario of an image of four blocks. Here, according
to the given mapping sequence in Fig. 4.4(a), block B¯l1 is swapped with the block
B¯l2, block B¯
l
2 is then swapped with block B¯
l
4, and so on. After completion of all
the block swap, as shown in Fig. 4.4(d), the watermarks remain valid for the new
orientation of the blocks. Consequently, the attacked image in Fig. 4.4(c) can be
verified as authentic as the input image shown in Fig. 4.4(b).
Selected block swap. In this case, an attacker is interested in a particular set of
image block(s) rather than all the blocks in an image. Here, an attacker chooses
a particular block or a set of blocks to swap, which requires correction of the
orientation of swapped blocks' watermarks to remain valid. This case is named
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Model 4.3 Proposed Counterfeiting Attack 1
Input: (i) watermarked image, i¯ =
{
B¯ln
}
; (ii) embedding function, Embed (·);
(iii) extraction function, Embed−1 (·); (iv) {u}set of indexes of the selected
blocks,
{
Blu
}
; (v) {uu}set of the mapped block indexes of {u}; (vi) {uux}set
of the mapped block indexes of {uu}; (inputs in (iv)(vi) can be obtained either
from Getmap (·) or by using any other secret recovery method).
Output: (i) attacked image, i¯a 0 i¯.
Begin
1: extract the watermarks from all the selected blocks,
i.e.,
{
w˜ln
}← Embed−1 : {B¯ln}
2: if {u} ∩ {n} 6= φ then . selected block swap
3: correct the watermarks of all the selected blocks and their
respective mapped blocks:{
B¯lua
}← Embed : {B¯lu}× {w˜luu}{
B¯luua
}← Embed : {B¯luu}× {w˜luux}{
B¯luuxa
}← Embed : {B¯luux}× {w˜lu}
4: interchange the selected blocks
{
B¯lua
}
and their mapped
blocks
{
B¯luua
}
5: return the attacked image, i¯a ←
({
B¯ln
} \({B¯lu} ∪ {B¯luu} ∪ {B¯luux}))∪{
B¯lua
} ∪ {B¯luua} ∪ {B¯luuxa}
6: else . complete block swap
7: interchange the selected blocks,
{
B¯lu
}
and their mapped
blocks,
{
B¯luu
}
without any watermark correction
8: return the attacked image, i¯a ←
{
B¯lu
}∣∣
u=n
9: end if
End
selected block swap. For example, see Fig. 4.5, where the selected block swap is
illustrated for the blocks of index 38 and 73. After the swap, the blocks B¯73 and
B¯38 will have the indexes 38 and 73 respectively. Thus, now for the index 38,
the block B¯73 needs to have the watermark w19 instead of w38 since block index
19 is mapped to the index 38. Similarly, for the index 73, the block B¯38 need to
have the watermark w73 instead of w19, and so on. After the block swap and the
watermark correction illustrated in Fig. 4.5(d), the input image (in Fig. 4.5(b))
can be modified to output a successful attacked image (Fig. 4.5(c)).
The general steps of the Counterfeiting Attack 1 model are given in Model 4.3.
For an entire block swap, the attacker simply interchanges all the blocks,{
B¯lu
}∣∣
u=n
with respective mapped blocks,
{
B¯luu
}∣∣
uu=q
as stated in Step 7&8
in the model. On the other hand, Step 3  5 describes a selected block swap sce-
nario. Here, as discussed above, watermarks embedded in
{
B¯lu
}
the selected
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Original 
Block 
Index 
Mapped 
Block 
Index 
…  19 
19 38 
38 73 
73 89 
89 … 
(a) Mapping sequence
 ࡮ഥ૜ૡ࢒  
 ࡮ഥૠ૜࢒  
 ࡮ഥ૚ૢ࢒  
 ࡮ഥૡૢ࢒  
(b) Input blocks
 ࡮ഥ૚ૢ࢒  
 ࡮ഥૡૢ࢒  
 ࡮ഥૠ૜࢒   ࡮ഥ૜ૡ࢒  
(c) Output blocks
 
Index:     19                        38                        73                          89 
Block: 
Watermark: 
 ࡮ഥ૚ૢ࢒  
࢝ǥ࢒  
 ࡮ഥ૜ૡ࢒  
࢝૚ૢ࢒
 ࡮ഥૡૢ࢒  
࢝ૠ૜࢒
 ࡮ഥૠ૜࢒  
࢝૜ૡ࢒  
Original blocks with original watermarks 
Index:     19                         38                         73                        89 
Block: 
Watermark: 
 ࡮ഥ૚ૢ࢒  
࢝ǥ࢒  
 ࡮ഥ૜ૡ࢒  
࢝ૠ૜࢒
 ࡮ഥૡૢ࢒  
࢝૜ૡ࢒  
 ࡮ഥૠ૜࢒  
࢝૚ૢ࢒  
Swapped blocks with re-ordered/corrected watermarks 
 
Index:     19                         38                         73                        89 
Block: 
Watermark: 
 ࡮ഥ૚ૢ࢒  
࢝ǥ࢒  
 ࡮ഥૠ૜࢒  
࢝૜ૡ࢒    
 ࡮ഥ૜ૡ࢒  
࢝૚ૢ࢒  
 ࡮ഥૡૢ࢒  
࢝ૠ૜࢒  
Swapped blocks with original watermarks 
(d) General steps
Figure 4.5: Selected block swap. (A part of jet-plane image [3] is used.)
blocks,
{
B¯luu
}
the mapped blocks of
{
B¯lu
}
, and
{
B¯luux
}
the mapped blocks of{
B¯luu
}
need watermark correction along with the interchange between
{
B¯lu
}
and{
B¯luu
}
. Finally, in either case, an attacker outputs an attacked image, i¯a. In the
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Counterfeiting Attack 1 scenario, an attacker can also shue all pixels in a block
to output an attacked image, keeping respective watermarks' locations (LSBs
least significant bits) in the block unchanged. Note that the attacker may wish
to do this independently or along with any of the above cases to introduce a
more meaningful modification with the attacked image. (A meaningful modi-
fication roughly means that the modification has practical visual semantic in the
application context.) Considering the inputs of the model 4.3, the Counterfeiting
Attack 1 represents a weak counterfeiting attack. Here, the attacker's capabil-
ity may only include a set of watermarked images and access to the embedding
function.
4.4.3 Counterfeiting Attack 2
In a more sophisticated counterfeiting scenario, an attacker may wish to modify
some (or all) watermarked image blocks for a more meaningful outcome. Here, a
set of selected blocks may either be modified directly or be replaced with another
set of chosen blocks. Unlike Counterfeiting Attack 1, where no pixels and wa-
termarks were modified (but their locations), in this counterfeiting scenario, the
original watermarks remain unchanged and valid for the replaced blocks. This
attack scenario is named Counterfeiting Attack 2.
The general steps of the Counterfeiting Attack 2 model are illustrated in
Model 4.4. An attacker first outputs a set of blocks perceptually similar to the
set of chosen blocks. These output blocks must have the same watermark as the
selected (original) blocks to remain valid. The output blocks then replace the se-
lected blocks in the watermarked image. The construction of the perceptually sim-
ilar blocks is defined as a function Sim (·), which outputs a set of blocks, {Alu} for
the set of chosen blocks,
{
C lu
}
such that Sim :
{
C lu
}×{B¯lu}→ {Alu}∪{⊥}, where
⊥ is a failure, and {Alu} ≈ {C lu} 0 {B¯lu} such that G : {Alu} = G : {B¯lu}. The
selected blocks
{
B¯lu
}
are replaced with the blocks
{
A¯lu
}
. As shown in Model 4.4,
once Sim (·) outputs {Alu}, an attacker extracts the watermarks embedded in the
selected blocks, and embed that extracted watermarks in
{
Alu
}
. Finally, the wa-
termarked blocks,
{
A¯lu
}
replace the selected blocks,
{
B¯lu
}
to output an attacked
image, i¯a as shown in the attack model.
A successful Counterfeiting Attack 2, however, mainly depends on the success
of the function Sim (·). With this additional requirement of Sim (·), this attack
presents a stronger notion of counterfeiting attack than the Counterfeiting At-
tack 1. The output of Sim (·), on the other hand, depends on the inputs and
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Model 4.4 Proposed Counterfeiting Attack 2
Input: (i) watermarked image, i¯ =
{
B¯ln
}
; (ii) Sim (·) (iii) embedding function,
Embed (·); (iv) extraction function, Embed−1 (·); (v) {u}set of indexes of the
selected blocks,
{
Blu
}
; (vi) {uu}set of the mapped block indexes of {u}; and
(vii) chosen blocks
{
C lu
}
for replacing the selected blocks; (inputs in (iv) & (v) can
be obtained either from Getmap (·) or by using any other secret recovery method).
Output: attacked image, i¯a 0 i¯.
Begin
1: compute a set of perceptually similar blocks for the chosen blocks, i.e.,{
Alu
}← Sim : {C lu}× {B¯lu} . here, {Alu} ≈ {C lu} 0 {B¯lu} such that
G :
{
Alu
}
= G :
{
B¯lu
}
2: extract the embedded watermarks from the mapped blocks, i.e.,{
w˜luu
}← Embed−1 : {B¯luu}
3: embed the extracted watermarks into the computed blocks in Step 1, i.e.,{
A¯lu
}← Embed : {Alu}× {w˜luu}
4: replace the set of selected blocks with the forged blocks, i.e.,
{
B¯lu
}
with
{
A¯lu
}
5: return the attacked image, i¯a =
({
B¯ln
} \{B¯lu}) ∪ {A¯lu}
End
perceptual similarity requirement. With the output of Sim (·), the attacker may
output an attacked image that satisfies the win condition. A simple Sim (·), for
example, can replace the pixels in a selected input block with their average in-
tensity or pixel value (leaving their LSBs intact that carry watermark bits). For
the output (modified) blocks, the watermarks remain valid as the modification
in the output blocks does not affect the watermark. This simple construction
of Sim (·) is used for the Counterfeiting Attack 2 implementation and will be
discussed in Section 4.6. However, the principle of keeping average intensity of
a block unchanged for a modified block is the main idea of a constant-average
attack [223].
The constant-average attack differs from the above example of Sim (·) con-
struction, where all pixels of a modified block will have the average intensity value
of the block. In constant-average attack, the pixels of a modified block are usu-
ally different but their average intensity remains the same as that of the original
block, as mentioned in Sec. 4.3.2. In other words, an attacker attempts to adjust
the pixels of an already modified block further so that their average intensity
equals that of the original block. Thus, the constant-average attack representing
a case of the proposed Counterfeiting Attack 2, employs a Sim (·) different from
the one considered here.
Moreover, Sim (·) generally extends the equivalence class principle (of the VQ
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attack [71]) for the block-wise dependent watermarking schemes, as pointed out in
Section 4.3.2. Once the Getmap (·) (or any other secret recovery method) outputs
the mapping sequence (or key), the block-wise dependence property is actually
lost. Consequently, Sim (·) outputs a block from an equivalence class, which will
give the same watermark as the original block and valid for the secret key (used
for the original watermarked image). Unlike the VQ equivalence principle, Sim (·)
has an additional requirement of perceptual similarity and has to output a block
perceptually similar to the input blocks. Here, the perceptual difference between
the Sim (·) input and output blocks, may result not only from the watermark
embedding, but also from other manipulations (e.g ., low pass filtering) of the in-
put image blocks. However, with a more strict perceptual similarity requirement,
Sim (·) may not work effectively, and may output a failure.
4.4.4 Counterfeiting Attack 3
As a notion of a stronger attacker, another counterfeiting scenario is illustrated
that introduces the highest level of modification into a watermarked image. Unlike
the other counterfeiting scenarios discussed above, here an attacker can choose
new blocks and generate their watermarks to output an attacked image. This
counterfeiting scenario is named Counterfeiting Attack 3. The severity of this
attack is that an attacker with the access to all watermarking functions can make
a more meaningful modifications than the above counterfeiting attacks.
The general steps of the Counterfeiting Attack 3 model are shown in the
Model 4.5. An attacker starts with choosing a set of new blocks,
{
C lu
}
and re-
generating the watermarks,
{
wnewlu
}
from the selected blocks,
{
Blu
}
. Having
access to the watermark generation and embedding functions, an attacker may
embed the extracted watermark in the chosen blocks. The chosen blocks' water-
marks,
{
wlau
}
are also generated and required to be embedded in the selected
blocks' mapped blocks,
{
Bluu
}
. Finally, the chosen blocks replace the selected
blocks to output an attacked image.
4.5 Applicability of the Counterfeiting Attacks
The developed and presented attack models in last section generalize the key
steps of the proposed attacks. To demonstrate their applicability, this section
discusses how the proposed attacks can be mounted on the self-authentications
schemes. Although the attack models theoretically apply to the schemes, whose
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Model 4.5 Proposed Counterfeiting Attack 3
Input: (i) watermarked image, i¯ =
{
B¯ln
}
; (ii) generation function, G (·) (iii) embed-
ding function, Embed (·); (iv) {u}set of indexes of the selected blocks, {Blu} ;
(v) {uu}set of the mapped block indexes of {u}; and (vi) chosen blocks {C lu}
for replacing the selected blocks; (inputs in (iv) & (v) can be obtained either from
Getmap (·) or by using any other secret recovery method).
Output: attacked image, i¯a 0 i¯.
Begin
1: regenerate the watermarks for mapped blocks, i.e.,
{
wnewluu
}← G : {B¯luu}
2: embed the regenerated watermarks into the chosen blocks, i.e.,
{
C¯ lu
} ← Embed :{
C lu
}× {wnewluu}
3: generate watermarks for the chosen blocks, i.e.,
{
wlau
}← G : {C lu}
4: embed the chosen blocks' watermarks into the mapped blocks, ie,
{
B¯luua
} ←
Embed :
{
B¯luu
}× {wlau}
5: replace the selected blocks,
{
B¯lu
}
with the watermarked chosen blocks,
{
C¯ lu
}
6: return the attacked image, i¯a =
({
B¯ln
} \{B¯lu}) ∪ {C¯ lu}
End
general model is developed and presented in Section 4.3.3, two self-authentication
schemes [6,7] are studied that capture the medical and other image applications.
The Zain and Fauzi scheme (or ZF scheme) [6] is an extended version of the
Lin et al . scheme [56] for medical image tampering detection and recovery, which
is later applied in a PACS-based operational environment [226]. The Edupuganti,
Shih, and Chang scheme (or ESC scheme) [7] is recently proposed for tampering
localisation and recovery of digital images. Before presenting the experimental
results, these two schemes and the experimental set-up are discussed below.
4.5.1 The ZF Scheme
The ZF Scheme [6] operates on 8× 8 non-overlapping blocks and their 4× 4 sub-
blocks of an image of size M ×N . The general steps of this scheme are described
with the three component functions (i.e., watermark-generation, -embedding, -
detection) using the proposed watermarking model (Chapter 3) and presented in
Appendix B. In order to get the mapping sequence for the image block indexes,
an 1D linear transformation is used. This transform uses a secret key, which is
a prime number chosen from the range of 1 to the total number of the blocks,
which limits the key-space to
[
2,
(
M
8
× N
8
)]
.
Additionally, 9-bit (1-bit intensity authentication, 1-bit parity, and 7-bit in-
tensity recovery) watermark is generated from each 4x4 sub-blocks. This water-
mark is generated considering various local properties of the image blocks and
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sub-blocks (e.g ., comparing image intensity between a sub-block and its corre-
sponding block, the odd parity of average-intensity-bits of a sub-block, etc.).
ZF scheme avoids VQ weaknesses and has good localisation ability. For higher
recovery rate of tampered pixels and their better restoration quality, this scheme
considers average intensity of individual sub-blocks as their recovery watermarks.
However, in addition to the common weakness of the small key-space, ZF scheme
uses the watermarks generated from local image properties, which have not been
justified for image authentication and integrity verification.
4.5.2 The ESC Scheme
The ESC scheme [7] operates on 2× 2 non-overlapping blocks of an image of size
M×M , whereM is a multiple of 2. As done for the ZF scheme, this scheme is also
described with the three watermarking functions in Appendix C. A lookup table
is generated for the mapped indexes of the image blocks {1, · · · , N} by using a
secret key, where N =
{
M
2
× M
2
}
. The secret key is chosen as a prime number
from the range of the block indexes, [2, N − 1]. Similar to ZF scheme, a liner
transform is used in the ESC scheme to obtain an initial mapping sequence. But,
this mapping sequence is modified in ESC scheme using a block-shift operation
(see Appendix C.1) to construct the final lookup table.
A 12-bit watermark is generated from a pair of 5-bit features (i.e., 5 MSBs of
the average intensities) of a paired blocks, and using a CRC-2 (Cyclic Redundancy
Check with a secret polynomial of degree 2). A block-pair is constructed using
two pixels of similar location in two-halves of the image blocks. Corresponding
mapped block pair is similarly constructed considering two-halves of the lookup
table. Two copies of a 12-bit watermark is then embedded in two mapped blocks
of the lookup table. Thus, the ESC scheme has a dual watermarking principle
for better tampering localisation and higher recovery rate.
The dual watermarking principle, 5-bit image block feature, and use of CRC-2
and lookup table make the ESC scheme attractive. However, the ESC scheme
suffers from various weaknesses that may cause security problems in a target
application. Like ZF scheme, this scheme has a small key-space (of [2, N − 1]).
Further, use of feature bits, lookup table and CRC-2 is not a useful mitigation for
any expected security problems. These weaknesses are examined and their possi-
ble reasons are identified when demonstrating the applicability and consequences
of the proposed attacks in following sections.
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4.5.3 Implementation of the Proposed Attacks
The proposed counterfeiting attacks are accomplished in two parts: secret recov-
ery and forgery. In the first part, an attacker tries to recover the secret parameters
(e.g ., key, mapping sequence). The general steps of this part are already shown in
Getmap (·) model (Model 4.2) and discussed in Section 4.4.1. Note that the com-
putation of this part, however, may vary depending on the design of the target
self-authentication scheme.
The Getmap (·) is implemented to demonstrate the relative computation time
for an attacker to obtain the mapping sequence of both the ZF and ESC schemes.
However, for implementing the proposed attacks on ZF and ESC schemes, the
attacker is assumed to have the secret keys. Since the key space of both schemes
is too small, it is not difficult to obtain the key at all, even for an attacker
having limited computational power. For example, for a typical image of size
512 × 512, the maximum key size of the ZF and ESC schemes are 13-bit and
15-bit respectively. Theoretically, compared with cryptographic keys, these key
lengths do not provide any protection [227].
In the second part, an attacker has to output a forgery using the secret key or
mapping sequence obtained in the first part. The output is valid for the embed-
ded watermark (to satisfy the win condition), and is different from any previous
outputs of the self-authentication scheme. In other words, an attacker outputs a
new watermarked image (with new pixels or watermarks, or both), which remains
valid for a given key. Here, an attacker of different capabilities (discussed in the
beginning of Section 4.4) may output forgeries in different levels: change of pixel
locations only, change of original pixels only, and change of original pixels and
watermarks, as shown in Table 4.1. Attacker's capabilities are roughly classified
here to indicate their relative notions of strength.
The proposed attacks are implemented that individually represent different
levels of counterfeiting scenarios (see Table 4.1). The first level scenario corre-
spond to the Counterfeiting Attack 1, where the input image blocks are inter-
changed with their mapped blocks, as discussed in Section 4.4.2. The two cases
of entire block swap and selected block swap are investigated. Counterfeiting At-
tack 2 represents another level of a counterfeiting scenario, where an attacker
replaces a set of selected blocks with a set of new blocks keeping the original
watermarks (see Section 4.4.3). (Constant-average attack [223] and synchronous
attack [222], discussed in Section 4.3.2, are two examples at this counterfeiting
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Table 4.1: Counterfeiting attack levels
Levels Counterfeiting Attack
Scenarios
Objectives Attacker's
Capabilities
1 Change of pixel locations
only (Counterfeiting
Attack 1)
To output a successful attacked
image with original image pixels
and watermarks, but their
locations are changed
Low
2 Change of original pixels
only (Counterfeiting
Attack 2)
To output a successful attacked
image with new pixels keeping the
original watermarks
Medium
3 Change of original pixels
and watermarks
(Counterfeiting Attack 3)
To output a successful attacked
image with both new pixels and
their watermarks
High
level.) Finally, Counterfeiting Attack 3 represents a third level of counterfeiting
scenarios. As discussed in Section 4.4.4, a new watermark is generated for some
chosen blocks and re-embedded in their mapped block pixels.
Therefore, the proposed attacks address the counterfeiting scenarios at three
levels of modifications, and it is argued that any counterfeiting scenarios (i.e.,
any possible ways of modifying a valid watermarked image) can be described
from one of these three levels. In other words, the proposed counterfeiting at-
tacks capture all possible counterfeiting scenarios at the three levels. In fact, an
attacker may have different ways to modify a watermarked image at a particular
counterfeiting level. However, a few of them are implemented to demonstrate the
applicability and consequences of modifying a valid watermarked image at each
counterfeiting level. All necessary simulation and implementation were carried
out using MATLAB (R2012a-7.14.0.739) and an Intel Core i5 3.2GHz CPU.
4.6 Experimental Results and Discussion
This section presents the experimental results to validate the effectiveness and to
demonstrate possible consequences of the proposed counterfeiting attacks. Several
experiments were conducted with a set of medical and other digital images. The
computation time is analysed for the effectiveness, and the sets of attacked images
are presented for illustrating the possible consequences, of the proposed attacks on
the ESC scheme [7] and ZF scheme [6]. As explained in the Section 4.5, the choice
of these two schemes are made because they are two typical self-authentication
schemes, where ZF scheme is the development of a prominent scheme [56] and
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Figure 4.6: Average computation time of Getmap (·) for ESC and ZF schemes for
images of increasing size (up to 512× 512).
ESC scheme is a recent scheme. Further, these two schemes capture the natural
and medical image application scenarios.
The Getmap (·) computation time, illustrated in Fig. 4.6, is obtained for the
increasing number of image blocks up to the image size of 512×512. As expected,
finding the mapping sequence for the ZF scheme is computationally less expensive
than the ESC scheme. Further, the average attack computation times of both
schemes (shown in Fig. 4.7) for yielding attacked images are obtained. To output
an attacked image with any level of modifications, it took less than a minute for
an input image of size 512×512. Note that these computation times are relative,
and depend not only on the computing power of the operating machine, but also
on the image and block sizes, number of blocks to modify, underlying design of
the schemes, etc. Here, a total of 113 (medical and other) images of size 512×512
are used, and their sizes are varied to observe the influence of varying image size
on the computation time.
A set of examples of the attacked images from the experimental results are
shown in Fig. 4.9 for the ESC scheme and Fig. 4.10 for the ZF scheme. The set of
corresponding original watermarked images are shown in Fig. 4.8. The modified
regions (unless the entire image is modified) of the attacked images are indicated
by a (red) dotted-ellipse. All the attacked images in complete block swap of
Counterfeiting Attack 1 are completely distorted as illustrated in Fig. 4.9(ac)
and Fig. 4.10(ac). Although these images may have no practical implication,
they are verified as authentic and un-tampered by the detector.
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Figure 4.7: Average computation time of the proposed attacks for the images of in-
creasing size (up to 512× 512).
(a) cameraman (b) house (c) jet-plane
(d) abdomen (e) colon
 
(f) retina
Figure 4.8: Original set of watermarked images: (ac) ESC scheme and (df) ZF
scheme. (Original test images for (ac) and (df) are downloaded from: [3]
and [4] respectively.)
As expected, the attacked images in selected block swap, shown in Fig. 4.9(d
f) and Fig. 4.10(df), are not completely distorted. Unlike the ZF scheme, ESC
scheme embeds two copies of a watermark (for each block) into two halves of the
input images. As a result, it is evident in Fig. 4.9(df) that the selected block swap
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Table 4.2: Perceptual Differences Between Output and Input Images of the Proposed
Attacks
Test Image Measure
Attack 1 Attack 1
Attack 2 Attack 3
(entire blocks) (selected blocks)
Cameraman (ESC)
PSNR (dB) 9.32 23.97 30.09 39.99
MSSIM 0.0158 0.8529 0.9897 0.9921
House (ESC)
PSNR (dB) 10.21 28.54 33.45 25.29
MSSIM 0.0186 0.9241 0.996 0.9824
Jet-plane (ESC)
PSNR (dB) 6.36 11.38 10.54 27.72
MSSIM 0.3016 0.6682 0.6689 0.9916
Abdomen (ZF)
PSNR (dB) 7.5 29.93 19.29 38.01
MSSIM 0.0207 0.9879 0.8683 0.9958
Colon (ZF)
PSNR (dB) 6.64 27.1 24.24 45.35
MSSIM 0.0069 0.9863 0.8965 0.9981
Retina (ZF)
PSNR (dB) 10.55 32.61 26.92 49.14
MSSIM 0.0538 0.9887 0.9042 0.9988
has symmetric visual artefacts in the two halves of the output attacked images.
Since for the selected block swap, a set of block indexes is arbitrarily chosen, the
output images had no or little practical significance. However, satisfying the win
condition with these attacked images suggests that an attacker may succeed with
modifying a valid watermarked image having some significant implications. For
example, location of a tumour in a Head MRI can be moved in another region of
interest, using the selected block swap.
Unlike the Counterfeiting Attack 1, the attacked images (shown in Fig. 4.9(g
i) and Fig. 4.10(gi)) for Counterfeiting Attack 2, are almost similar to the original
watermarked images (in Fig. 4.8). This is because that the function Sim (·) is
designed here to quantise a new block using the average intensity of the selected
block pixels as described in Section 4.4.3. Although this example represents
a particular case in this counterfeiting level like constant-average attack, there
can be many other ways to design Sim (·). Further, instead of entire blocks
manipulation, an attacker may also consider a selected block scenario for this
attack, requiring an additional watermark correction process as discussed for
Counterfeiting Attack 1 in Section 4.4.2.
Furthermore, the attacked images shown in Fig. 4.9(jl) and Fig. 4.10(jl)
for the Counterfeiting Attack 3 illustrate how an attacker outputs a successful
forgery with the highest level of modification. An attacker may select a set of
arbitrary blocks of a valid watermarked image to be replaced with a set of chosen
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(a) (b) (c)
(d) (e) (f)
(g) (h) (i)
(j) (k) (l)
Figure 4.9: Attacks on the ESC scheme watermarked images. From left, camera-
man (first column), house (second column), jet-plane (third column). (a
c) Counterfeiting Attack 1 (entire blocks), (df) Counterfeiting Attack 1
(selected blocks), (g-i) Counterfeiting Attack 2, and (jl) Counterfeiting
Attack 3.
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(a) (b)
 
(c)
(d)
 
(e) (f)
(g) (h) (i)
(j)
 
(k) (l)
Figure 4.10: Attacks on the ZF scheme watermarked images. From left, abdomen
(first column), colon (second column), retina (third column). (a
c) Counterfeiting Attack 1 (entire blocks), (df) Counterfeiting Attack 1
(selected blocks), (g-i) Counterfeiting Attack 2, and (jl) Counterfeiting
Attack 3.
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blocks. A win with such a modification opens many possible ways for an attacker
to make a complete practical sense for an attacked image, which demonstrates
the severity of this attack.
Although the malicious modifications in the output attacked images are per-
ceptually different from the original images, some of them are not clear in Fig. 4.9
and Fig. 4.10 as the images are shrunk. Therefore, to observe the difference be-
tween the attacked images and respective original watermarked images, their
PSNR and MSSIM values are presented in Table 4.2. However, it is stressed here
that the modifications in attacked images are random, and depend on attacker's
objectives. So the performance of the attacks and pattern of consequences cannot
be determined from the qualitative measures (e.g ., PSNR or MSSIM).
Both the ZF and ESC schemes accept all the attacked images (including those
shown in Fig. 4.9 and Fig. 4.10) as authentic, where clearly they are not. The
implications of the attacked images can be more severe if the attacks are applied
in a more meaningful way (i.e., to modify visual semantics different from that of
the valid watermarked images). However, the presented attacked image examples
in this chapter reasonably show that Counterfeiting Attack 1, Counterfeiting At-
tack 2, and Counterfeiting Attack 3 render the schemes invalid for their intended
purpose. They also suggest that there would be similar consequences for other
self-authentication schemes having similar weaknesses.
4.7 Countermeasures Against the Counterfeiting
Attacks
Many self-authentication schemes (including the ZF and ESC schemes) irrespec-
tive of their technical differences, do not consider the required properties of the
watermarks explicitly. This also means that the requirements for a self-authenti-
cation scheme either have not been completely studied yet or are not well under-
stood, which can be the main source of several security problems as mentioned in
Section 4.3.2. Addressing this, a set of general requirements for self-authentica-
tion schemes is outlined below. In this section, some guidelines are also discussed
to meet the requirements using conventional authentication tools. It is partic-
ularly illustrated, with a construction of a new self-authentication model, how
some of the tools can be combined to achieve the requirements and thus to avoid
the counterfeiting weaknesses.
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4.7.1 Requirements for Self-Authentication Schemes
General requirements of image (and other multimedia) authentication are well
known [209211, 228]. However, a self-authentication scheme, in general, has
additional requirements from the typical image authentication. This section at-
tempts to determine a set of requirements for the self-authentication schemes
in view of the standard authentication tools (e.g ., message authentication code,
digital signature) and existing image authentication schemes. In light of the self-
authentication objectives and application scenarios, the general requirements for
self-authentication thus can be: (i) authenticity, (ii) integrity, (iii) unforgeability,
(iv) non-repudiation (v) localisation accuracy, (vi) recovery quality, (vii) percep-
tual similarity, (viii) embedding capacity, (ix ) efficiency, and (x ) reliability. These
requirements are discussed below. It is worth noting that, for simplicity, these
requirements are not formulated explicitly.
Authenticity. The presence of a valid watermark in a watermarked image implies
that the content is deliberately watermarked by the embedder. It is important for
a self-authentication scheme to establish the image content is genuine and was wa-
termarked by an embedder possessing the proper embedding (and/or generation)
key (used in watermark embedding and/or generation).
Integrity. A valid watermark also ensures the image content is not unauthorisedly
and undetectably modified. This further requires the following properties for a
self-authentication watermark:
• Fragile: A valid watermark embedded in an image is required to be invalid
for any smallest changes in the image.
• Block-wise collision resistance: For a given image block, it is hard to find
another image block, which will have the same watermark. (This is a notion
of weak collision resistance; however a strong collision resistance can be
considered as discussed in Section 4.3.1.)
Unforgeability. A valid watermark can only be generated and embedded by a valid
generator and embedder (i.e., possessing the proper generation and/or embedding
key(s)), respectively. In other words, it is to be computationally hard to forge a
valid watermark. Here, a watermark may require the following properties: block-
wise dependence and block-wise collision resistance. Block-wise dependence can
be of two types:
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• Intra-block dependence: An image block is to be used as an input for its
watermark generation. This is required to be copy attack resistant (where
an attacker directly copies a valid watermark to illicitly embed that in a
chosen image which is later verified as authentic for the given key).
• Inter-block dependence: Image blocks are to be mutually watermark depen-
dent (i.e., watermark of one block is embedded into its mapped block) for
the VQ attack resistance. (Security against VQ attack may also require the
intra-block dependence.)
Non-repudiation. A watermarked image must be verifiable to resolve a dispute
arising either from a deceitful entity trying to repudiate a valid watermarked
image or from a fraudulent claimant.
Localisation accuracy. In case of a tampered image, the localisation of the tam-
pered pixels must come with an optimum accuracy. Ideally, localisation accuracy
only depends upon the image block size, and thus there is no false localisation of
an un-tampered image block.
Recovery quality. In case of a tampered image, the localised image pixels must be
recovered with an acceptable image quality. The notion of acceptable image
quality may vary with the applications.
Perceptual similarity. A watermarked image must be perceptually similar, which
ensures an acceptable level of distortion in the image, and thus the image re-
mains usable for its intended application.
Embedding capacity. A self-authentication scheme must have the required capac-
ity to accommodate the payload (i.e., the watermark plus any side information).
This requirement however may conflict with the restoration quality and percep-
tual similarity requirements, and thus a necessary trade-off is to be made.
Efficiency. A self-authentication scheme must be computationally efficient to
generate, embed and detect (with optimum tampering localisation and recovery)
a watermark for a given image. Although the computational effort depends upon
the size of input image, the work should not grow rapidly with the image size.
Reliability. A self-authentication scheme must be reliable to perform objectively
(for content authentication with optimum tampering localisation and recovery)
under given conditions and over a specified period of time.
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4.7.2 How Can Self-Authentication Requirements be
Met?
Meeting the above mentioned requirements for self-authentication schemes (in
Section 4.7.1) is a challenging task, which naturally pose a fundamental ques-
tion: can the conventional authentication tools meet the self-authentication re-
quirements? Addressing this question, some general principles of using conven-
tional tools as building blocks in self-authentication schemes are discussed. Their
promises and limitations are outlined to meet the requirements for the follow-
ing self-authentication objectives: (i) content authentication, and (ii) tampering
localisation and recovery. This is discussed below and summarised in Table 4.3.
Using Encryption. Encryption is a cryptographic tool generally used to preserve
confidentiality of information. Therefore, a direct use of an encryption may not
help meet the self-authentication requirements. Encryption of a suitable image
feature (either by a shared or public key) may help achieve data-integrity, au-
thenticity, non-repudiation, etc. to a certain extent [55, 215]. (The suitability of
an image feature may depend on several factors; namely, any feature properties
that results in security problems, feature length in bit, their computation, unique-
ness for image blocks, etc.) A similar use of encryption (with hash function) is
well known for the message authentication code and digital signature construc-
tions [82]. For the self-authentication scheme, however, the encrypted image-
block-features can be used (block-wise) for tampering localisation and recovery
(see Table 4.3). Thereby, some self-authentication requirements such as data-
integrity, authentication, localization accuracy, etc., can be attained, whereas
meeting unforgeability, efficiency, etc., can still be challenging.
Using Message Authentication Code (MAC). MAC (or keyed hash function) is a
cryptographic tool that generates and later verifies an authentication code (or
checksum) using a symmetric (or shared) key [82]. The security services that
MAC provides include data-integrity and authenticity. For self-authentication
schemes, block-wise integrity and authentication can be achieved by computing
the MAC for each given block (or its unique features) and embedding it into a
mapped block. This will help achieve the security level of the used MAC scheme.
However, similar to using encryption, computation time and payload size depend
on the input image and its block size. So, they can grow if the encryption or
MAC is individually used for each block. Also, using MAC may also lack the
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Table 4.3: Summary of Using Conventional Authentication Tools for the Attainment
of the Self-Authentication Scheme Requirements.
Tools Features/ advantages Limitations
Encryption Can provide (strict) data-integrity,
authenticity, non-repudiation,
etc., if used with hash functions
Faster than Digital Signature
Can be cryptographically secure
Can be robust to content
preserving manipulations, if a
suitable image feature is used
Tampering localisation and
recovery, if encrypted image
feature is used as a watermark
High capacity may be required and can be
computationally expensive, for block-wise
embedding
Message
Authen-
tication
Code
(MAC)
Data-integrity (strict)
Authenticity (strict)
Much faster than Digital Signature
Based on block-cipher or
cryptographic hash function
Can be cryptographically secure
Tampering localisation
No non-repudiation
High capacity may be required and can be
computationally expensive, for block-wise
embedding
No tampering recovery
No robustness to content preserving
manipulations
Digital
Signature
(DS)
Data-integrity (strict)
Authenticity (strict)
Time stamp
Non-repudiation
Unforgeability
Tampering localisation
Can be cryptographically secure
Trusted certificates are required
High capacity may be required and can be
computationally expensive, for block-wise
embedding
No tampering recovery
Much slower than MAC
No robustness to content preserving
manipulations
Perceptual
Hash
Function
(PHF)
Data-integrity (selective)
Authenticity (selective)
Robustness to content preserving
manipulations
Tampering localisation
High capacity may be required and can be
computationally expensive, for block-wise
embedding
Tampering recovery capability is not known
Possibly slower than MAC and DS as access
to the database of (large set)
pre-computed hash values is required
Key recovery weakness for linear
randomisation method
Learning for appropriate quantisation
threshold is required
Complete security analysis is required
Perceptual
Digital
Signature
(PDS)
Data-integrity (selective)
Authenticity (selective)
Unforgeability?
Non-repudiation?
Tampering localisation
Robustness to content preserving
manipulations
Possibly faster than PHF
High capacity may be required and can be
computationally expensive, for block-wise
embedding
Tampering recovery capability is not known
Possibly slower than MAC due to its
robust feature computation process
Complete security analysis is required
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tampering recovery capability.
Using Digital Signature (DS). DS is another cryptographic tool widely used today,
which offers many security services [82]; for example, data-integrity, authenticity,
non-repudiation, time-stamp, unforgeability, confidentiality, etc. Similar to MAC,
DS can be used, block-wise, for self-authentication schemes. If DS is block-wise
used, it can offer tampering localisation too, which however still lacks tampering
recovery capability. Besides, as DS is usually much slower than MAC, it can be
much more computationally expensive for the block-wise embedding principle.
It also requires trusted certificates, which incurs an additional cost for the self-
authentication schemes.
Using Perceptual Hash Function (PHF). PHF (also known as visual or robust
(image) hashing) is a keyed and content-based hash function. It uses image
features robust to content-preserving manipulation (e.g ., file-format conversion,
compression, etc.) and fragile to content-modifying manipulation (e.g ., change of
objects, background, colour etc.) [229]. Thus a perceptual hash value is usually
unchanged for a perceptually similar content. Similar to MAC, it uses a shared
key and can be used for image integrity and authentication. But, for some special
requirements such as access to search a database of large set pre-computed hash
values, and learning process for an appropriate quantisation threshold, etc., PHF
can be more computationally expensive than the other tools. Presumably, the
security levels of PHF are also not as rigorously studied as done for the MAC,
DS or cryptographic hash function, and thus using PHF without any security
proof can be vulnerable in a self-authentication scenario. Tampering recovery
capability of PHF is also unknown.
Using Perceptual Digital Signature (PDS). PDS (also known as visual or content-
based digital signature) that uses the content-preserving-manipulation-invariant
features (like PHF) and public key schemes [230]. PDS is promising for several
security services like DS, provided that the security levels have been examined
and thus known for the application. Generally, the performance of a PDS mainly
depends upon the image features and their extraction processes. However, for the
block-wise embedding principle, PDS is probably faster than PHF as PDS does
not require any database access and learning process like PHF. Similar to PHF,
tampering recovery capability of PDS is not known.
Whither are the Above Conventional Tools Leading? It is obvious that the above
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authentication tools distinguish their two different notion of security services:
strict and selective. Cryptographic tools are intended to serve the strict security
services, where a single bit change can be detected. While the strict security
services are important for other information, they may not be desirable for multi-
media information. There are some image and signal processing operations (e.g .,
compression, scaling, etc.), which are referred to as content-preserving manipula-
tion, do not essentially modify the semantics of the content, but may cause some
changes in their bit-wise representation [231]. This is legitimate and sometimes
desirable in the image and signal processing paradigm, where cryptographic tools
cannot be directly used. Therefore, for multimedia authentication and other
security services, the PHF and PDS are studied, which are robust to those legit-
imate changes, and thus provide the selective security services. However, since
defining the notion of selective security is more than challenging, in general, for
different applications, using the multimedia tools requires a clear justification for
an application as to what extent they need to be selective.
The above considerations and their summary in Table 4.3 lead us to a con-
clusion that use of cryptographic tools in self-authentication schemes can be rel-
atively secure, efficient, and straight-forward. Use of these tools also means that
their strict security services are valid, for the applications. On the other hand,
consideration of the content based tools (e.g ., PHS, PDS), may additionally re-
quire a well defined notion of content preserving manipulations, and a complete
security proof, for an application. In both cases (i.e., the cryptographic and
content-based tools), however, any individual tools are clearly not sufficient for
the self-authentication requirements leading to considering their combined use.
Using combined tools. Using the above authentication tools are not new for
image (or other multimedia) authentication, for example, in [55, 210, 215, 228,
230238], where authenticity and integrity verification of multimedia information
is mainly addressed. As mentioned above, the self-authentication schemes have
an additional tampering localisation and recovery objective. Combined use of
the conventional authentication tools thus can be a better option. For example,
two different image features, one computed over the whole image and the other
is computed block-wise, can be used for the content authentication, and the
tampering localisation and recovery, respectively. For the first feature, a suitable
signature scheme can be used. Whereas, the latter feature can be encrypted using
a private key encryption scheme and be embedded block-wise. The choice of the
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private key encryption is made here from the following facts: (i) it is simpler and
faster than the public key encryption, and (ii) using digital signature (for the
content authentication), which uses public key, would complement any security
need that the used private key encryption does not provide. With this setting,
authenticity and integrity of a watermarked image can be verified publicly (using
a public key of the signature scheme). If the image found tampered, tampering
then can be detected and recovered privately (using the private key of encryption
scheme). The next section discusses this with more details.
4.7.3 A New Self-Authentication Model
This section proposes a construction of the self-authentication model using the
above mentioned principle of using combined authentication tools. For simplicity,
the self-authentication objectives are partitioned into two levels: (i) primary
(i.e., content authentication) and (ii) secondary (i.e., tampering localisation and
recovery). Without understating the significance of tampering localization and
recovery, it is considered as the secondary objective, since it logically comes after
the content authentication (i.e., once the image integrity is found compromised).
The component functions are described below, before presenting the proposed
self-authentication model.
Key generation function, KeyGen (·). On the given security parameter τ ,
KeyGen (·) generates a set of keys: {(KS, KP ) , KR}. The pair of public and
private keys, KS and KP , are used for the signature scheme to sign and to verify
the signature, respectively. A private key, KR is used for both the encryption
scheme (which is symmetric and thus shares the same key for encryption and
decryption) and mapping function, Map (·).
Feature extraction function, Feature (·). This function takes any (watermarked
or un-watermarked) image and outputs two features: fpri and f sec, used for
primary and secondary objectives, respectively. Note that fpri is computed over
the whole image and f sec is computed block-wise, i.e., f sec = {f secn }, where an
input image i is divided into total Nb non-overlapping blocks such that i = {Bn}
and n = {1, 2, · · · , Nb}.
Signature scheme
(
Sign (·) , SigV erify (·) , KS, KP
)
. The signing function
Sign (·) outputs a signature, wpri on the primary feature, fpri and private signing
key, KS. This signature is embedded as a watermark and extracted in detection
to be verified using SigV erify (·) and its public key KP . Thus the signature
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scheme can serve the primary objective. Recall that the V erify (·) in the gener-
alized self-authentication model (Section 4.3.3) simultaneously verify the image
blocks' authenticity, tampering localization and recovery. However, for security
reason and more logical construction, as those tasks have been separated in terms
of primary and secondary objectives, the SigV erify (·) is used here to declare
the whole image's authenticity and integrity. If this verification fails, tampering
localization and recovery is attempted.
Encryption scheme
(
Encrypt (·) , Decrypt (·) , KR
)
. The feature f sec is block-
wise encrypted using encryption function Encrypt (·) and its private key KR.
The encrypted features are block-wise embedded as another watermark for the
secondary objective. If an image fails the signature verification, the regenerated
watermark, {wnewsecn } of the tampered image are compared with the extracted
watermark {w˜secn }. For a mismatch, a block B¯n is marked as a tampered block
B¯n, which is recovered by the recovery function, Recover (·).
Recovery function, Recover (·). This is a component function of the detection,
D (·), which outputs the recovered version, B˜n for a given tampered block, B¯n as
input, using the extracted and decrypted secondary feature of the block, f˜ secn1 .
Embedding functions, Epri (·) and Esec (·). In embedding, E (·), two separate
embedding function, namely Epri (·) and Esec (·), are used for embedding the
separate watermarks, wpri and wsec respectively. Unlike Epri (·) that embeds wpri
over the whole image, Esec (·) is used to block-wise embed wsec usingMap (·) and
its key KR. Both embedding functions operate on input images without inter-
fering each other (e.g ., embedding regions are different), and cannot distinguish
whether the input images are watermarked or not. To extract the embedded
watermarks in the detection function, D (·), their respective inverse functions,
Epri−1 (·) and Esec−1 (·) are used. As discussed in Section 4.3.3, the notion of
being inverse of the embedding function lies in fact that these inverse embedding
functions extract the bits (assuming as watermark) in the reverse way (i.e., from
their same embedding regions as the bits are supposed to be embedded in by the
embedding functions).
Mapping function, Map (·). A mapping function, Map (·) is used in block-wise
embedding of the encrypted secondary features. As mentioned in Section 4.3.3 for
the generalized self-authentication model, Map (·) uses a linear mapping trans-
form (i.e., q = [(k × n)mod Nb] + 1 for all n). However, it is stressed here that a
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pseudo-random-number-generator based mapping transform can be used to avoid
the discussed (Section 4.3.1) mapping weakness. Here, the same encryption key,
KR is used for the function Map (·).
The construction of a self-authentication model based on the above functions
and principle is presented in Model 4.6. The use of signature and encryption
schemes are shown there to achieve the primary and secondary objectives of a
self-authentication scheme respectively. For the signature scheme, either DS or
PDS can be chosen depending upon the required type of security (i.e., strict or se-
lective, as discussed in Section 4.7.2). Using a signature scheme, the authenticity
and integrity of a watermarked image is publicly verifiable (with KP ). Addition-
ally, for a tampered image, tampering can be localised and recovered privately
(with KR) as a secondary objective if required in some instances (e.g ., for digital
forensic processing).
For efficiency, the embedding functions, Epri (·) and Esec (·) can be the classic
LSB-based and block-based schemes, respectively. The primary feature, fpri thus
can be the most significant bits (MSBs) of an image, which are not affected by
the embedding functions. Similarly, the secondary feature, f sec can be chosen
such that the original set of pixels can be (at least partially) recovered from f sec.
Developing such a scheme, however, requires further study on the feature
extraction process, the required properties of the features for different objec-
tives, user key management, and overall security and performance analysis of the
scheme, for an application. Choice of the suitable mapping transform, and the
embedding, signature, and encryption schemes should also be clearly justified.
4.8 Discussion
Security aspects in watermarking applications have received limited attention in
the literature. Proper consideration of security requirements in watermarking
applications is most likely being impeded by the misinterpretation of watermark-
ing robustness. Considering security requirements in terms of the robustness
may lead to an inadequate assessment criteria for a digital image watermark-
ing scheme. To demonstrate this, a theoretical analysis is presented considering
sets of requirements for security against attacks, and robustness to distortions.
The analysis has verified that a robust watermarking scheme may only be secure
against any distortion attacks, where avenues for other attacks may still be open.
This also means that the requirements of neither the security nor the robustness
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Model 4.6 A New Self-Authentication Model
1: {(KS ,KP ) ,KR} ← KeyGen (1τ ) . key generation for the security parameter, τ
Watermark Generation, G (·)
Input: (i) an input image, i = {Bn}, where {n} = {1, 2, · · · , Nb}; (ii) keys, KS and
KR; (iii) Feature (·); (iv) Sign (·); and (v) Encrypt (·).
Output: (i) primary watermark, wpri; and (ii) secondary watermark, wsec
Begin
2:
(
fpri, {fsecn }
)← Feature (i) . feature extraction
3: wpri ← Sign (fpri,KS) . primary watermark generation
4: wsec = {wsecn } ← Encrypt ({fsecn } ,KR) . secondary watermark generation
End
Watermark Embedding, E (·)
Input: (i) an input image, i = {Bn}; (ii) watermarks, wpri and wsec; (iii) key, KR;
(iv) Epri (·); (v) Esec (·); and (vi) Map (·).
Output: (i) watermarked image, i¯.
Begin
5: i¯sec ← Esec (i, wsec,KR,Map (·)) . here, {wsecq } ←Map ({wsecn },KR) for all
n, where q is the mapped index of n
6: i¯← Epri (¯isec, wpri)
End
Watermark Detection, D (·)
Input: (i) watermarked image, i¯ =
{
B¯n
}
; (ii) keys, KP and KR; (iii) Epri−1 (·);
(iv) Esec−1 (·); (v) SigV erify (·); (vi) Map (·); (vii) Encrypt (·);
(viii) Decrypt (·); (ix) Feature (·); and (x) Recover (·).
Output: (i) a pass, > or the tampering localized and recovered images: i¯ and i˜.
Begin
7: w˜pri ← Epri−1 (¯i)
8: > or ⊥ ← SigV erify (¯i, w˜pri,KP )
9: if SigV erify (·) outputs a failure, i.e., SigV erify (·)→ ⊥) then
10: w˜sec ← Esec−1 (¯i,KR,Map (·))
11: (∼, {fnewsecn })← Feature (¯i)
12: wnewsec = {wnewsecn } ← Encrypt ({fnewsecn } ,KR)
13: for all image block index, n1 ∈ {n} do
14: if wnewsecn1 6= w˜secn1 then
15: mark the block as tampered, i.e., B¯n1 ← B¯n1
16: f˜secn1 ← Decrypt
(
w˜secn1 ,KP
)
17: B˜n1 ← Recover
(
B¯n1 , f˜
sec
n1
)
18: end if
19: end for
20: return i¯ =
{
B¯n1
}
∩ {B¯n−n1} and i˜ = {B˜n1} ∩ {B¯n−n1}
. continued on next page.
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Model 4.6 A New Self-Authentication Model (continued)
21: else
22: a pass, > . indicates i¯ is authentic and un-tampered
23: end if
End
can completely substitute one for another. This realization imposes individual
and careful considerations of the both properties, not only for developing a wa-
termarking scheme but also for its assessment to be complete.
A new paradigm of dedicated security analysis for the watermarking schemes
have been presented. For the security analysis of the self-authentication schemes,
a secret mapping sequence recovery method and three new counterfeiting attacks
are discussed, their models are presented and their applicability is validated. The
self-authentication schemes have attracted considerable attention in the research
and have the potential to address the rising concern of diminishing trustworthiness
of multimedia information like digital images. It has been observed that neither
the general weaknesses of the schemes nor their secret recovery demonstrate how
they can affect a target application. Although some particular counterfeiting
instances were studied in the literature, there can be many other counterfeiting
instances for self-authentication schemes. Taking every possible counterfeiting
instances into account is more than difficult (and may not be necessary too) in
developing a self-authentication scheme. Therefore, the modification of a valid
watermarked image has been generalized in three different levels: (i) change
of pixel locations only, (ii) change of original pixels only, and (iii) change of
original pixels and watermarks. It has been argued that the presented three
counterfeiting attacks representing these three levels of modifications capture all
possible counterfeiting instances. Experimental results successfully demonstrated
their practical consequences for two relevant schemes that capture the general and
medical image applications. The presented security analysis thus can be used as
a principle to analyse the security of other watermarking schemes.
A set of general requirements and guiding principles for using conventional
authentication tools (e.g ., digital signature, perceptual hashing, etc.) have also
been outlined to resist the counterfeiting attacks. The advantages and limitations
of the tools for multimedia applications are identified. The self-authentication
objectives have been partitioned into the primary (i.e., content authentication)
and secondary (i.e., tampering localisation and recovery) objectives. The use of
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combined tools has been suggested for achieving those objectives, since neither
one can individually help to completely achieve them. A new construction of
self-authentication model has then been proposed showing the combined use of
digital signature and encryption. The embedded signature would help verify the
image authenticity and integrity publicly, and the encrypted feature would allow
possible tampering localization and recovery if the signature verification fails.
Some necessary considerations and future tasks for the practical development
of self-authentication schemes in light of the presented (self-authentication) model
have been discussed; for example, choosing suitable signature and encryption
schemes, finding the proper feature extraction and embedding schemes etc. One
of the main challenges here is to find an efficient embedding scheme with high
embedding capacity that can fit in the proposed self-authentication model. To
compensate for the computational cost in using the signature and encryption
schemes, the simplest classic LSB-based embedding scheme may be chosen. How-
ever, as this research seeks to formulate a watermarking application framework
for the medical images, the classic LSB-embedding principle could not be directly
applied. It is therefore necessary to find an alternative efficient watermark em-
bedding scheme for the medical image applications, which the following chapter
will deal with.
As a final remark, the presented contributions can be considered a paradigm
shift for identifying the required security level, and for exploring the necessary
properties of a self-authentication scheme, for an application. The proposed at-
tack models can be used as a means to systematically examine the security levels
of similar schemes. Similarly, an appropriate consideration of the identified re-
quirements may lead to developing more secure variants of the schemes. As this
study has showed, failure to consider the security level and properties can ren-
der a self-authentication scheme vulnerable for its intended application. In other
words, identifying the security level and the properties can help not only to justify
the merit of a scheme, but to also show any potential security holes for similar
schemes.
4.9 Chapter Summary
This chapter has captured the security aspects in watermarking schemes and their
applications. Starting with the early assumption in developing watermarking
schemes, their security requirements and evaluation criteria are analysed and dis-
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cussed followed by a new paradigm for their dedicated security analysis. Thereby,
three new counterfeiting attack models and a new self-authentication model have
been developed and presented. Specifically:
• It has been demonstrated that the considerations of watermarking robust-
ness and security are confusing and incomplete in the watermarking litera-
ture. Their overall status has been investigated and the source of confusion
identified. General guidelines for their appropriate considerations have been
discussed.
• The need for a dedicated security analysis of watermarking schemes has
been verified. It has been reported that irrespective of the levels of ro-
bustness (i.e., robust, fragile, semi-fragile), a watermarking scheme must
have a separate consideration of security requirements. As the security re-
quirements vary with the applications, a dedicated security analysis of the
scheme is required for the intended application.
• A dedicated security analysis of the self-authentication schemes has also
been incorporated. The general weaknesses of the schemes and their ex-
ploiting in counterfeiting attacks have been reviewed. With formulating a
generalized model of the schemes, mapping sequence recovery model and
three new counterfeiting attack models have been presented.
• This chapter has reported that the proposed attacks capture all possible
counterfeiting instances in three levels of modification of a watermarked
image. Applicability of the attacks have been validated for two relevant
schemes. The computation time and sets of attacked images have illustrated
the effectiveness and consequences, of the proposed attacks.
• The presented security analysis of the self-authentication schemes have also
shown how a watermarking scheme, without a proper consideration of the
security properties and analysis, violates the systematic definition of the
security.
• A set of requirements of the self-authentication schemes have been out-
lined. Guiding principles using the conventional security tools have been
presented. Promises and limitations of the principles for attaining the self-
authentication objectives have been described. The objectives, based on
their priority and logical order, are classified in two levels: primary (i.e.,
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content authentication) and secondary (tampering localization and recov-
ery).
• This chapter has concluded by presenting a new construction of self-authen-
tication model to attain the identified requirements and objectives, and to
thus resist the proposed counterfeiting attacks. The practical development
of a self-authentication scheme in light of the proposed self-authentication
model has further entailed several tasks to address. One of the main tasks
pointed out has been to find an efficient embedding scheme for the medical
image applications, which will be addressed in the following chapter.
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Watermarking Application to
Medical Images
Chapter Organization
This chapter presents the development and validation of a new watermark
embedding scheme. Justification for considering the task of developing
embedding scheme is discussed in Section 5.1.1 and the challenges are
identified in Section 5.1.2. Section 5.2 reviews the relevant literature in
light of the identified challenges. Section 5.4 introduces the new water-
mark embedding scheme, and its features, implementation and applica-
bility to medical images. Section 5.5 presents capacity control analysis
to show the computational efficiency of the proposed scheme. Section 5.6
presents the experimental results. Section 5.7 discusses the findings and
contributions presented in this chapter. Finally, Section 5.8 outlines the
chapter summary. (The original contributions discussed in this chapter
resulted in a number of publications, see Appendices D.2, D.5, D.9 and
D.10.)
5.1 Introduction
Aiming at developing a medical image application framework of digital water-
marking, the research presented in the preceding chapters has led to a new self-
authentication model. The target application framework aims at achieving dif-
ferent security properties such as authentication and/or integrity verification of
the medical images, and confidentiality of meta-data (e.g ., EPRelectronic pa-
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tient record) etc., as determined in Chapter 2. These security properties can
be achieved by using a suitably designed watermarking scheme in light of the
self-authentication model.
The presented self-authentication model (Chapter 4) has been designed to
overcome the limitations of the conventional security tools for attaining the re-
quired security properties of digital images. As discussed in Section 4.7.2, indi-
vidual use of the conventional tools are incapable of attaining the requirements
of a self-authentication scheme. Moreover, due to (temporary) loss of the spa-
tial information of an image, direct use of those tools obliterate any semantic
understanding of the image. For example, an encrypted medical image has no
visual semantic to the medical professionals. The proposed digital watermarking
based scheme thus can help overcome this obliteration problem and can borrow
the security properties of the standard cryptographic tools by embedding the
watermark imperceptibly.
The practical development of a self-authentication scheme on the basis of the
self-authentication model however entails several tasks, as pointed out in the pre-
vious chapter. These tasks include, for example, choosing the appropriate digital
signature and encryption schemes and mapping function, and finding suitable
feature extraction and watermark embedding schemes, etc. Among those tasks
and focusing on the medical image application, developing an embedding scheme
is considered here. The reason for considering this task and the challenges in pur-
suing it, to follow up this research are described below. The method, analysis and
experiments are then briefly introduced that will be presented in the subsequent
sections of this chapter.
5.1.1 Towards Applying the Self-Authentication Model to
Medical Images
In developing a suitable self-authentication scheme in light of the presented self-
authentication model for medical image application, one main challenge is to
find an efficient watermark embedding scheme. The choice of pursuing this task
however as distinct from the other tasks mentioned above has been made by
considering the following factors.
(i) Finding appropriate signature and encryption schemes. Choosing the ap-
propriate signature and encryption schemes for watermark generation is
relatively less challenging. This can be readily accomplished by identifying
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the required criteria for the signature and encryption schemes, since their
performance (i.e., the security levels, computational complexity, etc.) are
well known. This may however require verification of the overall water-
marking performance for the chosen signature and encryption schemes.
(ii) Finding a suitable mapping function. In a similar fashion, a mapping func-
tion can be readily chosen from the literature considering the properties of
the key (e.g ., length, typepublic or private, etc.), and the efficiency of
the used mapping transform. As mentioned in Section 4.7.3, a pseudo-ran-
dom-number-generator based mapping transform can be used to avoid the
possible weaknesses of a small key space.
(iii) Finding a suitable feature extraction function. This task requires a further
study of the following:
 The required properties of the features (e.g ., size in bits, computa-
tional complexity, dependence on the input image, block-wise operabil-
ity, compatibility with the input image properties such as perceptual
distribution, file-format, etc.)
 Validation of the chosen feature extraction function(s) for the self-
authentication objective(s) and the application scenario(s).
 Security analysis for ensuring that the considered function(s) does not
possess any properties that may cause security problems.
This task offers a separate research opportunity, and by considering its
feasibility within this Ph.D. time-line, it is left out of the scope of the
research presented in this thesis.
(iv) Managing user keys. This task includes the generation, exchange, storage,
use and replacement of the keys. Since the keys of the proposed self-authen-
tication model are cryptographic, their management can be followed from
the standard guidelines (see [239241]) and tools (e.g ., [242,243]). Address-
ing this task also means consideration of the system policy, interactions and
co-ordination, user training, etc. This task, although critical to the security
of the proposed self-authentication model, is thus left to be addressed in
future research (see Section 6.2).
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Therefore, this research aims to find a suitable embedding scheme for the
medical image applications. The challenges in developing such an embedding
scheme are discussed below. The above-mentioned tasks, which this research has
not addressed, will be discussed again in the next chapter, considering future
research opportunities.
5.1.2 Challenges for Developing an Embedding Scheme
The envisaged research of applying the self-authentication scheme to the medical
images thus seek an efficient and suitable embedding scheme. The computational
efficiency is required to compensate for the computational costs of the signature
and encryption schemes to be used. Similarly, the suitability criteria are stressed
in considering the special properties and strict requirements of the medical images.
The challenges in attaining the efficiency and suitability of an embedding scheme
are specified below in light of the medical image application scenario.
Digital watermarking has to address a few conflicting requirements of medical
images: (i) high embedding capacity, (ii) low level of embedding distortion,
and (iii) continuous protection of the image. A relatively high embedding ca-
pacity is required for accommodating large size watermarks that help achieve
different objectives. But, usually the higher the required capacity, the higher the
embedding distortion. However, a lower level of embedding distortion is required
to ensure that the watermarked images can be accepted by the medical profes-
sionals for any medical or clinical uses. The continuous protection requirement
of a medical image, on the other hand, implies the protection of the image over
the entities (e.g ., systems and users) that the image may pass through during its
lifetime, which requires the watermark to always remain embedded. All the above
requirements therefore result in a dilemmaif any incurred embedding distortion
remains, legal and ethical concerns arise; if that is removed, security protection
discontinues.
The legal and ethical concerns about altering image pixels are reducing the
applicability of digital watermarking for medical images (see Chapter 2). Medical
professionals remain sceptical about allowing possible alteration of all the pixels
(in a medical image) irrespective of the techniques (e.g ., reversible, irreversible)
and the levels of incurred distortion of watermark embedding. This scepticism
motivates researchers to consider the RONI (region of non-interest) in medical im-
ages that are of no or little interest to doctors and medical professionals. However,
finding a suitable RONI selection technique, in general for all modality medical
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images, continues to be as a fundamental problem. (There are many modalities of
medical images: CTComputed Tomography, MRMagnetic Resonance, X-ray,
DSADigital Subtraction Angiography, RFRadio Fluoroscopy, USUltrasound,
MGMammography, to name a few.) The main reason is, different medical im-
ages have different perceptual content and random location of ROI (region of
interest, the complementary region of RONI in medical images, which presents
the anatomical objects or important features for diagnostic purposes).
In summary, finding an efficient and suitable watermark embedding scheme
for medical images becomes a challenging task, addressing the following criteria
simultaneously: (i) high embedding capacity with minimum distortion, (ii) min-
imum legal and ethical impact, (iii) minimum ROI/RONI selection complexity,
(iv) continuous protection of medical images, and (v) computational efficiency.
The rest of this chapter will deal with an embedding scheme for medical
images and presents its development, computational analysis and performance
evaluation. This starts with verifying the significance of above-mentioned crite-
ria from the literature. The border pixels of the multi-modal medical images are
then studied for their possible consideration as a general RONI and for develop-
ing an irreversible and spatial domain (border pixel based) embedding scheme. A
set of suitable least significant bit-planes of the RONI pixels are determined for
watermark embedding that would maintain a good (perceptual) quality in the em-
bedding region, while keeping the other pixels in the image untouched. This would
further allow the minimization of the legal and ethical impact and to achieve an
image-content-independent capacity with a low computational complexity. The
necessary analysis and experiments are conducted and the performance of the
developed embedding scheme is compared with two prominent schemes [5, 174],
and thereby, the suitability of the embedding scheme is validated.
5.2 State of Medical Image Watermarking
This section reviews the medical image watermarking schemes, particularly those
addressing the ROI (or RONI) selection, embedding capacity improvement, and
embedding distortion minimization problems. The ROI selection techniques and
the considerations in improving embedding capacity are reviewed to find how they
affect the computational efficiency and applicability of the schemes. Investigating
the distortion minimization aspects of the schemes further helps determine how
the embedding distortion contributes both in raising the legal and ethical concerns
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and in discontinuation of the security protection of medical images.
ROI selection is, more or less, assumed to be carried out properly by the inter-
vention of doctors, radiologists or medical experts [19,60,100,102,127,244]. This
is not efficient for any institute or health care system, where the number of medi-
cal images produced every day is potentially very high. Therefore, developing an
automatic selection technique has received attention in the literature. However,
since one ROI selection technique is not equally suitable for different modality
images, different techniques were also introduced for specific modalities. For ex-
ample, ROI is defined by using rectangles for MR-brain image [123], polygons for
CT, MR, and US [59], logical ellipses for CT, US, X-ray, and MR images [104],
and morphology operations [106] and K-means segmentation methods [245] for
MR images. Most of the medical image watermarking schemes that considered
ROI or RONI, suffer from the computational overhead of ROI/RONI selection.
In addition, a significant portion of the capacity is also eaten up by the ROI
pointers as a side information to re-locate the exact ROI later at the detector.
In summary, the main ROI/RONI selection problems include (i) computational
overhead, (ii) side information overhead, and (iii) limited applicability (i.e., not
equally suitable for all modality medical images).
Moreover, the embedding distortion in the ROIs and RONIs has been ad-
dressed in different ways in the literature. The RONI embedding is allowed
to have higher level of distortion. Additionally, the ROIs, if used for embed-
ding, the distortion is expected not only to be at a lower level than that of the
RONIs, but also to be reversible. Although a perceptual-content-adaptive em-
bedding approach was initially considered [246], commonly used techniques for
minimizing distortions in ROIs are: (i) lossless compression of ROIs [60,244] and
(ii) reversible embedding [5, 59, 106]. The reversible embedding techniques are
advantageous over the ROI compression based techniques, considering their fol-
lowing benefits: (i) the level of embedding distortion can be low, (ii) embedding
distortion can be removed and (iii) ROI/RONI computational overhead can be
avoided, since the original image can be restored.
In watermarking research, reversible schemes also have shown the best
capacity-distortion performance so far. Many prominent reversible schemes [5,
59, 106, 162, 164180, 247251] have been reported. These schemes are fragile
and introduce an invertible distortion in a watermarked image. Addressing the
low capacity and high distortion problems of earlier schemes [165167], Tian [168]
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pioneered the difference expansion (DE) scheme, which is later extended and gen-
eralized [170, 247, 248], then improved using the sorting of pixel-pairs [171] and
the simplified location map [173]. Addressing the location map problem of the
DE scheme, Ni et al . [169] introduced the histogram shifting (HS) scheme, which
is later improved using the difference-histogram [175], rhombus predictor and
sorting [176], adaptive and multilevel embedding [162, 164, 180, 252]. Reversible
contrast matching (RCM), another invertible transform, -based scheme is pro-
posed in [249] and extended in [250]. Thodi and Rodríguez [177] introduced the
prediction error expansion (PEE) scheme, which was later improved [174,178,179].
Additionally, focusing on the medical image application, Coatrieux et al . [106]
proposed a RONI based reversible watermarking scheme for MR images that
offers a continuous reliability protection of the image. However, morphology
operations based RONI selection of that scheme is not suitable for all modalities
of medical images. Guo and Zhuang [59] proposed a region based DE reversible
watermarking scheme for medical images to overcome the location map overhead
problem of DE techniques. Although the scheme considers the impact of altering
all pixels for embedding, it is inefficient for the manual ROI selection and the
significant side information of multiple polygon. Tsai et al . [5] presented an HS
based watermark embedding scheme using a linear prediction that maximizes
the embedding capacity, keeping the embedding distortion at significantly lower
levels, and thereby, demonstrating its applicability to medical images.
However, the capacity of the DE-, HS-, RCM- and PEE-based reversible
schemes is image-content-dependent, which is more likely to result in a vary-
ing capacity problem for different modality medical images. In other words, the
embedding performance of a particular scheme may vary with the image content
(e.g ., with different modality medical images). Thus, a prior capacity estimation
may be required to check if the capacity is sufficient for a given payload (i.e.,
watermark plus any side information). In addition to that computational over-
head, the overall performance of the scheme may significantly deteriorate when
the estimated capacity remains insufficient, and a multilevel (also called recur-
sive or multi-round or multi-pass) embedding is required. Furthermore, once
the watermarked image is restored to the original image, the security protection
discontinues.
A multilevel embedding re-embeds the remaining part of the payload in a
watermarked image repeatedly until the required capacity is achieved. Such re-
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peated alterations of pixels may not always incur more distortion (due to using
the same LSB-plane for re-embedding), but they are more likely to deteriorate
the overall embedding performance (e.g ., increase the embedding time). There-
fore, for embedding of the same size payload, the embedding time and level of
distortion in different medical images (even of the same sizes) may not be the
same. This means that: (i) the same size payloads may neither incur the same
level of distortion nor take the same embedding time, and (ii) the upper capac-
ity bound may significantly vary depending on the image contents, in the same
operational environment. The influence of these factors on the overall perfor-
mance of a watermark embedding scheme, while it is not desirable in general, it
may become more severe for some watermarking objectives like EPR-annotation,
database indexing etc. For achieving those objectives, the payload is of varying
size and thus requires varying capacity with a relatively high upper bound. Such
a payload is called dynamic. Achieving this requirement, however, is challenging
(particularly, under the perceptual constraints of medical images) and requires
an efficient capacity control.
Watermarking capacity control is the process to achieve the required capacity
while maintaining a low level of distortion. Ideally the process should minimise
the distortion. However, when the payload is dynamic this may lead to an unac-
ceptably high running time. The watermarking capacity control thus requires an
additional consideration of the running time and can be defined by considering:
(i) capacity estimation, and (ii) capacity (control) parameter(s). A prior capacity
estimation is required to check if there is sufficient capacity to accommodate a
specific payload. A suitable capacity parameter (e.g ., the number and location of
embeddable histogram bins in HS schemes) setting, on the other hand, provides
the required capacity with a minimum possible distortion and running time.
Although the estimation of a theoretical capacity bound was addressed in some
seminal works [186, 188, 253257], the capacity estimation is taken here to mean
the computation of (an upper) capacity bound in practice under a given capacity
parameter(s) setting. It has been observed that the capacity parameter is used
to control only the distortion disregarding the effects on the running time, which
is a main caveat in the current capacity control context. As a result, the capacity
control problem is partially addressed in [172,174,258260], but remains more or
less unsolved for the dynamic payload embedding. In other words, although the
reversible schemes have a relatively high capacity (upper bound), they typically
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have an inefficient capacity control (e.g ., require a recursive embedding in support
of capacity control). Thus, those schemes may not be suitable for medical image
applications, particularly for the dynamic payload embedding.
In summary, for the medical image application framework, the current state
of watermarking schemes has the following gaps and limitations:
RONI/ROI selection. There is no known general ROI/RONI selection tech-
nique for multi-modal medical images. Existing techniques are either man-
ual or modality dependent, and are thus inefficient and not widely useful.
Capacity improvement. Despite the higher embedding capacity, the reversible
schemes are less justifiable for the medical image application considering
their discontinued security protection, image-content-dependent capacity
and inefficient capacity control. Similarly, the irreversible schemes suffer
from the RONI/ROI selection problems (i.e., computational and side-infor-
mation overheads, limited applicability).
Distortion minimization. Recent reversible watermarking schemes have
shown better capacity-distortion performance, though being image-content
dependent, their distortion levels do not always remain at the same level
even for embedding the same payload in the images. Moreover, if RONI
is not considered, those schemes mean to have no guarantee which pixels
they are actually modifying (although this may not be necessary as the
modification can be reversed; but once reversed, the security protection is
also terminated). Otherwise, if RONI is considered, the effective capacity
becomes lower and computational complexity grows.
Legal and ethical impact minimization. A very limited attention is paid in
the literature to the legal and ethical concerns about altering a medical
image, regardless of the nature of alterationreversible or irreversible, for
watermark embedding. Reversible embedding or RONI embedding or the
both may minimize the concern, although none of their considerations are
explicitly made and well justified.
Computational efficiency. The computational efficiency/complexity of the
watermarking schemes is not explicitly considered in the literature. Partic-
ularly, for the reversible schemes, the current consideration of the capacity
parameter(s) is incomplete and leaves capacity control with an implicit as-
sumption: a recursive embedding may be used to attain the required capacity.
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This consideration may cause an exponentially increasing embedding time
and thus can be critical for the performance and applicability of a water-
marking scheme.
Developing an embedding scheme that completely addresses the above gaps
and limitations is far from easy. However, this research aims at developing a
scheme that can reasonably address them. Specifically, an efficient and general
RONI-based, irreversible embedding scheme with an efficient capacity control can
be well justified for simultaneously addressing the above problems (which will be
verified later in the Section 5.5 and 5.6). To this end, focus is given at developing
an efficient capacity control model, finding a general RONI selection approach,
and using them in developing a suitable embedding scheme, for the medical image
application.
5.3 Capacity Control and RONI Selection
In this section, a capacity control model is developed that would effectively help
consider the computational aspects in watermark embedding while keeping the
distortion at the lower level. Additionally, a general approach for the RONI
selection is investigated in light of the medical image properties and requirements.
The main idea is to find a common region in different modality medical images,
which can be considered as RONI in general. This will not only help minimize the
legal and ethical impact, but also provide an efficient way to permanently embed
the payload allowing a continuous protection of the images with an image-content-
independent capacity.
5.3.1 A New Computationally Efficient Capacity Control
Model
In order to develop a more complete capacity control model, the notion of capac-
ity control is generalised to be the process of optimising for the combination of
minimum distortion and acceptable running time. Here, distortion is the degree
of perceptual degradation incurred by the embedding function, and running (or
computational) time [261] is measured by the number of machine-independent
operations executed. (The necessary notations are adopted from the proposed
watermarking model discussed in Chapter 3.)
The current capacity control ideally aims at minimizing the distortion only
and thus lacks consideration of the running time as discussed in Section 5.2 and
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input I; W ; Sinfo
initialize : par, (T1, T2) ;
payload← Concat (W,Sinfo) ;
Cp ← Size (payload)
(
Dist, Et, Ct
)
← Est (I, par)
Ct ≥ Cp?
(Dist, Et) ≤
(T1, T2)?
update
par
update
T1, T2?
invoke
E(·)
recon-
sider
inputs,
E(·)
no
yesno
yes no no
yes
existing
scenario
extended scenario
· · ·
1
Figure 5.1: Flow-chart of the proposed capacity control model. Extension via no
condition (dim-dotted arrow) in existing scenario is proposed.
shown in Fig. 5.1[existing scenario]. The Hu et al . [174] scheme is here a promi-
nent example that fits in the shown existing scenario. (This scheme will be stud-
ied later in Section 5.5 for its capacity control analysis.) Therefore, the proposed
framework (incorporating the extended scenario in Fig. 5.1) aims to ensure the
attainment of the required capacity with both the least possible distortion and
running time simultaneously. For an input image and payload, the framework
seeks a suitable capacity parameter setting with the option given to the user to
update the predefined thresholds (or to reconsider the inputs/embedding scheme,
in a worst case scenario). The general steps are discussed below.
Consider an embedding function, E (·), embed a watermark, W and side in-
formation, Sinfo, in an input image, I. To find the least possible distortion, Dist
and running time, Et, the set of capacity parameters par and the thresholds
(TBW , TLSB) for (Dist, Et) are initialized with their minimum possible values.
With that setting, a capacity estimation function, Est (·) computes the total
(available) capacity, Ct depending on E (·). Here, a concatenation function,
Concat (·) calculates the payload such that payload ← Concat (W,Sinfo). The
required capacity, Cp is determined using Size (·) that returns the bit-length of
149
Chapter 5. Watermarking Application to Medical Images
its input such that Cp ← Size (payload). Until the Cp is achieved, par, TBW and
TLSB are updated as shown in Fig.5.1.
The main challenge here is to control the influence of increasing Cp on Dist
and Et, which depends on how E (·) is designed. This influence, however, may
be controlled by the capacity parameter, par, and the thresholds TBW and TLSB,
if such options are available for E (·). Further, an efficient updating of par is
crucial for capacity control to minimize Et. For example, based on the difference
between Ct and Cp, an adaptive update of par may significantly minimize the time
needed to reach the required capacity level. Bearing this in mind, the capacity
control efficacy is defined more formally in Definition 5.1 below. Here, only Cp is
considered, since Ct accounts for Cp (possibly with an increasing Dist and Et for
Ct ≥ Cp).
Definition 5.1. (capacity control efficacy). An embedding function, E (·) is said
to have an efficient capacity control, if it ensures the attainment of the required
capacity, Cp with minimum possible distortion, Dist and computation time, Et,
where Dist and Et grow with the minimum possible amount/step as Cp grows.
In order to demonstrate the viability of Definition 5.1, and thus to determine
the capacity control efficacy of E (·) for dynamic payload embedding, the following
questions are posed: (i) what are the Dist and Et values of E (·) for the lower
bound of the dynamic payload? and (ii) at what rate should Dist and Et of E (·)
be changed for the increasing Cp? Analysing watermarking schemes in light of
these questions would lead to define a criteria for the capacity control efficiency,
which states that the lower the (quantitative) values of the said parameters, the
higher the efficacy of the schemes. Therefore, the above capacity control model
and the stated criteria will be used later in Section 5.5 for validation of the
capacity control efficiency of the proposed embedding scheme (see Section 5.4).
5.3.2 A New General RONI Selection Approach
The general RONI selection approach for watermark embedding has to ensure
that it does not affect the medical decision made from the watermarked images.
This means that the observations of each modality medical images are to be
made with an extreme care, for learning the usual locations of ROIs (i.e., the
complementary part of RONIs) in the images. Ideally, ROIs in medical images
are both modality- and patient-wise uncorrelated, which make them more or less
a random phenomenon. For example, two head-MRIs of two different patients can
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have different ROIs. Similarly, the ROIs in head-MRI and knee-MRI are usually
different. Therefore, in practice, these properties of medical images lead to using a
subjective approach for RONI selection, which requires the doctor(s) to manually
locate the ROIs such that the region other than the ROIs can be used as RONI.
Naturally this approach if used, reduces the embedding performance. To some
extent, such deficiencies can be addressed by a few modality dependent RONI
selection (and segmentation) techniques as discussed in Section 5.2. However, as
far as finding a general approach for the RONI selection is concerned, none of the
existing approaches are applicable.
In order to develop the concept of general RONI selection, this investigation
thus starts with looking at the individual modality medical images and their usual
ROIs' locations. Necessary assumptions are made based on the observations and
RONI selection criteria are specified. Allowing for an efficient capacity control,
the set of capacity parameters are defined. Thereby, a general RONI selection ap-
proach is developed, which will be used as the basis for developing an embedding
scheme.
The RONIs of the Multi-modal medical images. Medical images can be of
different modalities and different perceptual properties as discussed in Chapter 2
and mentioned above. Irrespective of the modalities and different parts of human
body under examination, a general consideration in acquiring medical images
is endeavour to keep the prospective ROIs at the centre of the images. (Such
consideration of RONI, however, may require a prior clinical validation.) To
illustrate this, consider the scenario presented in Fig. 5.2. Suppose the ROI of a
chest X-ray shown in Fig. 5.2(a) was found close to the border of the image as
indicated by the red-circle, where the doctor (and/or medical specialists) being
prudent usually requests another image that places the ROI at the centre as
shown in Fig. 5.2(b). This fact suggests that the border-pixels of medical images
are of little or no significance to the doctors and can be generally used as RONI.
Specifically, the concept of using border-pixels as the general RONI is based on
the following considerations:
(i) For a medical image, the phenomenon under examination by the doctors or
other medical practitioners would occupy the central part of the image.
(ii) In situations, where ROI gets close to the border of the image, the examiner
is expected to seek another image, where the ROI would be placed at the
centre of the image.
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(a) (b)
Figure 5.2: Examples of ROI locations for different medical scenarios.
Criteria for the RONI selection. Proceeding with the considerations now
requires the specification of the criteria for the RONI selection. This is necessary
for determining the suitability of the RONI selection approach for the medical
images. This research proposes the following criteria for the RONI selection:
(i) RONI should have no relevance or impact on the medical objectives for
which the image was obtained.
(ii) RONI should keep the distortion at the minimum level.
(iii) RONI should provide the required capacity to accommodate the payload.
(iv) RONI should have the minimum computational and side-information over-
head.
Capacity control parameters. Use of the border-pixels for RONI selection
also requires finding the capacity parameters for the capacity control. In order
to have an efficient capacity control, thus this research considers two parameters,
namely; border-width and bit-depth. The border-width specifies how many pix-
els in the border of an image can be suitably used as RONI, and the bit-depth
specifies how many LSB-planes of the selected border-pixels can be used for em-
bedding the payload, while keeping distortion at the minimum level. Depending
on the required capacity, the values of these parameters are determined using
the capacity control of the embedding scheme. Analysis and validation of this
capacity control will be given after presenting the proposed embedding scheme
in the next section.
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5.4 A Novel Embedding Scheme for Medical
Images
This section presents the development of an embedding scheme and its features,
implementation, and applicability for medical images. Use of the least significant
border pixels in medical images is demonstrated for watermarking, not only to
minimize the legal and ethical impact but to also ensure a continuous protection
with much reduced computational complexity. Thereby, an adaptive LSB (least
significant bit) based watermark embedding scheme is proposed.
5.4.1 Features of the Embedding Scheme
The proposed embedding scheme offers various features in addressing the con-
flicting embedding problems for medical images and the limitations of existing
embedding schemes. The key features of the proposed embedding scheme are
described below.
General RONI selection and embedding. The proposed scheme avoids the
existing RONI (or ROI) selection problems as discussed in Section 5.2. This
scheme selects RONI considering the least significant pixels and their least signif-
icant bit planes of a medical image. Irrespective of image modalities and medical
scenarios (e.g ., which part of body is under examination), the border pixels of
the image are found of little or no significance to the medical procedure, as dis-
cussed in Section 5.3.2. In other words, considering border pixels as RONI offers
a general platform to work on different modality medical images. This approach
further adaptively searches the suitable number of LSB-planes of the RONI pixels
to keep the distortion in the embedding region at a minimum level.
Minimized legal and ethical impact. The proposed embedding scheme con-
siders the legal issues, and ethical concerns of medical professionals and patients,
arising from the embedding distortion. Since there is no clear cut boundary of
any acceptable embedding distortion, researchers try to keep it at a minimum
level, for medical images. This minimum level of distortion, however, is relative
and may vary significantly for different medical image modalities and for differ-
ent size payloads. Thus, an invertible distortion of reversible embedding schemes
might help, but due to their limitations (e.g ., varying performance, discontinued
security protection, as discussed in Section 5.2) and lack of clinical validation, doc-
tors and medical professionals have remained sceptical about considering them
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for medical images. As a result, keeping the ROI pixels untouched, the proposed
scheme should minimize the legal and ethical impact.
Image-content-independent capacity. The proposed embedding scheme of-
fers an image-content-independent capacity. Unlike the embedding schemes with
image-content-dependent capacity (e.g ., the reversible schemes, see Section 5.2),
this scheme only requires capacity estimation, when there is a change in pay-
load-or image-size (which will be discussed in Section 5.5). Consequently, the
required embedding time of the proposed scheme for the same size payloads and
images would remain the same and relatively less than other schemes that have
an image-content-dependent capacity.
Flexible capacity control ability. The proposed scheme also introduces an
adaptive capacity control for an increasing size payload. This would offer flex-
ibility to increase the embedding capacity when required, and to maintain a
minimum distortion in the embedding region, without deteriorating the perfor-
mance. An embedding scheme having a limited capacity control ability often
considers re-embedding, which makes the scheme relatively slower and may incur
more distortion, as discussed in Section 5.2. The proposed scheme attempts to
minimize this problem by increasing the border width (in terms of pixels) and
their LSB-planes adaptively to accommodate the increasing payloads.
Continuous security protection. The proposed scheme maximizes the du-
ration of protection by embedding the payload in an irreversible way, assuming
that the watermark has been generated to achieve any required security proper-
ties (e.g ., authentication, integrity verification, confidentiality). As mentioned in
Section 5.1.2, any particular security properties that a watermarking scheme re-
quires, can be obtained by deploying a suitable cryptographic technique(s). Here,
a watermark could be secure as long as the used cryptographic techniques are be-
lieved to be secure. Watermark embedding, however, needs to ensure that the
validity of the embedded watermark is always verifiable as long as the protection
is required. Unlike any reversible embedding schemes (where any protection is
terminated when a watermarked image is restored to the original), this scheme
allows the watermark to remain embedded for any operational environment (e.g .,
medical diagnosis, clinical study and research, image archives etc.). So, the ver-
ifiability of an embedded watermark for the required security properties helps
provide a continuous protection of the medical images, at any point of their uses.
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In support of the above features, the computational analysis and experimental
results will be presented in Section 5.5 and 5.6. Before that, the implementation
and applicability of the embedding scheme for medical images with greater tech-
nical details.
5.4.2 Implementation of the Embedding Scheme
The proposed scheme and its implementation details are now described using the
flow-chart illustrated in Fig. 5.3. For the given set of inputs: an image, I and
a watermark, W , the scheme with an initialized pair of thresholds (TBW , TLSB)
determines the border width, NBW (i.e., the number of pixels in the border that
are selected as RONI), and the number of LSB-planes (of RONI pixels), NLSB,
for embedding the payload, P . This helps determine the optimum combination
of NBW and NLSB, for which the embedding distortion in RONI remains at a
minimum level, with the capacity condition:
Ctotal ≥ Cp, (5.1)
where Ctotal is the total capacity and Cp is the size of payload. Total capacity is
calculated here using:
Ctotal = 2NBW × (r + c− 2NBW )×NLSB, (5.2)
where r and c are the number of pixels in a row and a column of an input image,
respectively.
If the capacity condition in (5.1) is not fulfilled, NBW and NLSB (initialized at
value 1) are increased by a unit step to increase the Ctotal. It has been observed
(from the experiments, which will be discussed in Section 5.6) that increasing
NBW gives higher capacity for a fixed NLSB than increasing NLSB for a fixed
NBW . Therefore, firstly, NBW is increased successively (after checking the ca-
pacity condition each time) up to its given maximum limit, TBW . Then, NLSB
is increased by a unit step, when NBW = TBW . This way, until the condition
in (5.1) is fulfilled, NBW and NLSB are increased up to their maximum limits
TBW and TLSB, respectively. In the above selection method of NBW and NLSB,
the threshold pair (TBW , TLSB) has an important role to select the RONI, and to
control the capacity adaptively for an increasing size watermark. For all modality
medical images, there should be a well defined (TBW , TLSB) that helps accommo-
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I : original medical image
W : watermark
I¯ : watermarked medical image
P : payload
Load : formatted side information
NBW : border-width, in pixels
NLSB : no. of LSB planes
List : list of NBW and NLSB for any
previous inputs’ sizes, (Ci, Cw)
Ctotal : total capacity
TBW : maximum NBW
TLSB : maximum NLSB
Size (·) : determines bit length
input I; W
initialize
TBW , TLSB , List;
Load← 0 ;
Cl ← Size (Load) ;
Ci ← Size (I) ;
Cw ← Size (W ) ;
NBW
& NLSB
known?
NLSB ← 1 ;
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Cp ← Cw+Cl
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NBW =
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?
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W
compute Load;
compute P ;
I¯ ← E : I × P
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no
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no
yes
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no
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yes
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Figure 5.3: Embedding flow-chart of the proposed scheme.
date the watermark used for medical image applications. However, for a given
(TBW , TLSB), if the capacity condition is not satisfied (i.e., no NBW and NLSB
are found for the given watermark and image), a user prompt is required to up-
date (TBW , TLSB) as shown in Fig. 5.3. Otherwise, the input image and/or the
watermark can be reconsidered.
Watermark embedding. Once the capacity condition is satisfied, the payload
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input I¯
initialize
data-frame of
Load
extract Load
extract W
output W
1
Figure 5.4: Extraction flow-chart of the proposed scheme.
is embedded using the embedding function, E (·) as given in (5.3). The function
E (·) replaces the bits in the selected LSB-planes of the selected border pixels
sequentially. However, in order to extract the watermark independently, a detec-
tor requires NLSB, NBW , and the size of the watermark, Cw. These values are
formatted in a predefined frame of Load using a function, Format (·), as given
in (5.4). An example of Load data-frame is shown in Fig. 5.5(b) for a 32-bit of
side information. First 8-bit is for NBW , next 8-bit is for NLSB, and the last
16-bit is for the watermark size, Cw. Note that this structure may be re-defined
according to the need for any watermarking objectives. The formatted side infor-
mation, Load is then concatenated with the given watermark, W , to compute the
payload, P as shown in Fig. 5.5(a). Here, a concatenation function, Concat (·)
can be used that concatenates the inputs in their given order and outputs a single
bit-stream (of the total number of bits of the inputs) as given in (5.5).
I¯ ← E : I × P (5.3)
Load← Format (Cw, NBW , NLSB) (5.4)
P ← Concat (Load,W ) (5.5)
Watermark extraction. The embedded payload is extracted from a water-
marked image as a part of detection. As illustrated in Fig. 5.4, a detector is
initialized with the predefined Load data-frame. Then the NBW , NLSB, and Cw
are obtained from the extracted Load data from the input watermarked image,
I¯. To extract the embedded watermark, W , the detector then extracts the Cw-
bit sequentially from the NBW border pixels of the NLSB LSB-planes. Here, the
extracted Cw-bit are the embedded watermark, assuming no bit-error occurs.
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An example of how the embedding scheme works. To exemplify the
above embedding and extraction processes, consider an instance of the proposed
embedding scheme as illustrated in Fig. 5.6. An 8-bit image of size 10×10 is shown
sliced into its 8-bit planes along Z-axis (with increasing order of significance,
downward). Let, a 150-bit watermark (i.e., Cw = 150) is to be embedded, where
TBW = 2 and TLSB = 4. Assuming a 32-bit Load data frame (i.e., Cl = 32),
Cp is calculated, i.e., Cp = 150 + 32 = 182. Now, for the given TBW and TLSB,
suitable NBW and NLSB are determined for embedding Cp bits. Here, the internal
computations are:
when, NBW = 1 and NLSB = 1, Ct = 36
NBW = 2 and NLSB = 1, Ct = 64
NBW = 2 and NLSB = 2, Ct = 128
NBW = 2 and NLSB = 3, Ct = 192
The embedding function finds Ctotal ≥ Cp for NBW = 2 and NLSB = 3, and
stops checking the capacity condition. As shown in Fig. 5.5(b), a 32-bit Load
is computed for NBW = 2, NLSB = 3, Cw = 150. (In this example, a 32-bit
Load data-frame is superfluous for a 150-bit watermark. That frame allows up
to 216 = 65536-bit watermark in practice, which however can be redefined for
different size watermarks.) Then the 182-bit P is computed by concatenating
the Load and W , which is finally embedded by replacing the LSBs in RONI in
a predefined order (which needs to be known by the detector). The embedding
is considered to start from f (0, 0, 1) to f (5, 8, 3) occupying 182-bit sequentially
(e.g ., outer border pixels first, continuing up to NBW pixels of all LSB-planes with
increasing significance up to NLSB = 3, counter-clockwise). Once the payload, P
is embedded, the watermarked image, I¯ is output.
On the other hand, to extract the watermark, W from a given watermarked
image, I¯, a detector first obtains the embedded Load information: NBW = 2,
NLSB = 3, and Cw = 150. Then, from the very next bit-location of Load data-
frame, 150 bits are extracted from 3 LSB-planes of 2 border pixels, in their
embedding order, and W is yielded.
5.4.3 Applicability of the Embedding Scheme
A fragile, blind, irreversible, LSB based (spatial domain) watermark embedding
scheme has been developed for being used as a building block in the self-authen-
tication model (see Section 4.7.3). Some key technical properties of the proposed
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Figure 5.5: Data-frame: (a) payload, P , and (b) Load for Cl = 32.
XY
Z
NBW = 2
f (1, 5, 2)
f (0, 0, 1)
f (1, 0, 3)
f (9, 9, 1)
ROI (untouched) bit
RONI (embedding) bit
Bit-plane 1
(least significant)
Bit-plane 2
Bit-plane 3
...
...
...
...
...
...
Bit-plane 4
Bit-plane 8
(most significant)
NLSB = 3

Figure 5.6: An example of the proposed embedding scheme for an 8-bit image of size
10×10 with NBW = 2 and NLSB = 3. (A few arbitrary bit locations in
different bit planes, e.g ., f (0, 0, 1), f (1, 5, 2), etc. are shown to identify
the overall bit locations.)
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scheme are described below to demonstrate how these properties can make the
embedding scheme more applicable for medical image application.
Fragile watermark embedding. The proposed scheme is fragile. That is, it
embeds a fragile watermark, which by definition becomes invalid even for the
smallest modification in the watermarked images. Therefore, a fragile scheme
usually requires a reliable (operating) environment to cope with the unintentional
communication errors (to make sure that only a malicious modification makes the
watermark invalid), for example, by using an error correction code. In addition to
this requirement, however, a reversible embedding (which is also fragile) assumes
a secure environment, where the users (e.g ., doctors, other medical professionals)
of a restored medical image are assumed to be trusted, which may not be always
true in a real scenario. As a result, unlike the proposed embedding scheme,
protection of medical images remains limited for the reversible embedding schemes
(considering that the watermark is used to achieve any security property). A
fragile watermark also offers a high (embedding) capacity, which is required for
medical images to accommodate necessary payloads for addressing some security
and non-security problems. Moreover, a fragile watermark embedding is relatively
simple in operation.
Blind detection. Blindness is a property of the watermark detector that de-
termines whether the watermarked image can be verified independently or not,
i.e., a blind detector does not require an original image (and/or watermark)
as input(s). Therefore, unlike non-blind watermarking, the blind watermarking
helps avoid any further security problems arising from such original information
being available at the detector. However, watermark embedding and generation
play important roles for a detector to work independently. Here, the proposed
embedding scheme is designed in such a way that the detector does not require
any original information to extract the embedded watermark from a watermarked
image.
Irreversible embedding. In the proposed scheme, irreversible embedding
helps with a permanent association of the watermark (to allow continuous pro-
tection of the watermarked images as discussed in Section 5.4.1), and makes the
side information more manageable than a reversible scheme. For example, in a
compression based reversible embedding scheme [244,262], a part of the total ca-
pacity is consumed by the losslessly compressed bit-planes or ROIs, which is not
the case for this scheme. In other words, this scheme does not keep the original
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bit-planes or RONI pixels that are replaced for embedding, and thus reduces the
side information overhead.
LSB-based (spatial domain) embedding. Most of the watermark embed-
ding schemes make use of relatively redundant bits (e.g ., LSBs) of the cover
images. The proposed scheme does not operate on the whole image, rather it
uses the LSB-planes of the border pixels directly. This scheme also does not
depend on the perceptual content of the embedding pixels. All these ultimately
help minimize the embedding time by avoiding complexities in prior capacity es-
timation and re-embedding like many other schemes, as discussed in section 5.2
and will be verified in Section 5.5.
Secrecy of embedding location. The proposed scheme does not aim to
achieve any security property for the embedding location, considering that a
fragile watermark may not require this property. Additionally, as already men-
tioned in Section 5.1.1, it is considered that any required security properties of
the watermark are obtainable by deploying a suitable cryptographic scheme(s).
This should also be the case for other reversible fragile-embedding, which sim-
ilarly has no secrecy of the embedding location with letting the detector know
the starting point of the embedded data (e.g ., the set of maxima and minima
of histogram, location map, or other side information), unless the embedding
algorithm is assumed to be a black-box.
5.5 Capacity Control Analysis
This section analyses the computational efficiency of the new embedding scheme
presented in previous section. The Hu, Lee, and Li (or HLL) scheme [174] is also
studied for the validation of efficiency. The HLL scheme is a PEE-based reversible
scheme, whereas the proposed scheme is an irreversible and general RONI (region
of non-interest) based scheme. The choice of the HLL scheme is made as it is
a prominent scheme having capacity control that closely represents the existing
capacity control scenario in the proposed capacity control model presented in
Section 5.3.1. Despite their technical differences, the both schemes can be used
for dynamic payload embedding. An asymptotic analysis of these two schemes is
presented to demonstrate how the dynamic payload embedding influences their
running time. The dynamic payload embedding is an important scenario for
medical image application (e.g ., EPR annotation, as discussed in Section 5.2).
Therefore, it is necessary to examine how well they fit in the proposed capacity
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control model and address the capacity problem in question.
5.5.1 Analysis and Improvement of the HLL Scheme
The HLL scheme [174] expands the (median) prediction errors (i.e., pe = x− xˆ)
using classical DE rule (i.e., p′e = 2pe + b) and its variant (i.e., p
′
e = 2pe − b).
(Where, x and xˆ are original and predicted versions of the pixels, pe and p
′
e are
original and expanded versions of the errors, respectively and b is the watermark
bit.) Thereby, an interleaving approach (e.g ., adding a bin first rightward, then
leftward, and so on or vice-versa for an embeddable region) is introduced for ca-
pacity control, considering a first round embedding. This consideration, however,
is also suggestive of possible successive embedding rounds (which is referred to as
an implicit assumption in Section 5.2). To demonstrate the consequences of that
assumption, an asymptotic analysis of the HLL scheme is performed to determine
the rate of growth of running time of the scheme. Although the capacity control
is usually considered to be an integral part of E (·), it is considered separate from
E (·) to simplify the analysis.
HLL capacity control has two main parts: OUF (over-/under-flow) map con-
struction and scanning as shown Fig. 5.7. For the given I and Cp, the OUF
location map, M is constructed recursively for each pixela vector for the cur-
rent pixel and the flaga flag-bit for HS direction (e.g ., 0 for the left). The JBIG
(Joint Bi-level Image Experts Group) compression is then used: Mˆ ← JBIG (M),
where Mˆ is JBIG compressed version of M . (For more details, see [174].)
The OUF map construction and scanning have the running time of c4n ×
(c1n+ c2 log n) and c3n, respectively, where n is input sizethe total number of
pixels, and c1 to c4 are time constantsthe fixed time period taken by the set of
operations. So, the capacity control running time becomes c1c4n
2 + c2c4n log n+
c3n leading to an asymptotic upper bound O(n
2) (considering the JBIG running
time is O(log n) as being arithmetic coding based [263]). With the running time of
E (·) in O(n), the HLL scheme's embedding performance depends on its capacity
control, leading to an overall upper bound of O(n2). So, for a k-round embedding,
the running time will be in O(n2k), where even with a small value, k will severely
impact on the HLL scheme's overall performance.
It is observed that the HLL scheme can be improved by avoiding the scanning
part. Instead of using the last pixel location, it is suggested to use the length of the
payload. Therefore, the payload can be extracted using the number of bits equal
to the length, from the first (or last, depends on how it was embedded) position.
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Figure 5.7: Capacity control flow-chart of the HLL scheme. (Dotted-blocks indicate
their approximate worst-case running time. The proposed improvement
helps avoid the scanning block shown by the dotted-arrow to invoke E (·).)
With this minor implementation improvement, although the upper bound still
remains in O(n2), the running time will be reduced by c3n as evident in Fig. 5.7.
5.5.2 Analysis of the Novel Embedding Scheme
The proposed scheme is designed to provide continuous security protection of
medical images and to minimize the legal-ethical impact. That scheme embeds
payloads in the LSB (least significant bit) planes of the border pixels of input
images. A greater capacity control is targeted in terms of NBW and NLSB with
their thresholds TBW and TLSB respectively, as shown in Fig. 5.8. Here, NBW
is the number of pixels in a given border width, NLSB is the number of LSB-
163
Chapter 5. Watermarking Application to Medical Images
c6n c7n c8n
initialize
(TBW , TLSB);
NBW ← 1;
NLSB ← 1;
compute Cp
compute Ct
Ct ≥ Cp?
invoke
E (·)
NBW <
TBW ?
NBW =
NBW + 1
update
(TBW , TLSB)
NLSB <
TLSB?
NLSB =
NLSB + 1
update
(TBW , TLSB)
?
reconsider
input
c5 c6 c7 c8
n ∗ (c5 + c6 + c7 + c8)
no no noyes
yes yes no
yes
...
1
Figure 5.8: Capacity control flow-chart of the proposed scheme.
planes, and ct is calculated using Ctotal = 2NBW × (r + c− 2NBW )×NLSB. Note
that Fig. 5.8 does not explicitly show any consideration for Et as shown in the
proposed framework in Fig. 5.1. Since the proposed scheme does not consider
recursive embedding, its running time always remains in O(n). The capacity
control running time of the proposed embedding function is n× (c5 +c6 +c7 +c8),
where c5 to c8 are time constants for the steps shown in Fig. 5.8.
5.6 Experimental Results
This section presents the experimental results of validating the proposed scheme
performance for medical image applications. Several experiments have been car-
ried out to evaluate the performance of the scheme, and to compare its perfor-
mance with that of two prominent schemes namely; Tsai et al . scheme [5] (or
THY scheme) and HLL scheme [174]. Different perceptual and computational
aspects have been considered for performance evaluation. A set of 370 medical
images of different modalities (e.g ., CT, MR, X-ray, US, etc.) and of different file
formats (e.g ., DCM, DC3, JPG, BMP, etc.) is used. Image sizes ranged from
196×258 to 600×600, and image bit-depths are of 8-bit and 16-bit. A watermark
is considered as a set of binary arrays, {0, 1}+. All necessary simulations were
carried out in MATLAB (R2012a-7.140.739) using an Intel Core i5 3.2GHz CPU.
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5.6.1 Performance Evaluation
The performance of the proposed embedding scheme has been evaluated for
the complete test-set of images, with varying their border-width and bit-plane.
This helps determine the effect of increasing border-width and bit-plane lead-
ing to different capacity and distortion levels. This experiment considers the
border-width of three pixels, i.e., NBW ∈ {1, 2, 3} and all their bit-planes, i.e.,
NLSB ∈ {1, 2, · · · , 8}. Although a separate experiment (i.e., capacity control test,
see Section 5.6.3) is designed and conducted that considers higher border-with
(for the dynamic payload embedding), the results of this experiment reasonably
demonstrate the possible effect of further increasing the NBW .
As expected, it is observed that the higher the values of NBW and/or NLSB,
the higher the capacity of the proposed scheme. Interestingly, see Fig. 5.9(a), the
capacity increases more with an increase of NBW than of NLSB, for NLSB = 2
or higher. To illustrate this, consider an instance from the Fig. 5.9(a): when
NBW = 2, and NLSB = 4, capacity is approximately 15 kbits. With an increase of
only NBW by one pixel, the capacity increases to 22 kbits. Instead of doing that,
however, if only NLSB is increased by one bit plane, the capacity becomes approx-
imately 19 kbits, which is lower by 3 kbits than the previous capacity obtained
for increasing NBW . This capacity difference becomes successively higher for the
higher values of NBW and NLSB. Such an effect of increasing NBW and NLSB on
the capacity suggests that for higher capacity, one should consider increasingNBW
first up to TBW , prior to increasing NLSB to its next level as shown in Fig. 5.3.
It is also observed in Fig. 5.9(c,d) that increasing NBW for a fixed NLSB, while
gives higher capacity, causes relatively low distortion in the embedding region.
Note here that the above choice of increasing capacity in terms of NLSB and
NBW are made based on the fact illustrated in Fig. 5.9. Here, the capacity dif-
ference depends on not only the NLSB and NBW , but also the size (.e., number
pixels in rows and columns) of an image. Therefore, as Fig. 5.9 represents the
average performances of the proposed scheme for a large set of test images, the
above mentioned approach in increasing capacity should be efficient in an opera-
tional environment. Although the approach may not be always similarly efficient
for different (particularly, very low) size of medical images, it may still be useful.
However, an increase in either NBW or NLSB naturally has a negative effect
on the computational efficiency and image quality of the proposed scheme. Here,
computational efficiency is evaluated in terms of embedding time, in that higher
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Figure 5.9: Performance evaluation of the proposed scheme for increasing values of
NBW (up to 3) and NLSB (up to 8): (a) capacity (kbits), (b) embedding
time (seconds), (c) PSNR (dBs), and (d) MSSIM. (Averages are calculated
for 370 images of different modalities and sizes.)
computational complexity results in the higher embedding time, and thus an em-
bedding scheme becomes less computationally efficient. As shown in Fig. 5.9(b),
the embedding time increases for the respective increases in NBW and NLSB,
which means that the higher capacity one needs, the longer time an embedding
function takes.
On the other hand, the image quality is evaluated in terms of PSNRpeak
signal-to-noise ratio and MSSIMmean structural similarity index [264], respec-
tively. PSNR estimates the perceived errors, and thus a PSNR value does not
indicate any particular subjective quality of an image [137]. Although the rela-
tive PSNRs for different values of NBW and NLSB of the proposed scheme can be
meaningful in Fig. 5.9(c), Fig. 5.10 illustrates how PSNR fails to represent im-
age quality degradation for the proposed scheme while compared with the THY
scheme [5]. Nonetheless, with MSSIMa particularly designed metric to measure
the similarity of perceptual contentsFig. 5.9(d) illustrates a more reasonable re-
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Figure 5.10: Performance comparison of the proposed scheme with the THY scheme [5], where NBW ∈ {1, 2, 3} and NLSB = 4:
(ad) for the same size images, (eh) for the variance of same size images, (a,e) capacity (kbits), (b,f) embedding time
(seconds), (c,g) PSNR (dBs), and (d,h) MSSIM.
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lationship of image quality degradation with NBW and NLSB.
As illustrated in Fig. 5.9(d), image quality degradation for different values of
theNBW andNLSB suggests a boundary for using the number of bit-planes, NLSB.
This means that up to 4 LSB-planes, the impact on quality of the border pixels
remains barely noticeable, which gives a maximum capacity of about 23 kbits for
NBW = 3 (where, 20 kbits capacity is presumably found sufficient for the consid-
ered self-authentication objectives, i.e., the authentication and integrity verifica-
tion). (For higher capacity, however, a higher border width can be considered.)
With this consideration, the following experiment considers NBW ∈ {1, 2, 3}, and
NLSB = 4 for the performance comparison.
5.6.2 Performance Comparison
The performance of the proposed scheme is compared with the THY scheme [5].
The choice of the THY scheme is based on the fact that it has received much
attention recently for medical image applications. A set of 150 same size im-
ages of different modalities is used to compare the performance of the proposed
scheme with the THY scheme. Fig. 5.10 illustrates the performances of the both
schemes for different parameters over (i) the test set of images arranged in no
particular order in Fig. 5.10(ad), and (ii) the variance of the test set of im-
ages in Fig. 5.10(eh). In both cases, a consistent and image content invariant
characteristics of the proposed scheme for the performance parameters (e.g ., ca-
pacity, embedding time, and image quality degradation) are evident. A varying
performance of the THY scheme, in contrast, indicates that without knowing the
image modality and content, it may be difficult to know how well the scheme can
perform, although that variations are suggestive of their certain ranges. To get
an overall picture, average values of the performance parameters are also given
in Table 5.1.
The average capacity of the THY scheme is about 84 kbits as given in Table 5.1
and also shown in Fig. 5.10(a, e), which is much higher than the maximum capac-
ity level of the proposed scheme for NBW = 3, and NLSB = 4. However, unlike
the proposed scheme, any smaller size payloads than the available capacity do
not mean that the distortion level or the embedding time will be lower for the
THY scheme. (Whereas, any higher size payloads may increase the embedding
time and distortion level as discussed in Section 5.2.) Besides, it has already
been mentioned above and also in Section 5.4.1 that the proposed scheme al-
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Table 5.1: Overall Performance
Methods Capacity (kbits) Embedding Time (s) PSNR (dB) MSSIM
THY [5] 84.023 0.2951 54.87 0.9899
Proposed (NBW = 1) 7.10 0.0014 50.56 1.0000
Proposed (NBW = 2) 14.18 0.0020 47.57 1.0000
Proposed (NBW = 3) 21.22 0.0024 45.85 0.9999
lows an increasing NBW and NLSB (up to the predefined thresholds, TBW and
TLSB, depending on the constraint of other parameters) to increase the capacity.
Whereas, THY scheme does have a fixed capacity for one level embedding (and
may require re-embedding resulting in significant performance issues as discussed
in Section 5.2). The proposed scheme also takes only a few milliseconds to embed
the same size of payload as shown in Fig. 5.10(b, f), and is found to be about
one hundred times faster than the THY scheme (although the embedding time
may vary with different programming scripts of an embedding function). Simi-
larly, Fig. 5.10(d, h) indicates that the MSSIM of the proposed scheme remains
consistently higher than that of THY scheme.
Unlike MSSIM, however, Fig. 5.10(c, g) illustrates that PSNR is not a suitable
subjective quality measure as mentioned in Section 5.6.1. Particularly, for the
proposed scheme that aims at maintaining a good quality in the embedding re-
gion, while preserves the ROIs completely. This means that the proposed scheme
keeps all the pixels in the watermarked images untouched except the border pix-
els, whereas THY scheme operates on the whole image. But, for the proposed
scheme, image quality degradation in the embedding region (i.e., the border pix-
els) has quite an impact on the PSNR values. Consequently, PSNR values for the
proposed scheme are lower than that of the THY scheme. Further, the perceived
errors may vary with the perceptual content of different modality medical im-
ages. Thus, the PSNR values appear to be random even for the same embedding
locations, payload, and image size, for the proposed scheme.
Performance of a watermark embedding scheme may also significantly vary
with the medical image modalities. Image modality-wise performances for differ-
ent parameters are presented in Table 5.2, where the variation in overall perfor-
mances is observed more precisely between the proposed and THY scheme. Note
that the average values for different performance parameters are given for the test
set of 370 images of different sizes. Similar to Fig. 5.10, a relatively consistent
performance of the proposed scheme is evident in Table 5.2, irrespective of the
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Table 5.2: Image Modality-wise Performance
Image Capacity (kbits) Embedding Time (s) PSNR (dB) MSSIM Image
Modality THY [5] proposeda THY [5] proposeda THY [5] proposeda THY [5] proposeda Variance
MR 89 23 0.3328 0.0027 60.40 51.81 0.9926 0.9999 245515
CT 11 23 0.3487 0.0027 61.12 51.79 0.9899 0.9999 238763
X-ray 75 22 0.3016 0.0025 65.14 55.45 0.9914 0.9998 220982
RF 81 22 0.3158 0.0024 63.96 53.33 0.9903 0.9999 207337
US 28 21 0.2114 0.0023 94.14 80.46 0.9988 1.0000 200711
MG 10 14 0.0883 0.0014 99.37 83.66 0.9989 0.9999 93470
DSA 67 23 0.3829 0.0026 54.59 46.50 0.9941 0.9999 248410
a for NBW = 3 and NLSB = 4
image modalities.
However, the results of this experiment do not demonstrate the complete per-
formance of the proposed scheme, particularly when the payload size becomes
large. In other word, the effect of further increasing capacity for accommodat-
ing higher size payloads, which requires to increase the border-width, NBW as
well, is yet to be addressed. In a dynamic payload embedding scenario, how
the scheme would perform thus still remains unknown. Since the validation of
the performance and capacity control efficiency for the dynamic payloads require
a different experimental set-up, another experiment is designed and conducted,
which is described in the next section.
5.6.3 Capacity Control Test
The performances of the new embedding scheme and the HLL scheme [174] have
been compared for varying payload size. The experiment was carried out using
test images [3] and the result is presented for the images shown in Fig. 5.11.
Why the HLL scheme was chosen for capacity control test has already mentioned
in Section 5.5. Once again, the HLL scheme is a prominent PEE-based scheme
and offers relatively efficient capacity control considering other similar schemes.
That scheme represents a typical existing capacity control scenario as depicted
in Fig. 5.1. From the experimental results, several observations have been made,
which are discussed below.
Fig. 5.12 and 5.13: (1st column) illustrate that, unlike the proposed scheme,
where the capacity control running time remains steady and much lower, it grows
almost exponentially for the HLL scheme, with the payload size. This is expected
for the HLL scheme as the number of input image scanning (Fig. 5.12 and 5.13:
2nd column) grows exponentially with the payload size. Note that these capacity
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(a) (b) (c) (d)
Figure 5.11: Test images of size 512 × 512 × 8: (a) Aerial, (b) Mandrill, (c) Stream
and bridge, and (d) Man. (Available here [3])
control times are implementation dependent and may be different for other op-
timized implementations. However, their relative trends shown in Fig. 5.12 and
5.13 will still apply for any other implementations.
Additionally, a step pattern in the performance variation is evident both for
the HLL scheme (Fig. 5.12 and 5.13: 2nd4th column) and the proposed scheme
(Fig. 5.12 and 5.13: 3rd & 4th columns). This means that their performance,
which is dependent on the payload size, remains unchanged until the capacity
condition (i.e., Ct ≥ Cp) is satisfied. Otherwise, respective capacity parameters
are increased with a step (up/down) pattern in their performance curves. Unlike
the HLL scheme, the equal step-sizes also mean that each increment of capac-
ity parameters consistently gives a fixed amount of capacity increment for the
proposed scheme.
Note that the TBW parameter is kept fixed at 25, and TLSB is varied from 1
to 5, because it has been observed in the previous experiment (see Section 5.6.1)
that increasing the number of LSBs is more effective for meeting higher capacity
requirements. The considered payload size is ranged from 1 kbits to 215 Kbits.
Fig. 5.12 and 5.13 (3rd and 4th columns) suggests that both schemes would have
more distortion for increasing the payload size further. This would also drastically
grow the running time demonstrating the possible (severe) impact of multilevel
embedding for the HLL scheme. This is unlike the proposed scheme, where the
running time would be nearly steady with the increasing payload size.
5.7 Discussion
Digital medical images have been subject to many complex and new legal and eth-
ical issues, with their remote access and distribution in distant medical services.
Thereby, while the security need of the medical images is critical, the conven-
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Figure 5.12: Evaluation and comparison of capacity control efficacy for Aerial and Mandrill. From left, capacity control time (1st
column), number of scanning the input image (2nd column), PSNR (3rd column), and MSSIM (4th column).
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Figure 5.13: Evaluation and comparison of capacity control efficacy for Stream and bridge and Man. From left, capacity control time
(1st column), number of scanning the input image (2nd column), PSNR (3rd column), and MSSIM (4th column).
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tional security tools can fall short of providing necessary protection as discussed
in Section 2.2.3. This research has come up with a new self-authentication model
to address this problem. However, the practical development of watermarking
scheme in light of that model entails several tasks to accomplish, among which
the development of a suitable embedding scheme is considered with necessary
justification. This is demonstrated in the research presented in this chapter.
Several challenges have been identified for developing the embedding scheme,
namely: finding an efficient ROI/RONI selection technique; increasing the capac-
ity keeping the distortion at the lower level; minimizing the legal-ethical impact;
and providing continuous security to the medical images. Particularly, there are
several conflicting criteria for designing such a scheme that make this task more
than challenging. For example, addressing the embedding distortion minimiza-
tion problem, if the distortion is removed, the security protection discontinues;
if not, the legal-ethical concerns arise. Additionally, it has been argued that the
existing capacity control is more interpreted as a trade-off between capacity and
distortion requirements. However, failure to also consider the running time may
render a scheme less attractive for an application, especially if dynamic payload
embedding is a requirement.
Completely addressing all the above challenges is far from being an easy task.
However, to address them in a balanced way in this research, an irreversible
and general RONI based embedding scheme has been developed. An approach
for utilizing least significant border pixels and their least significant bit-planes
for medical image watermarking has been introduced. A new capacity control
model has been developed and considered to achieve the required capacity with
simultaneously maintaining the reduced distortion and running time. Thereby, a
new embedding scheme has been proposed for medical image applications.
The technical properties of the scheme presented in this chapter are demon-
strative of its applicability for all modality medical images. The proposed fragile,
irreversible, spatial domain, LSB based embedding thus offers a set of attractive
features to address the limitations of many other schemes. The legal and ethical
impact, ROI/RONI selection problem, discontinuity in security protection are
such a few common limitations. The proposed scheme avoids such complexities,
and maintains a good image quality in the RONI, while keeping all other pixels
untouched to minimize legal and ethical impact. Thereby, it has shown a great
promise to address the major limitations of existing schemes, for medical images.
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Performance of the scheme is evaluated and analysed, and compared with two
prominent schemes [5,174] in the literature. Observations from the evaluated per-
formance have suggested that the proposed scheme up to 50% of the border-pixels'
bit-planes can be used for embedding. The performance comparison with THY
scheme [5] has demonstrated that, unlike the THY scheme, the proposed scheme
has a consistent capacity-distortion performance for different modality medical
images. In general, the proposed scheme has a significant computational efficiency
due to mainly (i) avoiding ROI/RONI selection complexities, and (ii) having an
image-content-independent capacity. An image-content-dependent capacity can
make the prior capacity estimation and capacity control more complex for many
schemes. A prior capacity estimation and capacity control are required to manage
the embedding capacity for an increasing size payload.
To verify the effect of increasing payload size, therefore, the capacity control
problem has been demonstrated by an asymptotic analysis of the proposed scheme
and the HLL scheme [174]. The performance variations of those schemes has also
been tested for the dynamic payloads. The analysis and experimental results
have shown that the capacity control of the proposed scheme outperforms that of
the HLL scheme. The results have also demonstrated how severely an inefficient
capacity control may affect the overall performance of a scheme thus validating
the proposed capacity control model.
Moreover, since the HS-, DE-, RCM- and PEE-based schemes usually have a
similar capacity control principle, they should have more or less similar effect on
the running time, for increasing payload size as well as for recursive embedding. It
is also noted that the given results are implementation dependent, and possible
optimized implementation could give better results than what is found in this
research. However, the trends shown in the graphs (in Fig. 5.9) will apply for
any implementation.
5.8 Chapter Summary
This chapter has presented a novel watermark embedding scheme for medical
image applications. In support of developing watermarking scheme in light of the
self-authentication model (Chapter 4), the choice of developing a new efficient
embedding scheme has been justified and the relevant challenges have been spec-
ified. The method, analysis, and experiments of the developed scheme have been
presented, and its efficiency and suitability for the medical images is validated by
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the analysis and performance comparison of two prominent schemes (HLL [174]
and THY [5]). Specifically:
• The state of the medical image watermarking schemes have been reviewed
in light of the specified challenges. Thereby, the need for an efficient
ROI/RONI selection technique and complete capacity control model have
been identified.
• A new capacity control model has been developed to simultaneously con-
sider the reduced distortion and running time, while providing the required
capacity. Thereby, the existing capacity control scenario has been shown
lacking the necessary consideration of the computational complexity of an
embedding scheme.
• Considering the ROIs practically exist around the centre of any medical
images, the use of the border pixels as a general RONI has been justified
for developing an embedding scheme. Necessary assumptions are made
based on the observations and the RONI selection criteria. Allowing for
an efficient capacity control, the set of capacity parameters are defined.
Thereby, a general RONI selection approach is developed.
• A fragile, blind, irreversible, LSB-based (spatial domain) watermark em-
bedding scheme has been developed. Its implementation, technical proper-
ties and features are described to demonstrate its applicability to medical
images.
• Considering the computational aspects, the capacity control analysis and
test of the proposed scheme has been conducted and compared with the
HLL scheme, which has capacity control that closely represents the existing
capacity control scenario.
• Considering the perceptual aspects, the performance of the embedding
scheme has been evaluated and compared with the THY scheme that is
well-known for medical image application.
• Finally, it has been concluded, with the facts from the observations, analysis
and experimental results, that the proposed scheme is more suitable and
efficient, and has a great promise to address all the major limitations of
existing schemes, for the medical image application.
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Conclusions and Future Research
Chapter Organization
This chapter concludes the thesis with a summary of the presented work.
Section 6.1 summarizes the major conclusions and contributions made in
each chapter. Section 6.2 outlines a number of avenues for future research.
6.1 Conclusions
The research presented in this thesis aimed to investigate digital watermarking
to provide a systematic way for designing, analysing, and applying it, with a
particular focus on medical image security. Digital watermarking is an evolv-
ing technology, which has great promise for addressing multimedia information
security. Digital medical images, on the other hand, are the outcome of the ad-
vanced imaging technology that has enabled modern health care to seamlessly
offer many distant medical services. Thereby, with the remote access and dis-
tribution, medical images are subject to growing security threats with legal and
ethical complexities. Under this circumstance, while the security need of the
medical images is critical, the conventional tools fall short of providing necessary
protection. Digital watermarking has thus been studied to address this problem
for this research.
However, despite its great promise, digital watermarking has not been widely
adopted in practice. Existing watermarking schemes often suffer from technical
and security flaws. Validation of the suitability of those schemes for an applica-
tion becomes more challenging. One main reason for these problems is that no
standard approach is undertaken for the watermarking application. Particularly,
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several research gaps have been identified: (i) there is no known construction of
a complete or formal watermarking model that helps identify and evaluate the
state-of-the-art watermarking scheme(s) for an application(s); (ii) watermarking
properties are not well defined and some of them (e.g ., robustness, security) are
naturally misinterpreted in practice; (iii) security levels of existing watermarking
schemes are mostly unknown; and for medical image applications, (iv) require-
ments for the watermarking of medical images are not well defined; and (v) there
is no watermark embedding scheme available which is equally suitable for different
modalities of medical images.
In addressing the gaps, a number of original contributions have been made and
presented in this thesis. This research has started with a comprehensive literature
review on digital watermarking schemes and their applications to medical images
(Chapter 2). Thereby the research gaps have been verified, which has led this
research to come up with the following main contributions:
• A novel formal generic watermarking model for digital image applications
has then been developed (Section 3.3). The novelty of the watermarking
model has been verified by a comprehensive comparative study of literature
(Section 3.2 and 3.3.3). The existing models are not generic (i.e., water-
marking scheme specific) and thus have the common limitations: (i) incom-
plete consideration of inputs, outputs, and functions, (ii) lack of definitions
for the watermarking properties, and (iii) incomplete realization of the ap-
plication scenarios. Therefore the general watermarking principle has for-
mally been conceptualized in this thesis by developing a generic watermark-
ing model for the image applications, in terms of necessary inputs, outputs,
and component functions. Additionally, more complete definitions of the
fundamental watermarking properties have been given using the presented
watermarking model, which help contextualize the usual literal meaning of
the properties for the image applications. Expected watermarking attacks
have also been defined that represent their general context for identifying
security requirements of image applications. The significance and effective-
ness of the presented watermarking model has thus been demonstrated by
showing its uses in formally defining fundamental watermarking definitions
(Section 3.4) and expected attacks on watermarking security (Section 3.5),
and in analysing the security of watermarking schemes (Chapter 4).
• In support of a dedicated security analysis of self-authentication schemes
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and to demonstrate another use of the presented formal generic watermark-
ing model, three new counterfeiting attack models have been developed
(Section 4.4). It has been reported that irrespective of the levels of robust-
ness (i.e., robust, fragile, semi-fragile), a watermarking scheme must have
a separate consideration of security requirements (Section 4.2). The nov-
elty of the presented counterfeiting attacks have been demonstrated in light
of the exiting attacks (Section 4.3). When existing attacks represent par-
ticular instances of counterfeiting scenarios, the new counterfeiting attacks
have been shown to capture all possible counterfeiting instances in three
levels of modification of a watermarked image (Section 4.5). Applicability
of the attacks have been validated for two relevant schemes (Section 4.6).
Thereby, the presented security analysis have shown the self-authentication
schemes to violate the systematic definition of the security.
• To avoid the identified security problems, a new self-authentication model
has been presented (Section 4.7). A set of requirements of the self-au-
thentication schemes have been outlined and self-authentication objectives
have been separated and prioritised for logical development of the model.
Guiding principles of using the conventional security tools have been pre-
sented. Thereby, a new construction of the self-authentication model has
been proposed to attain the identified requirements and objectives, and to
thus resist the proposed counterfeiting attacks. Developing a self-authen-
tication scheme according to the presented self-authentication model has
further entailed several tasks to address (Section 4.8). One of the main
tasks pointed out has been to find an efficient embedding scheme for the
medical image applications.
• A novel efficient watermark embedding scheme is then developed for medi-
cal image application (Section 5.4). The choice of developing an embedding
scheme has been justified and the relevant challenges have been specified
(Section 5.1). With determining the state of the medical image watermark-
ing schemes, the lack of efficient ROI/RONI selection and more complete
capacity control processes have been identified (Section 5.2). The existing
capacity control scenario has been shown lacking the necessary consider-
ation of the computational complexity of an embedding scheme. A new
capacity control model has therefore been developed to simultaneously con-
sider the reduced distortion and running time, while providing the required
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capacity (Section 5.3). Additionally, considering the ROIs that practically
exist around the centre of any medical images, the use of the border pixels
as a general RONI has been justified for developing an embedding scheme.
Thus, a simple and general RONI selection process has been shown to avoid
the current complexity of segmentation, and to allow modality independent
embedding. Using the novel capacity control and general RONI selection
approaches, a fragile, blind, irreversible, LSB-based (spatial domain) wa-
termark embedding scheme has been developed and validated by asymp-
totic analysis and comparing the performance with two prominent schemes,
namely the THY and HLL schemes (Section 5.5 and 5.6).
This research, with the above mentioned contributions, advances knowledge in
the area of digital image watermarking and its applications. Developing a formal
generic watermarking model, and defining fundamental parameters and possible
attacks presented in this thesis, are the first steps toward a unified and intuitive
watermarking theory. The developed model would allow a unified treatment of
all practically meaningful variants of digital image watermarking schemes. The
developed new attack models and their uses in rigorously analysing security of
watermarking schemes can be used as principles to determine the security levels
of watermarking schemes. The watermark embedding scheme for medical images
and its validation create knowledge of an efficient embedding approach, which
can be used for different applications such as content authentication, annotation,
etc. Further, the generalized notion of watermarking capacity control and the
use of asymptotic analysis for studying computational aspects of watermarking
schemes would create a new era in watermarking research. This would also pro-
mote necessary awareness for considering computational aspects in addition to
the conventional (i.e., only the distortion and capacity) performance evaluation
process for validating a watermarking scheme.
In summary, the findings, theoretical development and analyses, and experi-
mental evidence of this research represent a comprehensive source of information,
which can be assimilated and disseminated towards standardizing future research
in formal modelling, complete security analysis and computational aspects, of
watermarking schemes.
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6.2 Future Challenges
A number of possible avenues for future research have been identified. These are
summarized below.
• Further development and validation of the formal watermarking model
could be an interesting area for future research. Although we believe that
our model captures the fundamental properties of prominent schemes pro-
posed today, there may be certain applications which have different inputs
and outputs from those defined in our model. Therefore, the future devel-
opments may focus on an even more general model.
• Formal treatment of self-authentication schemes as a watermarking primi-
tive, which may include formally defining a self-authentication scheme and
its requirements, analysis of the existing state-of-the-art constructions, de-
veloping attack models for broad application scenarios etc. This will help
generate a methodological knowledge to know the strengths and weaknesses
of the schemes, to determine their security levels, and thereby to choose an
appropriate scheme for an application, would be easier and systematic.
• This research has identified that the computational aspects in watermarking
has not been well addressed. The developed capacity control model and
given asymptotic analysis approach can be further applied to determine the
computational complexity of the existing and new schemes.
• Exploring suitable feature extraction functions is another requirement for
the practical development of self-authentication (and also other similar)
schemes. This may include a further study on the following as mentioned
in Section 5.1.1: (i) the required properties of the features (ii) validation of
the chosen feature extraction function(s) (iii) security analysis for ensuring
that the considered function(s) does not possess any properties that may
cause security problem.
• Key management and mapping function of the the proposed self-authen-
tication scheme has not been addressed in this research. An investigation
is necessary for addressing the generation, exchange, storage, use and re-
placement of the keys used for the scheme. Such an investigation would
address the necessary considerations of the system policy, user training,
organizational and departmental interactions. It would also address the
co-ordination among all of these elements.
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Appendix A
Proof of Statements
We recall here our defined sets and their relations as discussed in Section 4.2.3.
S and R are the sets of `security requirements' and `robustness requirements'
respectively in the requirement space, P such that, S ⊂ P , R ⊂ P , S 6= φ, and
R 6= φ. The set Q ∆= S ∩ R represents the mutual requirements that can be
attainable by either S or R.
A.1 Statement 4.1
Statement. The mutual requirements, Q = S∩R do not help attain the complete
security requirements, S in the requirement space, P such that S 6= Q.
Proof. We have S 6= φ, R 6= φ, S 6= R, and thus S −R 6= φ. Here,
S −R = S ∩R′ (complement law, where R′ = P −R)
= (S ∩ S ′) ∪ (S ∩R′) (since S ∩ S ′ = φ by complement law)
= S ∩ (S ′ ∪R′) (distributive law)
= S ∩ (S ∩R)′ (DeMorgan's law)
= S ∩Q′ (where Q = S ∩R)
= S −Q (complement law)
which gives,
S −Q 6= φ (since S −R 6= φ)
⇒ S 6= Q
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A.2 Statement 4.2
Statement. If the requirements of robustness, R are completely attained, the
security requirements, S are partially fulfilled such that R 6= R− S.
Proof. We have S 6= φ, R 6= φ, and Q = S ∩R 6= φ. Here,
S ∩R = (R ∩R′) ∪ (S ∩R) (since R ∩R′ = φ by
complement law:
R′ = P −R)
= R ∩ (R′ ∪ S) (distributive law)
= R− (R′ ∪ S)′ (complement law)
= R− (R ∩ S ′) (DeMorgan's law)
= R− (R− S) (complement law)
Thus we have, R− (R− S) 6= φ (since S ∩R 6= φ)
⇒ R 6= (R− S)
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A.3 Statement 4.3
Statement. The security requirements, S cannot be completely attained either by
completely or partially attaining the requirements of robustness, R or vice versa
in an application scenario such that S 6= Q ∪ (R− S) and R 6= Q ∪ (S −R).
Proof. We have S 6= φ, R 6= φ, Q = S ∩R 6= φ, and S 6= R. Here,
R = R ∩ P (identity law)
= R ∩ (S ∪ S ′) (complement law)
= (R ∩ S) ∪ (R ∩ S ′) (distributive law)
= (S ∩R) ∪ (R ∩ S ′) (communicative law)
= Q ∪ (R ∩ S ′) (since Q = S ∩R)
= Q ∪ (R− S) (complement law)
which gives,
S 6= R
⇒ S 6= Q ∪ (R− S)
Similarly,
S = S ∩ P (identity law)
= S ∩ (R ∪R′) (complement law)
= (S ∩R) ∪ (S ∩R′) (distributive law)
= Q ∪ (S ∩R′) (since Q = S ∩R)
= Q ∪ (S −R) (complement law)
which gives,
R 6= S
⇒ R 6= Q ∪ (S −R)
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Appendix B
Model of ZF Scheme
To fit with our defined general watermarking model, we describe the ZF scheme
with three fundamental components: watermark generation, zfG (·), embedding,
zfE (·), and detection, zfD (·). This would help realize the scheme from an
abstract level to perform a systematic security analysis considering the proposed
attack models (Section4.4).
The ZF scheme defines an original image, i ∈ I of size M ×N , and its f (x, y)
is of 8-bit. Here, it can be noted that the ZF Scheme needs to be updated
accordingly for the images of grey-level other than 8-bit. The functions of the
scheme are described below and defined in Model B.1, B.2 and B.3.
Key (·). A embedding key, e is generated from the original image, i such that
Key (i) = e, whereKey (·) randomly returns a prime number from {1, 2, · · · , Nb},
and thus {e} ⊂ {1, 2, · · · , Nb}, where, Nb =
(
M
8
× N
8
)
. In detection, D (·), a
detection key, d is used as d = e, which makes the scheme `private'.
Watermark Generation, zfG (·). A watermark, w is generated from i, the
original image such that zfG (i) = w. In watermark generation, i is divided into
non-overlapping 8 × 8 blocks and each of this block is also divided into 4 × 4
non-overlapping sub-blocks such that i = {Bn} =
{
Bln
}
, where l = {1, · · · , 4}
for all n = {1, 2, · · · , Nb}. Here, l and n is used to denote the index of 4 × 4
sub-blocks and 8 × 8 blocks respectively, and will be used accordingly for other
notations. Thus, {Bn} and
{
Bln
}
represent 8× 8 blocks and corresponding 4× 4
sub-blocks respectively. We also denote Bn0 and B
l
n0 as the LSB zero version (i.e.,
all LSBs are set to zero) of respective Bn and B
l
n, which is done by LSB0 (·) as
shown in Model B.1. For all l and n, vln , p
l
n and r
l
n are the 1-bit intensity
authentication watermark, 1-bit parity watermark, and 7-bit intensity recovery
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watermark respectively calculated from Bln. Thus, the generated watermark from{
Bln
}
is 3-tuple such that w =
{
vln, p
l
n, r
l
n
}
.
Watermark Embedding, zfE (·). The indexes of 8×8 blocks, n are one-to-one
mapped to the indexes, q such that q = [(e× n) mod Nb]+1, for all n. Thus, Bq
represents the mapped 8× 8 block of Bn, and Blq represents the associated 4× 4
sub-blocks of Bq. As Model B.2 presents, watermarked image, i¯ ∈ I¯ is obtained
by embedding w in the LSBs of 4× 4 sub-blocks such that zfEe (i, w) = i¯. That
is, zfEe :
{
Bln
}×{vln, pln, rln}→ {B¯ln}, for all l and n, where B¯ln is the 4×4 sub-
block of i¯. We note that an individual block, Bln is watermarked with
(
vln, p
l
n, r
l
q
)
as defined in ZF scheme, where rlq is the intensity recovery watermark of B
l
q, the
mapped block of Bln. However, for simplicity, we assume here that zfE (·) obtains
the mapping sequence using the embedding key and maps the intensity recovery
watermark (i.e., from rln to r
l
q) inherently prior to embed them in B
l
n. Thus,
zfEe :
{
Bln
} × {vln, pln, rln} ≡ Embed : {Bln} × {vln, pln, rlq} = {B¯ln}. Embed (·)
is a function (used in our Getmap (·) and described in Section 4.4.1) that only
embeds the given watermark into image without knowing any mapping sequence
or key.
Watermark Detection, zfD (·). The function, zfD (·) operates on i¯ to output
a verified image, iˆ and an estimated image, i˜ such that zfDd (¯i) =
(
iˆ, i˜
)
. In case
of un-tampered image, the verified image is null (i.e., an empty set of pixels),
and the estimated image is same as the given input image such that iˆ = φ and
i˜ = i¯. Otherwise, iˆ shows the tampered blocks of the i¯, and possible recovery of
those blocks are made by yielding respective i˜. ZF scheme describes this in three
levels of detection as shown in Model B.3.
Here, the original watermark is extracted from i¯ such as zfE−1d (¯i) = w.
That is, zfE−1d :
{
Bln
} → {vln, pln, rln}, for all l and n. On the other hand, the
watermark, w˜ is regenerated from i¯ such as zfG (¯i) = w˜, that is zfG
{
B¯ln
} →{
v˜ln, p˜
l
n, r˜
l
n
}
for all l and n. We denote the verified version of 8 × 8 blocks and
4× 4 sub-blocks as tampered with a `hat' accent such that Bˆn and Bˆln represents
the tampered version of the B¯n and B¯
l
n respectively.
In the first level of detection, original and regenerated versions of intensity
authentication watermark, vln and parity watermark, p
l
n are compared, and B
l
n is
verified as tampered (i.e., Bˆln ← Bln) for any mismatch.
In the second level of detection, for any tampered sub-blocks, corresponding
image blocks are marked tampered. That is if Bˆln exists, Bˆn ← B¯n for all Bˆln.
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In the third level of detection, original and regenerated versions of intensity
recovery watermark, rln and r˜
l
n are compared. The blocks which remain valid (or
un-tampered) after the first and second levels of detection are only considered for
this level of detection.
From the above levels of detection, zfDd (·) returns the verified and estimated
version of the input watermarked image such that zfDd (¯i) =
(
iˆ, i˜
)
. Here,
iˆ =
φ, if
{
vln, p
l
n, r
l
n
} ∩ {v˜ln, p˜ln, r˜ln} = φ{
Bˆn1
}
∪ {B¯n−n1} , otherwise, where n1 ⊂ n
and
i˜ =
 i¯, if iˆ = φ{B˜n1} ∪ {B¯n−n1} , otherwise, where n1 ⊂ n
If no tampered block is found, zfDd (·) ends computation with the output of
estimated image same as the watermarked image. Otherwise, iˆ =
{
Bˆn1 , B¯n−n1
}
is returned, and zfDd (·) goes to the recovery part to output the estimated image.
The recovery part operates only on the tampered sub-block, Bˆln and its
{
rln
}
,
if Bˆlq does not exist (i.e., B¯
l
q is not tampered, since r
l
n is embedded in B
l
q). The
8-bit mean pixel value for a tampered sub-block is calculated from its 7-bit rln by
padding a zero at the end, which is done by GetP ix (·) as shown in Model B.4.
Thus, all the pixels of Bˆln are replaced with the value calculated from r
l
n to output
B˜ln, such that i˜ =
{
B˜n1
}
∪ {B¯n−n1}. Here, i˜ is the estimated image containing
the estimated blocks, B˜n1 and the other intact watermarked blocks, B¯n−n1 , where
n1 ⊂ n.
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B.1 Watermark Generation
Model B.1 ZF Scheme [6]: Watermark Generation, zfG (·)
Input: original image, i =
{
Bln
}
.
Output: original watermark, w =
{
wln
}
=
{
vln, p
l
n, r
l
n
}
.
Begin
1: for all n and l do
2: {Bn0} ← LSB0 : {Bn} . LSB0 (·) reset (to 0) the LSB
bit-plane of the input blocks
3:
{
Bln0
}← LSB0 : {Bln}
4:
{
vln, p
l
n, r
l
n
}← G : {Bln0} , where
vln =
{
1, if mean
(
Bln0
) ≥ mean (Bn0)
0, otherwise
pln =
{
1, for an odd parity of mean
(
Bln0
)
0, otherwise
rln = 7 MSBs of mean
(
Bln0
)
, and
mean (·) is an averaging function
5: end for
6: return
{
wln
}← {vln, pln, rln}
End
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Model B.2 ZF Scheme [6]: Watermark Embedding, zfE (·)
Input: (i) original image, i =
{
Bln
}
;
(ii) original watermark, w =
{
vln, p
l
n, r
l
n
}
;
(iii) embedding key, e.
Output: watermarked image, i¯ =
{
B¯ln
}
.
Begin
1: mapped index, q ← [(e× n) mod Nb] + 1
2: for all n and l do
3: B¯ln ← Embed
(
Bln,
(
vln, p
l
n, r
l
q
))
4: end for
5: return i¯← {B¯ln}
End
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B.3 Watermark Detection
Model B.3 ZF Scheme [6]: Watermark Detection, zfD (·)
Input: (i) watermarked image, i¯ =
{
B¯ln
}
;
(ii) detection key, d.
Output: (i) verified image, iˆ =
{
Bˆln
}
;
(ii) estimated image, i˜ =
{
B˜ln
}
.
Begin
1: get mapped index, q ← [(e× n) mod Nb] + 1
Begin Part `detection'
2: for all n and l do
3: originally embedded watermark,
(
vln, p
l
n, r
l
n
)← zfE−1d (B¯ln)
4: regenerated watermark,
(
v˜ln, p˜
l
n, r˜
l
n
)← zfG (B¯ln)
5: if
{
vln, p
l
n
} ∩ {v˜ln, p˜ln} 6= φ then . 1st level of detection
6:
{
Bˆln
}
← {B¯ln}
7: end if
8: if B¯ln = Bˆ
l
n then . 2nd level of detection
9: Bˆn ← B¯n
10: end if
11: if B¯ln /∈ Bˆn & B¯lq /∈ Bˆq &
{
rln
}∩{r˜ln} 6= φ then . 3rd level of
detection
12: Bˆln ← B¯ln
13: end if
14: if
{
Bˆn
}
= φ then . image is not tampered
15: return iˆ← φ
16: return i˜← {B¯ln}
17: else . image is tampered
18: iˆ←
{
Bˆn1
}
∪ {B¯n−n1}, where n1 ⊂ n
19: go to `recovery'
20: end if
21: end for
End Part `detection' . recovery part continued on next page.
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Model B.4 ZF Scheme [6]: zfD (·) recovery part
Begin Partrecovery
22: for all n and l do
23: if B¯ln = Bˆ
l
n & B¯
l
q 6= Bˆlq then
24: B˜ln ← GetP ix :
{
rln
}
. GetP ix (·) constructs a pixel from
its input recovery watermark by
padding additional zeros, and outputs
a block having all pixels equal to the
constructed pixel.
25: i˜←
{
B˜n1
}
∪ {B¯n−n1}
26: end if
27: end for
28: return i˜
End Partrecovery
End
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Appendix C
Model of ESC Scheme
We describe here the ESC scheme with three fundamental components: water-
mark generation, escG (·), embedding, escE (·), and detection, escD (·), as done
in Appendix B for the ZF scheme. This model represents the technical details
of ESC scheme from an abstract level, which helps demonstrate and realize the
scheme systematically.
The ESC scheme considers a host image of size M ×M , where M is multiple
of 2. The image is divided into 2× 2 non-overlapping blocks. For the set of block
indexes, n = {1, 2, · · ·N}, a set of mapped block indexes q = {(k × n) mod N}
is calculated, where N = M
2
× M
2
and k is a secret key chosen as a prime number
from the range of [2, N − 1]. The mapped block indexes are rearranged by a
`block-shift' operation, BlockShift (·) that shift a mapped block to the right half
of the original image block, if the mapped block belongs to the left half of the
original image block. Similarly, a mapped block index, whose pixels reside in
the right half of the original block, is shifted to the left. Thus, a block-shifted
version of q is obtained, which we denote by qq. BlockShift (·) is presented in
Model C.1.
Watermark Generation, escG (·). The ESC scheme generates 12-bit water-
mark for each block from 10-bit feature of a pair of blocks and 2-bit CRC. The
10-bit feature include 5-bit features of individual blocks. Three LSBs of each 8-bit
pixel in the blocks are reset to zero. Then average of the LSB-zero version pixels
for each block is calculated. The 5 MSBs of this average pixel is the 5-bit feature
of an image block. Now, two 5-bit features of two blocks, Bindex and Bindex+N
2
are
concatenated to get the 10-bit feature of a block pair, where index ∈ {1, · · · , N
2
}
as shown in Step 2 to Step 6 in the Model C.2. With a secret CRC polynomial
197
Appendix C. Model of ESC Scheme
of degree-2, 2-bit CRC is calculated for each 10-bit feature, which is later con-
catenated with respective 10-bit feature to form a 12-bit watermark, windex as
shown in Step 7. Thus, windex becomes the watermark for the block pair Bindex
and Bindex+N
2
and two copies of the watermark, windex are embedded in respective
mapped block pair. Thus, to construct a set of such a dual watermarks, another
copy of {windex} is produced and both of them are concatenated together for the
mapped block pairs as shown in Step 9 to Step 12. Finally 3-bit watermark,
wlindex for each pixels in a block, B
l
index is generated for all index ∈ n such that{
wlindex
}← escG : {Blindex}× CRCpoly.
Watermark Embedding, escE (·). In the ESC scheme, escEk (·) first generates
the lookup table qq from the set of block indexes, n and the secret key, k. As
discussed above and shown in Step 1 in Model C.3, BlockShift (·) helps obtain
the lookup table. Once this secret mapping sequence is obtained, generated
watermark,
{
wln
}
of the image blocks,
{
Bln
}
are embedded in their mapped
blocks
{
Blqq
}
. Here, for all index ∈ {1, · · · , N
2
}
, we have windex = windex+N
2
. The
watermark pair,
(
windex, windexN
2
)
is embedded in the mapped blocks Bqqindex
and Bqqindex+N
2
, where qqindex ∈ qq is the mapped index of index. Thus the
watermarked image, i¯ =
{
B¯ln
}
is obtained such that
{
B¯ln
} ← escEk : {Bln} ×{
wln
}
.
Watermark Detection, escD (·). The ESC scheme finds the tampered blocks
in four different levels as shown in Model C.4. The scheme first regenerates
the secret lookup table, qq using BlockShift (·) as used in escG (·). Embedded
watermarks are extracted and another set of watermarks are regenerated from
the input watermarked image, i¯ as shown in Step 2 to Step 7 in the model.
First level of detection is based on CRC verification. With the secret CRC
polynomial of degree 2, CRCpoly, extracted watermarks are verified. Since for
an authentic image block, CRC verification ends with zero (as the remainder of
the division). However, for any modification it should return a non-zero value,
for which the input block is marked as tampered block, Bˆindex for any index ∈ n.
In next two level of detections, the ESC scheme considers the number of
tampered blocks in 3 × 3 and 5 × 5 neighbourhood of an un-tampered block.
If total number of tampered blocks in a given neighbourhood of an input block
exceeds the predefined threshold, the input block is marked as tampered. Here,
two different threshold values are used for an individual neighbourhood of the
input blocks; one for the border line blocks and another is for any other blocks.
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For example, for a 3×3 neighbourhood, threshold values are (3, 5), where 3 is the
threshold (i.e., maximum number of tampered blocks in the neighbourhood) of
any borderline blocks, where 5 is the threshold for other blocks (i.e., that do not
reside in the borderline). Similarly, for a 5×5 neighbourhood, the threshold values
used are (8, 13). As shown in Step 13 to Step 18 of the model, this verification is
done by NebrCheck (·).
Fourth level of detection in ESC scheme verifies whether any tampered block is
left undetected, and corrects the set of tampered blocks, if an un-tampered block
is erroneously marked as tampered. To do this, extracted watermarks {wn} are
divided into two halves giving two sets of watermarks. Each set of watermarks
represents two different version considering two-halves of the mapped block in-
dexes, which should be identical if no block is tampered. We may recall here the
watermark generation and embedding of the ESC scheme. For extracting, inverse
of embedding function, escE−1k (·) is used, and for regenerating the watermarks,
generation function, escG (·) is used. Thus, {wn} = windex and windex+N
2
, for all
index ∈ {1, · · · , N
2
}
. Then from all windex and windex+N
2
, two sets of 5-bit feature,
{1h_avg_Bn} and {2h_avg_Bn} of each block are obtained.
Similarly,
{
1h_avg_B˜n
}
and
{
2h_avg_B˜n
}
, another two sets of 5-bit fea-
ture, are obtained from the regenerated watermark, {w˜n} = w˜index and w˜index+N
2
,
for all index ∈ {1, · · · , N
2
}
. For all un-tampered mapped block, B¯n /∈
{
Bˆn
}
,
the original 5-bit feature is compared with the 5-bit feature obtained from regen-
erated watermark. Here, for any mismatch, B¯index for all index ∈ n is marked
as a tampered block, i.e.,
{
Bˆn
}
← B¯index. Otherwise, if the block is already
marked as tampered, i.e., Bˆindex exists, then the block is marked as valid, i.e.,
Bˆindex ← φ. After detection in above four levels, escDk (·) recovers any tam-
pered block, and returns a verified image, iˆ and an estimated image, i˜. That is:
escDk (¯i, CRCpoly) =
(
iˆ, i˜
)
, where
iˆ =
φ, if
{
Bˆn
}
= φ{
Bˆn1
}
∪ {B¯n−n1} , otherwise, where n1 ⊂ n
and
i˜ =
 i¯, if iˆ = φ{B˜n1} ∪ {B¯n−n1} , otherwise, where n1 ⊂ n
199
Appendix C. Model of ESC Scheme
Like ZF and other image authentication schemes, escDk (·) ends with the
output of estimated image same as the given watermarked image if no tampered
block is found. Otherwise, escDk (·) returns iˆ =
{
Bˆn1 , B¯n−n1
}
and goes to the
recovery part to output the estimated image,
{
B˜n1
}
∪ {B¯n−n1}.
In recovery part, for any tampered block indexes, n1, ESC scheme recon-
structs the tampered blocks from the 5-bit feature extracted from an un-tampered
mapped block. As used in zfD (·), the GetP ix (·) helps obtain a recovered block,{
B˜n1
}
from its feature-bit. Here, GetP ix (·) pads additional zeros to get a pixel,
and replaces all the pixels in a block with the new pixel.
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Model C.1 BlockShift
Input: (i) set of image block indexes, n =
{
1, 2, · · · (M
2
× M
2
)}
;
(ii) secret key, k.
Output: lookup table, qq (set of the block-shifted version of the mapped block
indexes).
Begin
1: q ← {(k × n) mod N} . N = M
2
× M
2
and M ×M is the image size.
2: for all index ∈ q do
3: if index /∈ nleft then
4: qqright ← index
5: else
6: qqleft ← index, where
nleft =
{
k1
M
2
+ 1, · · · , (2k1 + 1) M
4
}
and
nright =
{
(2k1 + 1)
M
4
+ 1, · · · , (k1 + 1) M
2
}
for all k1 =
{
0, 1, · · · ,
(
M
2
− 1
)}
7: end if
8: end for
9: return qq ← qqleft||qqright . Concatenation of the sets qqleft and qqright
(each of size M
4
× M
4
) to form a matrix of
size M
2
× M
2
End
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C.1 Watermark Generation
Model C.2 ESC Scheme [7]: Watermark Generation, escG (·)
Input: (i) original image, i =
{
Bln
}
, where n =
{
1, 2, · · · (M
2
× M
2
)}
and l = {1, 2, 3, 4};
(ii) secret CRC polynomial of degree 2, CRCpoly.
Output: watermark, w =
{
wln
}
;
Begin
1: for all index ∈ n and l = {1, 2, 3, 4} do
2: Blindex0 ← 3LSB0
(
Blindex
)
. 3LSB0 (·) resets (to zero) three LSBs of
all pixels in the input block.
3: avg_Bindex ← 5MSBs
(
mean
(
Blindex0
))
. 5MSBs (·) returns five
MSBs of the input pixel.
4: avg_Bindex+N
2
← 5MSBs
(
mean
(
Bl
index0+N
2
))
. N = M
2
× M
2
, and mean (·) returns average or
arithmetic mean of pixels in the input block.
5: end for
6: for all index ∈ n do
7: 10bit_feature← (avg_Bindex) ||
(
avg_Bindex+N
2
)
. Concatenation of two 5-bit features of two blocks to get a 10-bit feature.
8: temp_windex∈{1,··· ,N2 } ← 10bit_feature ||
CRC2 (10bit_feature, CRCpoly)
. CRC2 (·) returns 2-bit CRC, which is concatenated with
10-bit feature to get 12-bit watermark for a block-pair.
9: end for
10: for all index ∈ {1, · · · , N
2
}
do
11: windex ← temp_windex
12: windex+N
2
← temp_windex
. the watermarks, wlindex and windex+N
2
are same and are to be
embedded in the mapped blocks of Blindex and B
l
index+N
2
.
13: end for
14: return w =
{
wln
}
End
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Model C.3 ESC Scheme [7]: Watermark Embedding, escE (·)
Input: (i) original image, i =
{
Bln
}
, where n =
{
1, 2, · · · (M
2
× M
2
)}
and
l = {1, 2, 3, 4};
(ii) original watermark, w =
{
wln
}
;
(iii) secret key, k.
Output: watermarked image, i¯ =
{
B¯ln
}
.
Begin
1: qq ← BlockShift (n, k)
2: for all n and l do
3: B¯lqq ← Embed
(
Blqq, w
l
n
)
4: end for
5: return i¯← {B¯ln}
End
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C.3 Watermark Detection
Model C.4 ESC Scheme [7]: Watermark Detection, escD (·)
Input: (i) watermarked image, i¯ =
{
B¯ln
}
, where n =
{
1, 2, · · · (M
2
× M
2
)}
and
l = {1, 2, 3, 4};
(ii) secret key, k ;
(iii) secret CRC polynomial of degree 2, CRCpoly.
Output: (i) verified image, iˆ; (ii) estimated image, i˜.
Begin
1: qq ← BlockShift (n, k) . lookup table construction
2: for all qq and l do . original watermark extraction
3: wln ← escE−1k
(
B¯lqq
)
4: end for
5: for all n and l do . watermark regeneration
6: w˜ln ← escG
(
B¯lqq, CRCpoly
)
7: end for
8: for all index ∈ n do . first level of detection
9: if CRC2 (windex, CRCpoly) 6= 0 then
10: Bˆqqindex ← B¯qqindex . where qqindex is the mapped index of index
such that qqindex ∈ qq
11: end if
12: end for
13: for all B¯n /∈
{
Bˆn
}
do . second level of detection
14: Bˆn ← NebrCheck
(
3× 3, B¯n, T3×3
)
. NebrCheck
(
dim, B¯n, Tdim
)
returns the input block, B¯n if total
number of tampered blocks in its dim ∈ {3× 3, 5× 5}
neighbourhood exceeds the threshold, Tdim. Here, T3×3 = (3, 5)
for dim = (3× 3) and T3×3 = (8, 13) for dim = (5× 5) where the
first value in each pair is for the blocks that reside in the
borderline, and the second value is for all other blocks.
15: end for
16: for all B¯n /∈
{
Bˆn
}
do . third level of detection
17: Bˆn ← NebrCheck
(
5× 5, B¯n, T5×5
)
18: end for
. see `continued part1' on next page.
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Model C.5 ESC Scheme [7]: escD (·) continued part 1
19: for all index ∈ {1, · · · , N
2
}
do . extracting 5-bit feature of each block
from the watermark of the 1st half blocks
20:
(
1h_avg_Bindex, 1h_avg_Bindex+N
2
)
← extract (windex)
. extract (·) returns a pair of 5-bit feature of
the partner blocks from the watermark.
21:
(
1h_avg_B˜index, 1h_avg_B˜index+N
2
)
← extract (w˜index)
22: end for
23: for all index ∈ {N
2
+ 1, · · · , N} do . extracting 5-bit feature of each
block from the 2nd half blocks'
watermarks
24:
(
2h_avg_Bindex−N
2
, 2h_avg_Bindex
)
← extract (windex)
25:
(
2h_avg_B˜index−N
2
, 2h_avg_B˜index
)
← extract (w˜index)
26: end for
27: for all index ∈ n do . fourth level of detection
28: find qqindex ∈ qq . mapped index of index
29: if B¯qqindex /∈
{
Bˆn
}
&
(
1h_avg_Bindex 6= 1h_avg_B˜index
)
OR
B¯qqindex+N
2
/∈
{
Bˆn
}
&
(
2h_avg_Bindex 6= 2h_avg_B˜index
)
then
30: Bˆindex ← B¯index
31: else if B¯index ∈
{
Bˆn
}
then
32: Bˆindex ← φ
33: end if
34: end for
35: if
{
Bˆn
}
= φ then . image is not tampered
36: return iˆ← φ
37: return i˜← {B¯n}
38: else . image is tampered and go for recovery
39: iˆ←
{
Bˆn1
}
∪ {B¯n−n1} . n1 is the set of tampered block indexes
40: for all index ∈ n1 do
41: . see `continued part2' on next page.
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Model C.6 ESC Scheme [7]: escD (·) continued part 2
42: if index ∈ {1, · · · , N
2
}
then
43: if Bqqindex /∈
{
Bˆn
}
then . where qqindex is the mapped index
of index such that qqindex ∈ qq
44: B˜index ← GetP ix (1h_avg_Bindex)
45: else if Bqqindex+N
2
/∈
{
Bˆn
}
then
46: B˜index ← GetP ix (2h_avg_Bindex)
47: end if
48: else
49: if Bqqindex /∈
{
Bˆn
}
then
50: B˜index ← GetP ix (2h_avg_Bindex)
51: else if Bqqindex−N
2
/∈
{
Bˆn
}
then
52: B˜index ← GetP ix (1h_avg_Bindex)
53: end if
54: end if
55: end for
56: end if
End
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of RONI Pixels for Medical Image Watermarking, in Proceedings of the 15th
International Conference on Digital Image Computing: Techniques and Applica-
tions (DICTA'13), IEEE, 2013, pp. 18.
D.3 H. Nyeem, W. Boles, and C. Boyd, On the Robustness and Security
of Digital Image Watermarking, in Proceedings of International Conference on
Informatics, Electronics & Vision (ICIEV'12), IEEE, 2012, pp. 1136-1141.
D.4 H. Nyeem, W. Boles, and C. Boyd, Developing a Digital Image Water-
marking Model in Proceedings of the 13th International Conference on Digital
Image Computing: Techniques and Applications (DICTA'11), IEEE, 2011, pp.
468-473
D.5 H. Nyeem, W. Boles, and C. Boyd, Capacity Control in Fragile Water-
marking Schemes, To be submitted to the 40th IEEE International Conference
on Acoustics, Speech and Signal Processing (ICASSP) 2015
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Journal Papers:
D.6 H. Nyeem, W. Boles, and C. Boyd, A Review of Medical Image Water-
marking Requirements for Teleradiology, Journal of Digital Imaging, vol. 26,
no. 2, pp. 326-343, Springer, 2013.
D.7 H. Nyeem, W. Boles, and C. Boyd, Digital Image Watermarking: A For-
mal Model, Fundamental Properties, and Possible Attacks, EURASIP Journal
on Advances in Signal Processing, Springer. (awaiting editorial decision)
D.8 H. Nyeem, W. Boles, and C. Boyd, Counterfeiting Attacks, Countermea-
sures and Future Challenges: Developing a Secure Self-Authentication Water-
marking Model, Multimedia Tools and Applications, Springer. (under review)
D.9 H. Nyeem, W. Boles, and C. Boyd, Content-Independent Embedding
Scheme for Multi-Modal Medical Image Watermarking, BioMedical Engineering
Online, Springer. (under review)
D.10 H. Nyeem, W. Boles, and C. Boyd, An efficient watermarking scheme
for medical image applications, IEEE Transactions on Information Technology
in Biomedicine, IEEE. (to be submitted)
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